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ABSTRACT 
Factors Driving Financial Inclusion and Financial Performance in Fintech New 
Ventures: An Empirical Study 
by 
Miguel Angel Soriano 
Financial inclusion, or providing access to and active use of affordable 
financial products to the 2 billion unbanked adults globally, can facilitate individual 
prosperity, reduce poverty and increase economic development.  Digital technologies 
such as mobile phones, cloud computing, data analytics and blockchain are one of the 
biggest enablers of financial inclusion by making it economically possible to serve 
these individuals. 
This dissertation examined the role of digital technologies in financial 
inclusion from the perspective of new financial technology (Fintech) ventures serving 
the unbanked and underbanked.  Supported by strategy management theories, I 
identified key factors that impact the success of these Fintech startups, as measured 
by financial performance and financial inclusion.  I collected primary data on 63 
Fintech startups from Southeast Asia, India and Africa and ran multi-variate 
regression and binomial logit models to quantify the main effects of these factors.   
The results showed that founders with prior financial services experience, the degree 
of customer centricity in the company’s business model, and strategic partnerships 
with financial institutions and e-commerce firms, had a significant and positive 
correlation with financial inclusion (as measured by Active Customers) and financial 
  
 
performance (as measured by Annual Revenue).  A qualitative analysis of 4 Fintech 
startups from the data sample demonstrated that other factors such as scalability, prior 
startup experience, and type of product sold (pull vs. push) are also critical to the 
startups’ success, and provide insights for further empirical research. 
This study has immediate practical applications for VC firms and investors 
that evaluate new technology ventures in financial inclusion by providing a 
quantitative, data-driven methodology.  Finally, the results highlight that a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative insights is important to move research forward on the 
vital role that Fintech startups play in driving financial inclusion in emerging markets. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
 Financial exclusion, or not having access to formal financial services such as 
bank accounts, is a pressing and pervasive global issue that affects more than 2 billion 
people, or about half of the global adult population, according to the World Bank’s 
Global Findex survey for 2014.  The majority of the people that are financially 
excluded are the poor, living on incomes of less than $2.00 per day, most commonly 
referred to as the “Base of the Pyramid” (BoP).  This number significantly increases 
to 3.5 billion people if we consider the “underbanked”, or people that have a savings 
and/or checking account, but rarely use it, and do not have access to other important 
financial products such as credit cards and/or loans.  The problem expands when you 
consider that there are more than 200 million micro, small and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs) that currently do not have access to credit, representing a $2.1 trillion 
lending gap (Stein, Ardic, & Hommes, 2013).  The greatest prevalence of financial 
exclusion is in emerging markets such as Africa, Asia and Latin America.  According 
to the World Bank, approximately 55% of the adult population in Southeast Asia 
(excluding China) have no access to bank accounts.  However, in some countries, 
such as Cambodia and Myanmar, that number significantly increases to 75% to 80% 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper, Singer, & Van Oudheusden, 2015).   
Being excluded from the formal financial system means that these individuals 
and businesses have to rely on informal mechanisms such as pawn brokers, payday 
lenders and loan sharks that are often extremely expensive and unreliable.  Realini 
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(2015) refers to these individuals as “financial nomads”, since they live from day to 
day, paying steep prices for financial products, penalty fees and high financing costs, 
which perpetuates their status and prevents them from rising up the steps of the 
financial pyramid.  This situation is one of the biggest ironies in today’s world: the 
people with the most limited resources are the ones paying the highest fees for 
financial products and services.  Therefore, providing access to affordable financial 
products to the unbanked and underbanked has tremendous potential to help them 
improve their social and economic status. 
 It has been widely studied and documented that financial inclusion, or 
providing access to affordable financial products and services, generates significant 
benefits to the poor, marginalized and MSMEs, and is also an important engine of 
economic development.  Access to formal financial services and products allows 
households to expand consumption, manage risks and invest in durable goods, health 
and education.  Financial inclusion is an important policy issue that is being 
addressed globally by many international agencies, the private sector and government 
bodies.  The World Bank declared that one of its key objectives is to achieve 
universal financial access by 2020.  The World Bank has already received 
commitments and pledges from 32 partners towards achieving this ambitious goal.  
The G20 launched the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) in 2010 to 
carry forward work on financial inclusion, by developing a concrete action plan to 
accelerate financial inclusion through policies and regulations.  Governments around 
the world have made significant progress in incorporating financial inclusion 
considerations and strategies into their guidelines for banking regulation and 
 3 
 
supervision.  According to Klapper, El-Zoghbi, & Hess (2016), financial inclusion 
plays a pivotal role in helping to achieve the United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030.  In particular, financial inclusion facilitates the 
first SDG: eliminating extreme poverty.  Moreover, financial inclusion can also help 
reduce hunger and promote food security, which is the second SDG.  By having 
access to financial services such as credit, savings accounts and insurance products, 
farmers can increase their food production, make bigger investments and allow them 
to take risks which can lead to increased earnings (L Klapper et al., 2016).   
 Significant progress has been made in accelerating financial inclusion and 
increasing global awareness to this important issue.  In a 3-year span (from 2011 to 
2014), the number of adults globally who do not have a bank account declined from 
2.5 billion to 2 billion, based on World Bank’s Global Findex survey.  While the 
improvement is impressive, there is still a tremendous amount of work needed to 
reach the 2 billion who are still unbanked.  According to the Center for Financial 
Inclusion (CFI) at Accion, one of the largest non-profit organizations in the world, the 
use of digital technologies will be crucial to achieve full financial inclusion.  The Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation reiterates this statement, confirming that providing 
access to financial services through digital-based tools is extremely important to help 
people in the world’s poorest regions improve their lives and build sustainable 
futures.   
Academics and practitioners agree that advances in mobile phone technology, 
cloud computing, big data analytics and blockchain are revolutionizing the financial 
services industry, by allowing any individual to access financial services for the first 
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time wherever they are and whenever they need them in a faster, cheaper, more 
transparent and more efficient way than traditional banks.  According to Ericsson, out 
of the 2 billion adults that are unbanked globally, 1.7 billion have a mobile phone.1  
GSMA, a global organization that represents the interests of more than 800 mobile 
operators worldwide, states in their website that mobile phone penetration rate in 
most emerging market countries averages around 80% to 85% as of 2016, even 
though the banked adult population average in these countries may be well below 
40%.  Therefore, the mobile phone has become a key tool to access financial products 
for the unbanked and underbanked.  In September 2016, the McKinsey Global 
Institute published a report which is the first to quantify the expected economic 
impact of digital finance.  The report highlights that mobile technology can lower the 
cost of providing financial services by 80% to 90%, enabling providers to 
economically serve the BoP.  Moreover, the significant savings will lead to higher 
financial inclusion and boost annual GDP of all emerging markets by $3.5 trillion by 
2025 (Manyika, Lund, Singer, White, & Berry, 2016).  The report also shows that 
digital finance could increase the volume of loans extended to individuals and 
businesses by $2.1 trillion and allow governments to save $110 billion annually, by 
reducing leakage in spending and tax revenue.  Therefore, digital financial services 
through mobile phone technology will become one of the main ways to accelerate 
financial inclusion in the future.  The next chapter discusses in more detail the type of 
companies that are leading the effort in driving higher financial inclusion using 
                                                            
1 Mobile Wallets, Presentation at ADB Conference on Financial Inclusion in the Digital Economy, 
May 24-25, 2016, Ericsson. 
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technology, and presents the problem statement that will be addressed in this research 
study. 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem and Purpose of Study 
 
New technology ventures in the financial services sector, or most commonly 
referred to as Fintech startups2, are using technology to revolutionize how we do 
banking and all of the different financial products and services globally.  A small 
subset of these Fintech startups is helping to drive financial inclusion for the 
unbanked and underbanked in emerging markets.  Although there are different ways 
of driving higher financial inclusion in emerging markets, there are several 
advantages why these new technology ventures should take the lead in this effort.  
These Fintech startups can be viewed as social enterprises due to their dual goal of 
providing a social impact (through financial inclusion) and driving profitability.  They 
are more likely to develop innovative solutions in a faster manner than established 
corporations, and also able to quickly identify new consumer needs.  Given their 
entrepreneurial drive, these new ventures are adept at identifying gaps in the market 
and develop new business opportunities.  In addition, these companies are nimble and 
flexible and quickly adapt to changes in the environment, typically a lot faster than 
the larger corporations.  Although these new technology ventures are more 
innovative, they generally take significantly higher risks since they are fairly young 
companies which are just getting established.  To compound the issue, these new 
                                                            
2 Throughout the research study, I will interchangeably use the terms ‘new technology ventures’ and 
‘Fintech startups’ to describe these companies.  Please note that I am only addressing a small subset 
of the Fintech startups universe in my research study – namely, those that are serving the 
unbanked and underbanked in emerging markets.  The Research Methodology chapter provides 
more information on the data sample used in this research study. 
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ventures often lack significant resources to scale up their efforts.  Given these 
challenges, and the fact that the Fintech startups serving the unbanked and 
underbanked are essentially new technology ventures, it is highly likely that they may 
not succeed within the first 5 years of being founded.  There have been numerous 
studies in the last 20 years confirming this issue.  In 2012, Shikhar Ghosh from 
Harvard University published a study that looked at 2,000 U.S. companies over a 6-
year period, and found that 75% of venture-backed firms failed.  A larger study of 
11,250 U.S. technology ventures that were founded between 1991 and 2000 showed 
that only 36% of companies in the technology sector survived after 4 years, and only 
22% survived after 5 years (Song, Podoynitsyna, Van Der Bij, & Halman, 2008).    
Within financial inclusion, there are unique factors that these new technology 
ventures should have in order to drive higher financial inclusion and higher financial 
performance.  This research study will explore these factors for the Fintech startups 
serving the unbanked and underbanked by developing an empirical model to test their 
significance and quantify their main effects.  Specifically, the exploratory model will 
evaluate the likely combination of internal and external factors in Fintech startups that 
may result in higher business performance and drive higher financial inclusion.  My 
research study will attempt to answer the following questions: 
(1) What internal factors related to resources/capabilities, business models 
and strategic partnerships will have the biggest impact on financial 
inclusion and financial performance of Fintech startups which are serving 
the unbanked and underbanked? 
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(2) How does the market/environment affect these startups, and what other 
factors may have an impact? 
Many authors have studied the factors that drive the success of new ventures 
in both entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship literature, however, most of this 
research is based on case studies, anecdotal evidence and interviews of VC firms and 
startup founders (Macmillan, Zemann, & Subbanarasimha, 1987; Hall & Hofer, 1993; 
W. Gartner, Starr, & Bhat, 1999; and Gurdon & Samsom, 2010).  More recently, Lee 
& Teo (2015) developed the LASIC principles, which consists of five factors that 
they consider to be important for Fintech companies to succeed in financial inclusion; 
the authors demonstrated the presence of these factors through two case studies: 
Alipay and M-PESA.  Short, Moss, & Lumpkin (2009) performed a detailed review 
of the social entrepreneurship literature over the last 20 years and noted that there is a 
lack of empirical research with operational hypotheses, and in order for the field to 
order to progress, it needs to have more theoretically driven questions and more 
quantitative analytical methods.  To address this challenge, my research study will 
develop an empirical, data-driven model based on operational hypotheses that will 
determine the internal and external factors that have the largest impact on the success 
of Fintech startups in financial inclusion.  The main factors are supported by major 
theoretical frameworks from strategy management, namely: (1) Resource Based View 
(RBV) theory; (2) Social Capital and Network theory; and (3) Industry Organization 
Economics.  While this is an empirical study, it is exploratory in nature due to the 
limitations and challenges in accessing sufficient data on Fintech new ventures that 
are serving the unbanked and underbanked in Asia and Africa.   
 8 
 
1.3 Contributions to Academic Literature and Practice 
 
This research study has important implications to the academic literature on 
entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship.  First and foremost, it will expand the 
limited empirical research published in these fields.  One of the main challenges with 
empirical research in these fields has been the limited amount of data from startups, 
as well as gaining access to the data since it is mostly private.  I am addressing these 
issues by partnering with VC firms and Fintech startup founders to obtain the 
information that I need.  Moreover, there are subscription-based, secondary data 
sources which are now capturing some of the private data from startups, which I have 
accessed for this research study.  Finally, this research study will expand existing 
theoretical frameworks used in entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship to help 
explain the key factors that impact the performance of new technology ventures in 
financial inclusion. 
From a practical perspective, this research study will provide important 
contributions.  The empirical models developed from this research study will serve as 
a data-driven tool that VC firms and investors can use to evaluate Fintech startup 
investment opportunities in financial inclusion.  Currently, most VC firms use 
qualitative tools and past experience to evaluate the investment opportunities in 
startups.  The results of my research study will serve as another tool, which is based 
on actual data, that can be used by VC firms to determine whether to invest in the 
new ventures.  The Fintech new venture founders should also benefit from my 
research study, since it will provide a framework that they can follow in order to 
increase their chances of success.  In addition, the empirical model can assist 
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governments and policymakers on how to help social entrepreneurs in their ventures 
which are targeting the unbanked and underbanked.  Finally, the empirical model can 
be extended to other areas in the financial services sector, as well as other industries, 
specifically those which have similar characteristics and business dynamics such as 
the healthcare sector. 
This research study is organized in the following manner.  Chapter 2 provides 
a review of the extant literature on financial inclusion, digital technology and its 
impact on financial inclusion, and social entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship 
academic papers that are relevant to my research.  Chapter 3 presents the theoretical 
model and proposed hypotheses and their supporting arguments.  Chapters 4 and 5 
review the research design, proposed methods/analysis and results.  Chapter 6 
highlights illustrative case studies to support the quantitative analysis.  Chapter 7 
offers the main conclusions.  Chapters 8 and 9 discuss the weaknesses and limitations 
of the research study and suggest areas of future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 Financial inclusion and the use of technology to drive financial inclusion play 
a central role in this research study, so it is important to review the academic 
literature and research reports published in these areas.  Moreover, given that the 
small subset of Fintech startups that I am evaluating can be viewed as enterprises 
using technology to drive a social impact, a review of the relevant academic literature 
on social entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship is also needed.  The literature review 
is divided into the following three sections:  
2.1 Review of the literature published on financial inclusion, specifically 
addressing how it is defined and measured, its importance and evidence 
on how it helps fight poverty and drive economic activity;  
2.2 Review of the literature on the role that digital financial services play in 
driving higher financial inclusion, the different innovations and business 
models used, and empirical evidence on the impact on financial inclusion; 
and  
2.3 Review of the relevant academic literature on social entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurship.   
My research study investigates how new technology ventures can help drive 
higher financial inclusion, so it is indispensable to gain an in-depth understanding of 
what is financial inclusion and the relevant work that has been published on this 
topic.  Digital financial services have become a key enabler to financial inclusion, and 
the review of the academic literature showing how technology is solving this global 
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issue provides strong support for the selection of my research topic.  While extensive 
work has been published showing the benefits of technology on financial inclusion, 
Financial technology startups have not been studied in detail regarding the 
contribution they make to increasing financial inclusion.  My research study aims to 
close some of the gap in the literature, and focus on the different factors that these 
new ventures need to have in order to drive higher financial inclusion and higher 
financial performance. 
2.1  Financial Inclusion 
 
It has been widely studied and documented that financial inclusion provides 
significant benefits to the poor and marginalized, and is also an important engine of 
economic development.  Access to formal financial services and products allows 
households to expand consumption, manage risks and invest in durable goods, health 
and education.  Almost 40 years ago, Mohammed Yunus, the founder of Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, pioneered the 
concept of microfinance as a way to help the BoP to improve their lives.  An 
anecdotal example quoted by Chibba (2009) provides some evidence: “Sarah Doe of 
Liberia received micro-credit from an NGO to assist her to start a micro-enterprise.  
Her business did reasonably well, and, with an additional loan in a subsequent year, 
she was able to expand it. This (also) enabled her to send four of her children to 
school, open a savings account and build a better home for her family” (p. 2).  As of 
July 2016, Grameen Bank has made $19.5 billion in unsecured loans to the poor since 
its founding with a 98.8% repayment rate, and has served almost 9 million people in 
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Bangladesh, of which 98% are women.3  This innovative business model has inspired 
a global microcredit movement that has spread to over 65 developing countries and 
providing financial access to more than 200 million borrowers. 
Before I discuss in more detail the supporting evidence highlighting the benefits 
of financial inclusion in today’s world, it is worthwhile defining the concept of 
financial inclusion, how it is measured, the different barriers to financial inclusion, 
and the role of microfinance to address financial inclusion.  Over the last 20 years, 
financial inclusion has been defined in many different ways in the existing literature.  
In early academic papers, financial inclusion is defined indirectly in terms of 
exclusion, and was related to the broader context of social exclusion.  For instance, 
Sinclair (2001) defines financial exclusion as the inability to access financial services 
in an appropriate form, and it could be due to problems related to prices, marketing or 
self-exclusion in response to negative experiences.  Moreover, the author highlights 
that the financially excluded are closely related to social exclusion: the low-income 
earners or unemployed living in poor housing and/or high crime environments.  
Kempson, Whyley, Caskey, & Collard (2000) re-affirm this relationship between 
social exclusion and financial exclusion, and identify the lack of access to financial 
services as one of the core elements of social exclusion.  In their book “Financial 
Exclusion”, Carbó Valverde, Gardener, & Molyneux (2005) broadly define financial 
exclusion as the inability of some societal groups to access the financial system.  
Therefore, these academic papers and books make the connection that the financially 
                                                            
3 Grameen Bank, July 2016 Monthly Report. 
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excluded tend to be the poor and marginalized, and in most cases, live in developing / 
emerging countries. 
More recent research has defined financial inclusion directly.  As part of the 
World Bank’s Global Findex Database developed in 2011 to measure financial 
inclusion, Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, (2012) define financial inclusion simply as the 
number of adults that have an individual and/or joint account at a formal financial 
institution.  While account ownership is a useful top-line indicator of financial 
inclusion, others, such as Amidžić, Massara, & Mialou (2014) use a broader 
definition.  The authors define financial inclusion as “an economic state where 
individuals and firms are not denied access to basic financial services based on 
motivations other than efficiency criteria” (pg.5).  These definitions are useful, but 
they are not comprehensive in addressing all of the issues and complexities related to 
financial inclusion.  Sarma (2008) takes a more holistic approach in defining financial 
inclusion as a process that ensures ease of access, availability and usage of 
financial services by all members of society.  The advantage of this definition is that 
it views financial inclusion as a multi-dimensional concept, which requires three 
dimensions to be financially inclusive: accessibility, availability and usage.  The 
Center for Financial Inclusion at Accion, one of the largest non-profit organizations 
in the world, expands on Sarma’s multi-dimensional concept, and defines financial 
inclusion across five different dimensions (Conde, Bykere, Cheston, & Rhyne, 2016):  
(i) Access to a full suite of financial services – credit, savings, insurance and 
payments;  
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(ii) Quality of products and delivery – convenient, affordable, suitable, 
provided with dignity and client protection; 
(iii) Financial capability – clients are informed and able to make good money-
management decisions; 
(iv) Inclusiveness – everyone who can and wants, has access including the 
poor, women, and rural; and 
(v) Diverse and competitive marketplace – a range of providers, a robust 
financial infrastructure and a clear regulatory framework. 
Based on the different financial inclusion definitions presented above, I adopt a 
modified version of the multi-dimensional approach from Sarma in my research study 
– namely, I define financial inclusion based on three key factors: (1) providing access 
to financial products and services through digital methods to all people irrespective of 
their economic status; (2) offering products and services which are affordable to all; 
and (3) are actively used by customers.  My research study measures these 3 factors 
(accessibility, affordability and active usage), however, I selected active usage as the 
main measure for the empirical models.  The Research Methodology chapter expands 
on the reason for selecting active usage to measure financial inclusion, and how I 
operationalize it in my models. 
There is wide disparity in the way that financial inclusion is measured, with no 
standard method adopted as of today.  Measuring financial inclusion is critical in 
order to have a better understanding of the magnitude of the problem and what factors 
are related and/or affect it.  In addition, it can be a useful tool for policy making and 
policy evaluation.  Honohan (2008) was one of the first authors to develop a financial 
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inclusion indicator using household survey data based on the fraction of the adult 
population in a given country with access to formal financial institutions.  For those 
countries without household survey data on financial access, the author derived the 
indicator by using GDP per capita and bank account information for the entire 
country.  One of the main limitations of Honohan’s financial access indicator is that it 
only provides a snapshot of financial inclusion at one point in time, and thus it is not 
applicable for understanding changes over time.  On the other hand, Sarma (2008) 
constructed an index of financial inclusion for each country based on the composite 
values of the three main dimensions he defined: accessibility, as measured by the 
number of bank accounts per 1,000 population; availability, as measured by the 
number of bank branches and number of ATMs per 100,000 people; and usage, as 
measured by the volume of credit plus deposit relative to the country’s GDP.  The 
advantage of this methodology is that the data is more readily available and tracked 
periodically by country, so it is easier to compare over time and across countries.  
With a composite index of financial inclusion, Sarma was able to identify which 
country-specific factors are related to the level of financial inclusion.  Other authors 
have used variations of Sarma’s financial inclusion index.  For instance, Park & 
Mercado (2015) closely follow Sarma’s methodology in constructing a financial 
inclusion indicator, but they include five different measures, and each measure is an 
average value from 2004 to 2012 for each country.  The authors use their financial 
inclusion indicator to measure financial inclusion in 37 developing countries in 
Southeast Asia and more importantly, to determine the macroeconomic and country-
specific factors that affect the degree of financial inclusion.  Additional dimensions 
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have been used by other authors in constructing their own financial inclusion index 
such as: quality, as measured by disclosure requirement and cost of usage (Amidžić et 
al., 2014); barriers that lead to involuntary financial exclusion (Cámara & Tuesta, 
2014); and sustainability, as measured by different factors that determine whether the 
financial product offered is profitable to the financial institution and affordable for the 
customer (Kessler, Ikdal, Naidoo, Portafaix, & Hendrickson, 2017).   
As Cámara & Tuesta (2014) point out, a major limitation of the different financial 
inclusion indexes discussed above is that they are mainly based on supply-side 
aggregate data, which does not provide a complete picture of inclusiveness and may 
be misleading.  For example, a supply-side indicator such as the number of loans or 
accounts in a country can overestimate the inclusiveness of financial systems, since 
an individual may have multiple accounts or loans.  The authors are the first to 
develop a financial inclusion composite index using both demand and supply-side 
data sets.  The demand-side data set comes from the World Bank’s Global Findex 
database, the first public database that collects information from 150,000 nationally 
representative and randomly selected adults from 148 countries around the world.  
The Global Findex database was published in 2012, and it is updated every 3 years; 
currently, data is available for 2011 and 2014.  The data is available at the individual, 
not household level, which helps improve accuracy and comparability. 
The World Bank’s Global Findex database has become the most important, 
reliable and most frequently cited source of data to measure financial inclusion.  The 
database provides information on more than 100 indicators, including by age, gender 
and household income.  The data provides tremendous amount of information and 
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insights regarding financial inclusion around the globe.  Of the 2 billion adults that do 
not have access to an account at a formal financial institution, 46% of them live in 
developing countries.  This number is in stark contrast to only 6% of adults in 
developed countries that are unbanked (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015).  Digging 
deeper, the database also shows that the poor, those adults living on less than $2 per 
day, show the highest incidence of financial exclusion: 77% of them lack a bank 
account.  From a regional perspective, account ownership varies widely between 
emerging economies.  In the Middle East, 86% are unbanked, while in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 66% of adults do not have a bank account.  On the other hand, only 54% and 
31% are unbanked in South Asia and East Asia & Pacific, respectively.  Significant 
variations also exist within regions; for example, in the East Asia & Pacific region, 
China’s unbanked population is at 21%, but Indonesia’s unbanked population is at 
66%, and Myanmar is at 77% (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015).  It is interesting to note 
that 25 countries around the world have 73% of the world’s 2 billion unbanked – 
these countries are where the World Bank is focused on driving higher financial 
inclusion. 
The Global Findex database shows there has been a significant improvement from 
2011 to 2014 in the number of adults globally that have access to formal financial 
products and services.  In a 3-year span, the number of unbanked decreased from 2.5 
billion in 2011 to 2 billion in 2014, connecting about 700 million to formal accounts – 
the number is higher than 500 million due to population growth (Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2015).  Increase in account ownership was particularly strong in East Asia & 
Pacific, South Asia and Latin American and Caribbean regions, with each region 
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increasing by approximately 10%.  However, the gap observed in account ownership 
between gender remained constant at 9% - women’s access to formal financial 
products and services is 9% lower than men. 
While the Global Findex database provides expansive data on access to formal 
financial products and services for individuals, it does not measure financial access 
for micro-, small- and medium enterprises (MSMEs).  According to International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the private arm of the World Bank, there are 200 to 245 
million formal and informal MSMEs in emerging markets that do not have access to 
loans, but are in need of one, resulting in an estimated financing gap of $2.1 to $2.3 
trillion (Stein et al., 2013).  Prior research has demonstrated that MSMEs employ the 
largest number of people in aggregate, and generate the most new jobs (Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2011).  Therefore, it is essential to also address the 
financial inclusion issue for small businesses. 
Now that I have defined financial inclusion and detailed the different ways it is 
measured, an important question to address is: what are the barriers that limit 
financial inclusion? Theory suggests that barriers that prevent broad financial access 
can be a critical mechanism for generating income inequality and poverty traps 
(Banerjee & Newman, 1993).  By knowing the barriers to financial inclusion, it 
allows policymakers to design rules and regulations to potentially help reduce them.  
A large number of barriers and constraints have been cited in different academic 
papers and journal articles, including: lack of personal documentation, lack of 
financial infrastructure, limited amount of funds, high costs to maintain a bank 
account, lack of financial literacy and restrictive regulations.  The key constraints to 
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financial inclusion can be categorized between supply-side barriers, which are related 
to the financial institutions that supply formal accounts and services, and demand-side 
barriers, which are barriers related to the individuals (Beck & De La Torre, 2007).   
The main demand-side barriers to financial inclusion are the lack of formal 
identification and the lack of financial literacy.  According to the World Bank, there 
are an estimated 1.5 billion people globally who do not have a government issued and 
recognized document as proof of identity.4  As part of the Know Your Customer 
(KYC) process for opening an account at a bank, a proof of identity is required.  
Having a formal identification is essential not only to open a bank account, but also to 
gain access to important services such as health care, education and social safety net 
programs.  To address the lack of formal identification, some countries have 
implemented biometric systems to identify individuals – the most successful example 
is Aadhar in India, where the government has set up a centralized database that issues 
a unique number to all individuals and also records their fingerprint and iris scan as a 
proof of identity.  So far, Aadhar has been able to provide a digital identity to more 
than 1 billion people in India.  I will discuss in more detail the Aadhar system in the 
Digital Financial Inclusion section.  The lack of financial literacy has also been 
identified as one of the barriers why the poor do not have a bank account.  By 
educating individuals on the different financial products and the benefits to having a 
bank account, it is expected that it could result in higher account openings and usage.  
A study conducted in western India providing female microentrepreneurs with 
financial literacy courses demonstrated no impact on their savings behavior (Field, 
                                                            
4 The World Bank Group ID4D global dataset as of January 2016. 
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Jayachandran, & Pande, 2010).  Miller, Reichelstein, Salas, & Zia (2015) performed a 
meta-analysis of the literature on financial literacy. Their paper reviewed 188 journal 
articles on financial literacy, and it shows that most literacy programs did not have 
positive impact on financial knowledge or behavior. Moreover, where it worked, the 
improvement was minimal.  Beck (2015) offers an explanation of the low success of 
financial literacy interventions.  He believes it could be due to an omitted variable 
problem; specifically, there may be psychological traits that impact both financial 
behavior and financial literacy, which have not been uncovered and thus results in 
some interventions being more successful than others.  On a positive note, Beck 
(2015) points out there seems to be higher effectiveness in financial literacy programs 
that are short duration (“teachable moments”), and administered to individuals when 
they are in the process of making financial decisions. 
The key supply-side barriers to financial inclusion are the high costs of financial 
products and services for the poor and marginalized, and the lack of banking 
infrastructure in rural areas due to dispersed population (Beck, 2015).  The cost of 
setting up a bank account for the poor is extremely high relative to their income, 
which makes the provision of an account at a formal financial institution more 
difficult.  To add to the maintenance costs, most bank accounts require a minimum 
balance, and also charge flat fees for withdrawing funds, irrespective of the amount 
withdrawn.  The poor and marginalized usually have limited resources, and thus make 
smaller size and/or fewer transactions, which results in lower profitability for the 
banks.  According to McKinsey Global Institute, the annual cost of opening and 
maintaining an account at a financial institution in emerging economies is 
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approximately $20 to $30 (Manyika et al., 2016), which can be costly for the poor if 
they maintain account balances that are at or below these levels.  Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, & Peria (2008) performed a survey of the largest banks in 62 developing 
countries and document the variations in the cost of different financial products.  For 
example, the authors highlight that it takes more than $700 to open a bank account in 
Cameroon, which is higher than the country’s GDP per capita; fees to maintain a 
bank account in Sierra Leone exceed 25% of the GDP per capita in that country.  
While these figures may be a bit outdated, the cost relative to the low-income levels 
in emerging economies have remained very similar over the years.  For MSMEs, high 
costs in the form of high interest rates and the requirement to have collateral for loans 
are also major constraints.  In this case, due to lack of proper and typical financial 
information on these businesses, banks view them as high risk and thus charge 
significantly higher interest rates.  Another major constraint is the limited number of 
branches and ATMs in rural areas where the population is more dispersed.  Banks do 
not view it as economically viable to have branches in rural areas where the 
population is significantly lower than urban centers.  To address these supply-side 
barriers, microfinance institutions have emerged. 
Microfinance has been lauded as one of the most innovative and important ways 
to provide financial access to the BoP and microenterprises.  Microfinance is the 
provision of credit without collateral, in relatively small amounts and for a short 
period of time, to the poor and marginalized.  The objective of microfinance is to 
serve as a replacement to the informal financial arrangements that the poor use such 
as moneylenders and pawnshops to access credit, since they have been excluded from 
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the formal financial system.  The modern microfinance movement originated in the 
1970s when Accion in Brazil and Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, led by Muhammad 
Yunus, started experimenting with new models of lending to the poor.  The key 
innovation introduced is the concept of group lending, whereby borrowers set up 
small groups and each group member receives a small loan.  The repayment of the 
loans takes place at regular intervals, either bi-weekly or monthly in group meetings.  
The key aspect of group lending is that each member of the group is essentially 
responsible to monitor other members that they pay their obligations.  If one member 
defaults on their loan, then other members will be affected as well.  Stiglitz (1990) 
studied the idea of peer monitoring in microfinance, where members of the group 
have a direct interest in ensuring that no individual member defaults.  He found that 
this model reduces moral hazard and adverse selection, since the borrowers who are 
presumed to have better knowledge of one another, will not select to be in groups 
with potential defaulters.  In addition, he showed that by transferring the risk from the 
lender to the borrower, it leads to an improvement in the borrower’s welfare.  The 
concept of peer monitoring and joint liability lending is also related to the concept of 
social capital, where it has been shown that social capital among group members 
matters for default probability (Beck, 2015).  Loan disbursements and repayments are 
often taken in group meetings, which also provides additional repayment incentives 
through peer pressure.  Another feature of microfinance is the promise of repeat and 
larger loans if the borrower is able to pay the existing loans fully and on time.  
Academics have shown that this feature reduces default probability among borrowers 
(Karlan et al., 2009).  The microfinance model has worked well, with typical 
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repayment rates higher than 95% in most cases, proving that the poor can and will 
repay their loans. 
The microfinance sector expanded steadily in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching an 
estimated 31 million borrowers worldwide by 2000.5  The sector continued to expand 
rapidly, especially after Mohammad Yunus, the father of microfinance, was awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.  By the end of 2013, microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
had collectively served 211 million borrowers, of which 114 million were living in 
extreme poverty.6  From a regional perspective, Asia is the leader in the global 
exposure to microfinance, with more than 75% of the world’s microfinance borrowers 
are based in Asia.7   
Initially, MFIs were set up as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
received grants from different donors to fund for the microloans provided to the poor.  
However, the increased attention has attracted a large number of for-profit lenders 
and investors seeking higher yields, based on the fact that MFIs typically charge high 
interest rates.  Based on data from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX), an 
organization that receives periodic financial statements and operating metrics from 
MFIs in developing countries, about half of all MFIs had annual yields (a good proxy 
for interest rates) greater than 30%, while about 33% had yields between 20% to 
30%.  In his paper discussing the challenges and issues of MFIs, Ghosh (2013) 
provides an explanation for the high interest rates charged: “Rather than engage in 
                                                            
5 The state of the microcredit summit campaign 2015: Mapping pathways out of poverty, Microcredit 
Summit Campaign, December 2015. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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costly screening of borrowers, it is easier for MFIs to charge excessive interest rates 
to everyone, through which they can absorb any losses on bad loans” (pg. 1206).  
Another explanation for the high interest rates is due to high operating costs at MFIs.  
Operating costs are significantly higher than traditional banks, since it costs more to 
lend and collect a given amount through thousands of small loans than to lend and 
collect the same amount in a few large loans.  Rosenberg, Gaul, Ford, & Tomilova 
(2013) analyzed the data of more than 450 MFIs from the period of 2004 to 2011, and 
they found that operating costs for MFIs are typically 15% of MFIs’ loan balances in 
2011.  While trying to help the poor by providing access to financial products they 
need, unfortunately, the effect is minimized by the fact that the poor pay excessive 
interest rates, which may perpetuate their economic status. 
The rapid growth of microfinance in the mid-2000s led to a crisis in the sector.  
Ghosh (2013) summarizes key reasons that led to the meltdown.  One major factor 
was the emergence of multiple MFIs in the same area resulting in intense competition 
for borrowers.  In efficient markets, competition is encouraged and should be 
beneficial for customers since it can drive interest rates lower.  However, the 
increased competition between MFIs actually had several negative consequences.  
First, it reduced the incentives of information sharing about clients among MFIs, 
which indirectly encouraged borrowers to take out multiple loans from different 
MFIs.  Second, the competition also eroded the credit discipline of the MFI managers, 
due to the fact that they were incentivized to maximize the number of loans and 
clients.  Another important factor was overstretched management systems and 
controls as a result of the employment of staff that were not adequately trained.  
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Therefore, monitoring became more challenging and mechanisms to control for fraud 
were relaxed.  Finally, the conversion of MFIs to for-profit entities and the influx of 
funding sources for MFIs encouraged these organizations to take higher risks in 
underwriting in order to achieve higher returns for investors.  In 2010, all of these 
factors (as well as a few others) contributed to a scandal in the states of Andhra 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu in India, where more than 200 suicides were related to the 
aggressive sales and collection practices of MFIs.  The crisis resulted in reforms in 
government policy and regulations towards MFIs in many developing countries, 
which have made the sector stronger and more mature over the last 5 years.  In 
addition to providing group loans, MFIs have diversified into individual loans for 
productive and social uses (business, education, healthcare, farming), as well as 
providing savings and insurance for the benefit of their customers.   
A key question remains: does microfinance and other financial inclusion efforts 
really help fight poverty and lead to economic growth?  From a theoretical 
perspective, the answer is a resounding yes, and many researchers have performed 
numerous empirical studies over the last 15 years to try to prove it.  Several authors 
have summarized the different empirical studies on financial inclusion and its impact 
on poverty and economic development (Beck, 2015; Cull, Ehrbeck, & Holle, 2014; 
Leora Klapper, Demirguc-Kunt, & Singer, 2017).  These research papers mainly 
outline empirical studies that use randomized control trials (RCT) to assess whether 
different financial products have an impact on helping the poor and accelerating 
economic growth.  Development economists believe that this is one of the most 
adequate tools to use since it allows you to assess whether an intervention works 
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when compared to a control group (Cull et al., 2014).  In general, most studies have 
been conducted at individual financial product levels, and the impact varies across the 
different products.  While it is important to evaluate the benefits of providing access 
to individual financial products so that you can understand which may be most 
effective, to date, there have been no empirical studies conducted to measure whether 
providing access to a broad range of financial products to the poor can have a higher 
impact rather than just evaluating individual financial products.  Below, I provide a 
summary of some of the main empirical studies conducted for the four major 
financial product categories:  Payments, credit, savings and insurance.   
Payments 
Payments represent one of most basic and common transactions that any 
individual performs on a daily basis.  Payments are made when making purchases at 
retail stores, paying utility bills and taxes or sending money to someone (domestic 
and international).  Similarly, people receive payments for work performed (wages), 
for the sale of products and services or for government/social programs.  An 
important form of payment that is essential for the financial well-being of developing 
countries is remittances, or money transfers, which can take place domestically 
(within a country) or internationally (cross-border).  The migration of individuals in 
emerging countries from rural areas to cities in search of better jobs and opportunities 
has led to the exponential increase of domestic money transfers to support their 
families.  In most cases, the cost of remittances is high relative to the amount being 
sent due to lack of transparency, and take place through informal means, such as 
couriers who are entrusted to deliver cash to the family members in rural villages.  
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These informal methods are prone to theft and high charges (can be as high as 15% of 
total transaction size in some countries).  Likewise, international remittances refer to 
person-to-person transfers, but across borders (i.e., between two countries).  Donovan 
(2012) notes that international remittances are one of the largest sources of external 
financing in developing countries, and often serve as a lifeline to the poor.  
International remittances provide significant benefits to the poor by helping families 
raise their living standards and providing funds for education, healthcare and food.  
Indeed, there are more than 200 million migrants from low- and middle-income 
countries send money to their families back home, with an estimated 800 million 
people worldwide supported directly by remittances (Ponsot, Terry, Vazquez, & De 
Vasconcelos, 2017).  The flow of international remittances as of 2016 was $445 
billion, which has more than doubled over the last 10 years, and approximately 25 
developing countries receive 10% or more of their GDP from remittances (IFAD & 
World Bank, 2015).  However, one of the biggest issues with remittances is the high 
prices, which is mainly due to fragmented and inefficient payment systems and lack 
of liquidity.  The average cost to send remittances from a money transfer organization 
(MTO) such as Western Union, or a bank in Sub-Saharan Africa is approximately 
7.3% of the transaction amount. 
Cash is the most convenient way of making payments.  As Leora Klapper et al. 
(2017) point out, 59% of adults who received a wage payment, 91% of adults who 
received a payment for agricultural products and 48% of adults who received a 
government transfer payment did so in cash in developing economies in 2014.  While 
cash is ubiquitous and readily available, there are inherent costs related to safety, 
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storage and time lost.  For example, sending cash to family members in other regions 
via couriers is susceptible to theft and crime.  Moreover, it may require significant 
travel time to go to the nearest bank branch or money transfer operator in order to 
receive a government transfer payment.  Consequently, shifting payments from cash 
into bank accounts and digital payments has many potential benefits, including lower 
costs, higher transparency, faster transaction times and lower incidence of crime.  
Aker, Boumnijel, Mcclelland, & Tierney (2013) performed a rigorous study on social 
welfare programs in Niger, and they found that by disbursing the government 
payments electronically, it reduced overall wait time by 75% when compared to 
collecting the payments in cash.  Advances in mobile phone technology have made 
digital transfers to be accessible to the poor, even if they may not have a bank 
account.  I will discuss the benefits of digital payments in more detail in the Digital 
Financial Inclusion section of the literature review, and highlight more evidence on 
the benefits it provides to the poor.   
Credit 
Most of the empirical studies on the access to credit have been related to the 
effectiveness of MFIs to help lift the poor out of poverty, by providing them with 
small loans (also known as microcredit).  Performing systematic reviews of numerous 
studies of the impact of microcredit on the poor, Cull et al. (2014) and Leora Klapper 
et al. (2017) both highlight that the results from most of these empirical studies have 
been mixed.  Initial research on microfinance performed in the 1990s and early 2000s 
showed significant social and economic benefits, but were mostly based on anecdotal 
evidence and descriptive statistics (Banerjee, Karlan, & Zinman, 2015).  More recent 
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empirical studies and evaluations have shown more modest conclusions.  Bauchet, 
Marshall, Starita, Thomas, & Yalouris (2011) corroborate this point and mention that 
while increasing access to credit does not produce dramatic effects of completely 
lifting people out of poverty, it allows for the creation of new businesses and moving 
away from the consumption of temptation goods such as tobacco and alcohol.  Also, 
microloans help some households to smooth consumption – an important aspect for 
the poor which suffer from unpredictable and irregular income streams.  Banerjee et 
al. (2015) analyzed six extensive RCT studies across four continents and six countries 
on the impact of microcredit under different models, and they concluded that the 
effects were “modestly positive, but not transformative” (p. 1).  Stewart et al. (2012) 
conducted a broad review of 17 microfinance interventions globally, and they find 
mixed results on the effect of microcredit on higher income and more economic 
opportunities.  Although the evidence at the individual level is not very strong, there 
is evidence that microcredit provides positive benefits to microentrepreneurs by 
allowing them to borrow so that they can grow their businesses (Cull et al., 2014).   
Savings 
Savings is an important financial tool that allows individuals to set aside funds for 
future expenses such as large purchases, education, old age and potential 
emergencies.  Savings can also help households manage cash flow spikes and smooth 
consumption.  In developing countries, savings mainly takes place through informal 
means – one of the most common methods is through rotating savings clubs, also 
known as ROSCAs.  These clubs operate by having members make weekly deposits, 
pooling the deposits together and then disbursing the entire amount to a different 
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member each week.  Other forms of informal savings include cash under the mattress, 
jewelry, real estate or livestock.  However, there are a few issues with these informal 
savings mechanisms.  First, they tend to be risky due to potential theft and asset 
depreciation (in the case of jewelry and other physical assets).  Second, informal 
savings options may not be very liquid, due to high transaction costs and how long it 
takes to sell the different items to get cash.  Finally, the informal savings clubs tend to 
be community driven, and thus an individual’s savings cannot be transferred to 
another community, if the individual is seeking better opportunities elsewhere.  
Saving at a formal financial institution can provide many potential advantages, 
including lower risk of theft and curbing impulse spending.  Micro-savings, which is 
the ability to save small amounts at a high frequency in formal financial institutions, 
seem to provide a significant benefit for the poor.  Similar to microcredit, Cull et al., 
(2014) and Leora Klapper et al. (2017) have reviewed empirical studies of micro-
savings interventions to evaluate their impact on the poor.  One study the authors 
highlight is a field experiment in Kenya which showed that women market vendors 
were able to save significantly more when they were provided with a savings account, 
and as a result increased their expenditures by 38% when compared to a control group 
(Dupas & Robinson, 2013a).  The study speculates that by keeping the money in an 
account that was not immediately accessible, people are able to better resist the 
temptation to spend the money.  Dupas & Robinson (2013b) performed another 
empirical study where they show that using a commitments savings account, which 
require the saver to deposit a certain amount of money in a bank account for a 
specified period of time, can help the poor better cope with health emergencies.  In 
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particular, individuals increased their investments in preventive health by 138% when 
they were provided these savings accounts, as compared to a control group.  Pande, 
Cole, Sivasankaran, Bastian, & Durlacher (2012) performed a systematic review of 
12 micro-savings studies in emerging markets and they conclude that “innovative 
design of new savings products that increase the supply of savings and increase 
demand for savings by helping people address behavioral challenges were found to 
increase income at least in the short run” (pg. 5).  Overall, most empirical studies on 
micro-savings seem to have a more positive impact on improving the livelihoods of 
the poor than the studies on the impact of microcredit.  For the savings products to be 
effective, they need to be customized and tailored to overcome the behavioral 
constraints of the poor and marginalized. 
Insurance 
Insurance is an important financial product to help manage risks due to 
unexpected expenses from health emergencies, natural disasters or income loss from 
the death of wage earner, yet it is rarely used by the BoP.  One reason for the lack of 
use is that in most cases these insurance products are difficult to understand and are 
very expensive relative to the limited income of the poor.  Microinsurance, which 
refers to providing insurance for small amounts of coverage by paying very small 
premiums, has become the main way to provide insurance to the poor and 
marginalized.  Several randomized control trials offering weather-related 
microinsurance products to farmers in India and Ghana encouraged them to take 
higher risks by investing in higher return, high risk crops and resulting in higher 
income for the farmers (Cole, Sampson, & Zia, 2011; Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, & 
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Udry, 2014).  The insured farmers had higher total revenues more assets post-harvest, 
and they were 8% less likely to report missed meals when compared to other farmers 
that did not get weather-related insurance.  Empirical studies on the impact of 
microinsurance on the poor are fairly limited and little is known on the welfare 
benefits; therefore, more studies need to be conducted. 
In summary, financial inclusion provides significant benefits to help the poor, and 
it is supported by a wide range of empirical studies.  However, the effectiveness and 
impact in the reduction of poverty and economic growth varies by financial product.  
So far, savings accounts offer the biggest impact, provided that the accounts are 
customized, inexpensive and serve a specific purpose.  Equally, digital payments 
offer significant impact on improving the livelihoods of the poor.  Although research 
on microcredit has been the most extensive, its impact is only modest.  Finally, initial 
studies on insurance show promising results, but they are still fairly limited and more 
work needs to be done in this area.  As I will demonstrate in the next section, the use 
of technology in all of these financial products has the potential to significantly 
increase access to formal financial services to the unbanked and underbanked. 
 
2.2 Digital Technologies and Financial Inclusion 
 
Industry experts, academics and NGOs agree that the use of digital technologies 
will be vital in order to achieve the World Bank’s ambitious goal of full financial 
inclusion by 2020.  One of the largest supporters is the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation; they firmly believe that providing access to financial services through 
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digital-based tools is extremely important to help people in the world’s poorest 
regions improve their lives and build sustainable futures. 
 Advances in mobile phone technology, cloud computing, big data analytics 
and blockchain / distributed ledger technology are transforming the financial services 
industry, allowing people to access financial products and services at anytime and 
anywhere in the world in a cost efficient and fast manner.  CGAP defines digital 
financial services as providing financial products and services via mobile phone 
and/or online using any electronic instrument (card, mobile phone, internet) and 
where accounts can be accessed remotely.8  Digital financial services help overcome 
the major supply-side barriers to financial inclusion: the high cost of bank accounts 
and the limited number of bank branches in far-flung rural communities.  Mobile 
phones have become one of main channels for processing small-value transactions for 
poor people at low cost and at scale.  According to Roger Nord, Deputy Director of 
the IMF’s African Department, technological innovations within the financial sector 
is the most promising way to advance financial inclusion.  He states that: “Access to 
formal financial services is often difficult in low-income countries; bank branches are 
concentrated in urban areas and costs & fees can be high.  Financial technology can 
tackle both problems at once: suddenly financial services are available to anyone with 
a mobile phone at a fraction of the cost”.9  Overall, digital technologies are 
transforming the financial services industry in three main ways.  First, digital 
financial solutions are expanding access and reach to all customers, especially the 
                                                            
8 Digital Financial Services: The Current Landscape, CGAP presentation, January 2015. 
9 Leveraging Financial Technology for the Unbanked, by Rodolfo Maino, IMF Country Focus Blog, 
September 19, 2016. 
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unbanked and underbanked.  Second, digital technologies are significantly lowering 
the costs of providing financial services, making it possible to serve the BoP in a 
profitable way, which was not possible before.  Finally, digital technologies enable 
new business models, offering expanded services to customers and generating new 
revenue streams for financial service providers.  Therefore, both the provider and the 
customer benefit from it, creating a win-win situation.  In this section, I will discuss 
in detail how digital financial services drive financial inclusion through different 
technology platforms, innovations and business models.  Specifically, I will discuss 
the benefits and potential economic impact of digital financial services on financial 
inclusion. Then, I will provide an overview of the key role that mobile phone 
technology plays in driving higher financial inclusion for the poor.  Finally, I will 
discuss the main technology platforms and innovations that have emerged to provide 
access to financial products and services to the poor, as well as the empirical evidence 
on the benefits of these technologies, through the lens of the four main financial 
products: payments, credit, savings and insurance. 
Potential Economic Impact and Benefits of Digital Financial Services 
In 2016, McKinsey Global Institute published a report that is the first to quantify 
the potential financial effect of “digital financial inclusion”, or providing the 
unbanked and underbanked with digital financial services, in emerging markets.  The 
report crystallizes some of the key benefits of digital financial services by providing 
calculated figures and estimates.  According to the report, digital finance has the 
potential to provide access to financial services to 1.6 billion people in emerging 
economies by 2025, with more than half of them being women (Manyika et al., 
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2016).  The report also highlights that the widespread use of digital finance could 
boost annual GDP of all emerging economies by $3.7 trillion, with the majority 
coming from increased productivity as a result of digital payments, and the remainder 
coming from additional investments that people and MSMEs would make by being 
part of the formal financial sector.  Furthermore, digital finance would unlock $2.1 
trillion in new credit to MSMEs and reduce government costs by $110 million since 
there would be higher transparency resulting in lower leakage.  One of the key 
benefits of the digitization of financial services is that it can lower the cost of 
financial transactions by 80% to 90% when compared to traditional financial products 
from bank branches.  According to the McKinsey report, the total cost of providing 
traditional financial products for an individual in emerging markets is approximately 
$75 to $130 annually.  However, by using digital technologies, the cost can be 
reduced to $10 to $20 annually (Manyika et al., 2016).  Most of the reduction is 
generated from the cost of supporting money transfers which can be reduced by more 
than 90%.  One of the most powerful aspects of digital financial inclusion is the 
network effects that can further accelerate adoption (Voorhies, Lamb, & Oxman, 
2013).  For instance, it took M-PESA, one of the most successful mobile money 
transfer companies in the world, only three years to grow to 40% of the adult 
population that uses their service in Kenya, and achieve 70% of the adult population 
by end of 2015.  This adoption rate is exponentially faster than using traditional bank 
accounts, which usually increases in line with GDP growth rate.  Another advantage 
of digital financial services is the ability to quickly implement it, since it does not 
require any major investments or costly infrastructure.  The report concludes by 
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reviewing three building blocks that are required to achieve the potential economic 
impacts of digital financial inclusion: (1) Widespread digital infrastructure in the 
form of robust digital payments and widespread connectivity; (2) Dynamic financial 
services market, with an enabling regulatory framework that promotes financial 
innovation; and (3) New digital products that truly solve the customers’ problems and 
provide an advantage in cost and utility (Manyika et al., 2016). 
Mobile Phone Technology and Financial Inclusion 
Digital financial services through mobile phone technology has become one of the 
primary ways to accelerate financial inclusion for the unbanked and underbanked in 
emerging markets.  According to Ericsson, out of the 2 billion adults around the 
world that do not have a bank account today, 1.7 billion have a mobile phone.10  
Indeed, mobile phones are widely available and used in developing countries, with 89 
active subscriptions per 100 people (Neef et al., 2014).  The total cost of ownership of 
mobile phone usage is falling rapidly, and poor people increasingly view mobile 
phones as a necessity, not a luxury.  Mobile money is the main mechanism to drive 
financial inclusion through the mobile phone.  Donovan (2012) defines mobile money 
as the provision of a broad array of financial products and services through a mobile 
device (feature and smart phones).  The author states: “Mobile money could become a 
general platform that transforms entire economies, as it is adopted across commerce, 
healthcare, agriculture, and other sectors” (p. 61).  Using mobile money typically 
involves two different stakeholders – consumers and agents – and four different steps: 
                                                            
10 Mobile Wallets, Presentation at ADB Conference on Financial Inclusion in the Digital Economy, 
May 24-25, 2016, Ericsson. 
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(1) Consumer uses a mobile phone to add value to his mobile wallet (digital way to 
store the money) through a retail agent – this is referred to as the cash-in step; (2) 
Consumer sends money from his mobile wallet to someone else via their mobile 
phone; (3) The other person receives a text message in their mobile phone saying that 
someone has sent them money; and (4) The digital value sent can be converted to 
cash simply by visiting a retail agent who verifies the user’s identity and makes the 
switch – this is referred to as the cash-out step.  The process is relatively simple, more 
reliable than informal methods, and can cross enormous distances at the speed of a 
text message.   
Mobile money has been successfully demonstrated to serve the financial needs of 
the poor and achieve significant scale.  The most successful example is M-PESA in 
Kenya, which is part of the mobile network operator (MNO) Safaricom.  Founded in 
2006, M-PESA currently reaches at least 84% of Kenyans living below $2 per day 
(Costa & Ehrbeck, 2015), with more than 16.6 million active users and 101,000 
agents.  The company was able to grow very quickly, achieving 1 million active users 
in just 8 months (GSMA, 2016b).  Ten years after the launch of M-PESA, mobile 
money is commonplace in Kenya and an essential part of the country’s financial 
system.  The company has launched new products and services and has significantly 
expanded the ecosystem through partnerships with different financial institutions.  
The transformative power of M-PESA in Kenya is clearly visible in the financial 
access it has provided to Kenyans: while there are only 11 ATMs and 6 commercial 
bank branches per 100,000 adults in the country, there are 538 mobile money agent 
outlets per 100,000 adults (GSMA, 2016b). 
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M-PESA in Kenya is not the only mobile money success story in the world.  
GSMA published a report at the end of 2016 which highlights the state of the mobile 
money industry over the last 10 years.  According to the report, there are 277 mobile 
money services in 92 countries around the world, with more than 500 billion 
registered accounts (of which 174 million are active) and more than 43 million 
transactions processed per day (GSMA, 2016b).  The scale of financial access in 
emerging and low-income countries is enormous: more than 40% of the adult 
population in Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Uganda, Gabon, Paraguay and 
Namibia are using mobile money on an active basis.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, there 
were 277 million registered accounts in December 2016, which is more than the total 
number of bank accounts in the region.  In addition, there are currently 35 mobile 
money providers globally with each having more than 1 million accounts, proving 
that scale is possible in diverse geographies (GSMA, 2016b).  The spread of mobile 
money has been attributed to a large portion of the reduction of the unbanked 
population from 2.5 billion to 2 billion from 2011 to 2014 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2015).  Mobile money has also been demonstrated that it can lift people out of 
poverty.  Suri & Jack (2016) conducted a study over a 6-year period in Kenya on the 
long-run impact that M-PESA has had on the economic lives of Kenyans.  In addition 
to showing that access to mobile money allowed individuals to protect themselves 
against health and income risks, the authors found that M-PESA increased per capita 
consumption levels and lifted 194,000 households, or 2% of Kenyan households, out 
of poverty. The impacts were mainly driven by changes in financial behavior, and 
were more pronounced for households led by females. 
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Despite the success of mobile money over the last 10 years, the industry faces a 
number of challenges.  Mobile money services represent a two-sided market, with 
agents (supply side) and customers (demand side), and thus signing up both sides in 
sufficient quantity is needed in order to be viable.  The agents are an essential part of 
the model since they are the ones that exchange digital money for cash; therefore, the 
profitability of the agents is vital for the success of mobile money.  Maurer, Nelms, & 
Rea (2013) outline four inter-related problems that have emerged regarding the agent 
networks: profitability, proximity, liquidity and trust.  If the agent network grows too 
fast and saturates the market, this could lead the mobile money agents to have 
insufficient transactions to be profitable.  If the agents do not have enough liquidity to 
meet the customers’ needs, then it will negatively affect them.  Finally, if the agents 
do not build a relationship with the customers, then client trust will not develop and 
the number of transactions may be very low.  From the customer side, a key challenge 
is winning and retaining the trust of customers, where many of them are poor and 
have never used technology before.  The result is that even though mobile money is 
available to customers, they are not necessarily using it.  For instance, out of the 556 
million mobile money accounts that were registered globally in 2016, about 31%  of 
these accounts are active (GSMA, 2016b).  Mobile money operations need to create a 
clear and trustworthy value proposition that fits within the social and cultural 
practices of customers, so that they can trust it and adopt its use (Donovan, 2012).  
Another hurdle related to the issue of account inactivity is the apparent lack of 
interoperability between mobile money providers, which means that individuals are 
limited to transferring money to those who are using the same mobile network 
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operator (MNO).  Since interoperability is closely related to competition, this issue is 
already being addressed at the government level through regulations that require 
interoperability at different levels of the value chain.  Several countries in Africa such 
as Tanzania and Nigeria have introduced regulations that require interoperability.  
From an economic perspective, mobile money operators have to strike the right 
balance in terms of the fees they charge for their services.  According to Mas & 
Radcliffe (2010), many mobile money operators are faced with the trade-off between 
charging higher costs for their services to make profits sooner but not scale as 
quickly, or lower costs to reach scale and build a mass market at the expense of 
waiting longer to achieve profitability. Regulation is also a major challenge for 
mobile money.  The mobile money industry is at the intersection between the 
telecommunications and banking sectors, and thus faces regulation from both areas.  
In order to have a successful mobile money implementation, regulators must 
encourage these new technologies, while minimizing fraud and risk.  Successful 
regulation should be proportional and incremental, and involve the collaborative 
exchange between industry, government and the society (Donovan, 2012).  Through 
the lens of new technology ventures serving the unbanked and underbanked, my 
research attempts to empirically show that adopting a customer centric and 
interoperable business model will help drive higher financial inclusion, thus 
expanding the academic work mentioned above. 
Digital Payments  
Originally, mobile money was used to send money to others within the same 
country or topping up the airtime available in your mobile phone.  Over the last 5 
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years, mobile money has evolved into a more sophisticated proposition, and now 
serves as an access point to the basic financial products such as payments, credit, 
savings and insurance.  One of the fastest growing financial products within mobile 
money is digital payments – in the form of bill payments, merchant payments, 
international remittances and government disbursements.  In 2011, these transactions 
accounted for only 7.8% of total mobile money transactions; however, by 2016, this 
share has more than doubled to 18.8% (GSMA, 2016b).  Digital payments represent 
the second stage in the pathway towards digital financial inclusion (Radcliffe & 
Voorhies, 2012).  According to the authors, countries will go through several stages 
of market development to achieve a fully digital economy, with each stage serving as 
a building block for the next stage, and taking place over a period of time.  The first 
stage, basic connectivity, is having a critical mass of mobile coverage and penetration 
within rural areas, providing the “rails” for the use of financial products and services.  
Once the connectivity layer is in place, digital payments (Stage 2) can be adopted to 
make some of the most basic transactions, namely transfers between people over 
long-distances and remote areas, as well as making bill payments and government 
disbursements.  The subsequent stages deal with the adoption of more complex 
financial products through digital technology, such as credit, savings and insurance.  
Digital payments therefore serves as the initial step towards adopting other digital 
financial products.  Radcliffe & Voorhies (2012) believe that leading with digital 
payments helps overcome trust barriers that may prevent people from adopting a new 
technology platform.  Since digital payments are more immediate, their usefulness 
can be validated more quickly.   
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The benefits of digital payments have been well documented in numerous 
empirical studies conducted over the last 10 years.  The impact of these studies can be 
viewed from the perspective of different stakeholders: governments which digitize 
payments and the recipients of digital payments.  From a government perspective, by 
moving towards digital payments, it increases transparency by improving the 
traceability of government disbursements and having a more accurate record of the 
amount of the payments that each individual is going to receive.  In turn, this 
effectively may lower the incidence of bribes which may take place when cash is 
used.  A study performed in India shows that making social security pension 
payments digitally via smart cards reduced the incidence of bribes by 47% when 
compared to manual cash payments (Muralidharan, Niehaus, & Sukhtankar, 2014).  
As mentioned previously, another key benefit of digital payments is that it 
significantly lowers the transaction costs of government transfers.  Aker et al. (2013) 
conducted a rigorous evaluation of a social transfer program in Niger, and they show 
that the cost of administering the program is 20% lower by using mobile transfers 
than by cash distribution.  Another study in India shows that using digital financial 
services to transfer funds for a public works program lowered program fund expenses 
by 38% and also reduced corruption by 25% (Banerjee, Duflo, Imbert, & Pande, 
2015). 
From the perspective of the recipients of digital payments, it is clear that lower 
cost is the most significant benefit.  By having the disbursements of government 
programs and/or paying bills electronically, it can save the poor who live in remote, 
rural areas a significant amount of travel cost and time required to go to a bank 
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branch or government office.  In the same Niger study (Aker et al., 2013), the authors 
found that the time savings attributable to the mobile transfers for each payment 
translated into an amount large enough to feed a family of five people for a day.  
Moreover, digital payments are nearly instantaneous, regardless of the distance.  This 
is highly beneficial in emergency situations that lead to unexpected income shocks, 
such as natural disasters or health issues, where you need the money almost 
immediately.  An indirect benefit of using digital payments, especially for regular bill 
payments, is that it can help people build a “digital footprint” in the form of a 
payments data history which can then be used to assess their credit risk for a potential 
loan.  Since most poor people lack a credit history, digital payments of utility bills 
can assist in determining whether the individual is able to pay its obligations on time.  
In Kenya, M-Shwari, which is a combined savings and loan product offered in 
partnership with Safaricom and The Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA), offers short-
term loans to its customers based on their transaction and payments history with M-
PESA (Cook & McKay, 2015). 
Digital Credit 
One of the most significant effects of mobile money has been the ability to 
provide loans to the unbanked and MSMEs that did not have access to credit in the 
past.  As of 2016, there were 52 mobile money-enabled credit companies, up from 
seven companies in 2011 (GSMA, 2016b).  Most of the growth has taken place in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where the mobile money industry is more established and 
mature.  M-Shwari is a perfect example of a mobile money-enabled credit product, 
which is offered by CBA and Safaricom.  A similar product to M-Shwari, M-Pawa 
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was introduced in Tanzania in 2014, and as of May 2016, has 4.8 million accounts 
and disbursed $179 million to entrepreneurs – mostly young people and women 
(GSMA, 2016b).   
Credit risk assessment is an essential step needed to provide a loan to an 
individual or a business.  The bank will assess the individual’s or the business’ ability 
to repay the interest and principal of the loan within the agreed timeframe, by 
reviewing different data points such as their income, employment and other debt 
obligations that they may have.  Unfortunately, the unbanked and most 
microenterprises may not have this information available, and thus banks consider 
them as high risk and usually refuse to extend them a loan.  If the banks extend loans 
to these “thin file” customers, it is typically at exorbitantly high interest rates to cover 
the potential risk of default.  Therefore, the lack of data is a key barrier to provide 
access to credit to the poor and microenterprises.   
The internet, computers, mobile devices (phones and tablets) and Internet of 
Things (IoT) devices are generating a staggering volume of digital data – in a 30-
minute span, all of these devices will generate digital data equal to all of the written 
works in human history (Yaworsky, Goswami, & Shrivastava, 2017).  All of this data 
has powerful implications for driving higher financial inclusion, specifically by 
providing access to loans to the BoP, MSMEs and the underbanked.  New companies 
have emerged that are using varied forms and combinations of non-traditional data – 
mobile call data records, user location and movement patterns, psychometric data, bill 
payments, internet browsing patterns, and social media behavior – and analyzing it 
with predictive and complex algorithms to develop a new way to assess the 
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creditworthiness of the consumers and the MSMEs.  Since the cost of data storage 
and computing power has significantly declined and data analytics has become more 
mainstream, these new companies use their alternative credit assessment methods to 
offer convenient, quicker and lower cost unsecured loans to the unbanked, 
underbanked and MSMEs when compared to traditional banks.  The use of these 
digital data sources has the potential to help between 325 million and 580 million 
people in the world’s six largest emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, 
Indonesia and Turkey) gain access to formal credit for the first time (Costa, Deb, & 
Kubzansky, 2016).  A perfect example of using digital data to develop alternative 
credit scores and lend to the unbanked is M-Shwari in Kenya.  As mentioned above, 
M-Shwari is a savings and loan product launched by a partnership between Safaricom 
and CBA in Kenya.  M-Shwari relies on mobile phone records to set initial credit 
limits and their subsequent savings and borrowing to adjust credit limits.  In the first 
22 months of operations, M-Shwari has reached 7 million people, and disbursed 20.6 
million total loans with only a 2.2% default rate (Chen & Faz, 2015).  Another 
example is a company called Entrepreneurial Finance Lab (EFL), based in the U.S., 
and providing credit scores based on psychometric data in 16 developing countries 
around the world.  Unlike other companies which use mobile data, social media and 
internet data, EFL uses a behavioral science assessment to uncover personality traits 
that are predictive of credit risk.  The company partners with financial institutions to 
supply the psychometric assessments on their customers to ultimately create a credit 
score in conjunction with more traditional credit information.  Firms with different 
business models are emerging in this area, using a wide range of digital data sources 
 46 
 
to provide a credit score.  Some of these firms position themselves as pure data 
science companies offering algorithm-driven credit scores to the financial institutions 
which ultimately supply the unsecured loans to the unbanked; while others are 
developing the credit score and lending directly to the consumers.  However, the jury 
is out on which business model has been the most successful – it is still too early to 
know.  In addition, which kinds of data will prove the most predictive when 
evaluating creditworthiness, and which will be supplementary, remains to be seen 
(Costa et al., 2016). 
As part of the loan application process, every financial institution performs a 
Know Your Customer (KYC) check, which requires the prospective borrower to 
provide proof of identity.  While this requirement may be very easy for customers in 
developed economies, it is a significant barrier for the poor in developing economies.  
In section 2.1, I highlighted that there are approximately 1.5 billion people in the 
world that do not have an identity document, which excludes them from not only 
accessing formal financial products and services but also basic needs such as 
healthcare, education and social welfare programs.  Having a legal identity document 
is one of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) – providing a 
legal identity for all by 2030.  Also, proof of identity is a key enabler to other SDG 
targets, particularly those related to financial inclusion.  In fact, the World Bank’s 
Identity for Development (ID4D) Program has suggested that accessible, secure and 
verifiable identification systems could help expand financial services by 
approximately 375 million unbanked adults in emerging countries (Identification for 
Development Strategic Framework, 2016).   
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Digital identity refers to providing a proof of identity through electronic means, 
such as a numeric identification stored electronically, biometrics in the form of 
fingerprint and iris scans stored digitally, and facial recognition.  A digital identity 
can be more efficient than a traditional identification system since it may be able to 
process the identification check in a faster and more efficient manner than traditional 
manual checks, which can enable higher financial inclusion.  To date, the most 
successful digital identity implementation globally is the Aadhaar program in India.  
Aadhaar provides a permanent identity number to every resident of India, including 
migrants and citizens living abroad.  In addition to the unique identification number, 
biometric scans in the form of fingerprints and iris scans are stored electronically for 
every individual, together with a photo.  The advantage of the Aadhaar digital system 
is that it allows identities of individuals to be verified anytime, anywhere.  By mid-
2016, the number of residents registered in Aadhaar had surpassed 1.1 billion, or 94% 
of the Indian population, making Aadhaar the world’s largest biometric database and 
the first online biometric-based identity system in the world (GSMA, 2017).  Aadhaar 
has become an essential component to provide access to financial services to the 
unbanked population in India in a cost-efficient manner.  According to GSMA, the 
Aadhaar-enabled e-KYC platform reduces the cost of KYC process for mobile money 
providers from $0.60 per customer to only $0.07 (GSMA, 2017).  In addition, the 
Aadhaar platform is now being used to biometrically identify and authenticate 
residents that are eligible for government transfers, and using mobile money accounts 
as well as bank accounts to deposit the funds quickly and securely.  The success of 
Aadhaar has prompted different emerging market countries to explore the 
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implementation of digital identity systems.  In addition, different technology firms are 
working on a number of initiatives to provide global digital identities.  For instance, 
Microsoft, Consensys, and Blockstack Labs announced in June 2016 that they are 
collaborating to create a blockchain-based, open-source digital identity system.11  
Similarly, Deloitte has developed a Smart Identity prototype, which also uses 
blockchain technology. 
Over the last 10 years, new and innovative digital lending business models have 
emerged to provide loans to both individuals and businesses.  Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
lending is one of the most popular of these new models, achieving significant growth 
and widespread adoption globally.  P2P lending, or also commonly referred to as debt 
crowdfunding, is the matching of borrowers (individuals and businesses) who need 
money with investors (individuals, financial institutions) who have money, through 
an online platform or mobile phone.  The emergence of P2P lending has its roots on 
the “crowdsourcing” idea, where you tap into the power of the crowd to increase 
efficiency and realize tasks that would be difficult to accomplish by one individual 
(Brabham, 2008).  In this case, you are targeting the wallet of the crowd, bringing 
individuals and financial institutions that have capital to lend, and matching them 
with borrowers that need a loan.  While this concept is not new, the use of technology 
is facilitating the process and making it easier and more efficient.  The P2P lending 
platform allows investors to make fractional investments in multiple loans of different 
borrowers, thereby diversifying their risk.  Initially, P2P lending emerged in the UK 
                                                            
11 https://cointelegraph.com/news/id2020-how-blockchain-could-be-used-to-solve-global-identity-
crisis. 
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and the U.S. in 2006, and since then it has been adopted in most developed countries 
and now quickly growing in emerging markets.  In fact, China is the largest P2P 
lending market globally, with more than $100 billion in loan volumes as of 2015, 
followed by the U.S. at $36 billion and the U.K. at $4.6 billion.12  Although the 
volumes are still relatively low, other emerging markets are showing strong growth 
rates, with total volume of all emerging markets at approximately $1.5 billion as of 
2015.13  P2P lending has the potential to drive financial inclusion, by providing loans 
to the unbanked, underbanked and MSMEs, which the banks have ignored.   
There are two different categories of P2P lending, which are mainly distinguished 
by who is the borrower: (1) P2P lending, where the borrowers are individuals seeking 
a loan for personal use; and (2) P2B lending, where the borrowers are SMEs seeking 
a loan for their business.  In addition, P2P lending platforms have diverse operational 
models.  Jenik, Lyman, & Nava (2017) define 3 major operational models, which are 
typically present in emerging markets: 
(i) Client-segregated account = in this model, an individual borrower is 
matched with investors through the P2P lending platform.  The platform is 
mainly a matching mechanism, which evaluates the credit risk of each 
borrower to determine the appropriate interest rate to charge.  The 
investors will earn interest on their investment and have the capability to 
invest in many different loans to build a portfolio.  The platform does not 
                                                            
12 http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/150621476811901072/Session-5A-Kieran-Garvey-Crowdfunding-
Panel-21-9-16-final-final.pdf 
13 Ibid. 
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assume any risks related to the loan, and earns revenue by charging a 
service fee to both the borrower and investor for the matching process; 
(ii) Balance sheet lending = the platform lends directly to the borrowers and 
holds the loan on its balance sheet.  In this model, the platform makes 
revenue through transaction fees charged to the borrower and investor, as 
well as the spread in the interest rate (the difference between the platform 
cost of borrowing and the interest it charges to borrowers); 
(iii) Notary = loans are not provided by investors, but by partner banks and 
financial institutions through the platform.   
P2P lending platforms can provide significant benefits to the unbanked, 
underbanked and MSMEs in emerging markets.  The most immediate and obvious 
benefit is improved access to access to loans which was not available before, or was 
too expensive.  In 2013, the World Bank performed a study on crowdfunding for 
development, and it indicates that there are is an opportunity for up to 344 million 
people to participate in crowdfunding, in particular P2P lending (InfoDev, 2013).  
The report also highlights that by accessing loans through P2P lending platforms, the 
poor and marginalized can effectively build a credit history, which may allow them to 
get offers for loans from traditional banks in the future.  Similar to the benefits listed 
for microcredit, P2P lending offers the opportunity to access loans that can help 
households and businesses smooth out consumption and deal with unexpected 
emergencies and income shocks.  Another important benefit is the ability to borrow at 
potentially lower rates than traditional financial institutions and informal financial 
services, since the use of technology can make the process more efficient and a lot 
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faster.  For instance, a loan that may have taken 5-15 days to obtain approval from a 
traditional bank, may only take 1-3 days for approval when using a P2P lending 
platform.  Since P2P platforms are online, they have no physical presence.  To add to 
these features, most P2P lenders use innovative algorithms to determine 
creditworthiness of applicants, and have a streamlined application and approval 
process.  The result is lower operating costs which could be passed on to the borrower 
in the form of lower interest rates.  Finally, P2P lending platforms provide 
convenience, since most online platforms are available 24/7 from the comfort of your 
home.  Also, the use of technology makes the application, approval and disbursement 
process more streamlined and efficient.   
Despite the benefits of P2P lending, there are a few risks and challenges that need 
to be addressed so that this innovative business model can continue to scale and drive 
higher financial inclusion.  First, in most emerging market countries there are no clear 
regulations established yet for P2P lending.  Jenik et al. (2017) define a few 
additional challenges related to infrastructure and individual behavior.  Specifically, 
the authors mention that the limited access to technology may make it difficult to 
access the P2P lending platforms.  In many developing countries, access to the 
internet is still limited to urban areas, with limited availability in rural areas.  Finally, 
from a customer perspective, a major obstacle to overcome is the lack of general 
awareness and trust.  Due to the fact that P2P lending is a fairly new concept, there is 
still limited awareness from potential borrowers and investors on this innovative 
model.  Therefore, more education is needed to build the trust with the potential 
users. 
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Digital Savings 
 The mobile phone has become a powerful enabler to provide access to savings 
to the poor, whether it is through storing cash through a mobile money account or a 
dedicated savings account linked to mobile money.  The main benefits of using digital 
tools for savings over informal methods are higher transparency, lower costs, 
increased liquidity (since funds can be available immediately) and significantly lower 
risk of theft and/or asset depreciation.  According to GSMA, as of 2016, there were 
36 dedicated mobile savings services in 18 countries (two thirds are in low income 
countries), which has enhanced the availability of formal savings products to the 
poor.  In fact, the percentage of mobile savings accounts with a positive balance 
increased from 43% in June 2014 to 69% by the end of June 2015 (GSMA, 2016a).  
The two most common types of mobile savings accounts are: (1) Using mobile 
money accounts to store cash; and (2) Using a dedicated savings account at a 
financial institution linked to mobile money so that it allows users to top-up their 
savings account by using mobile money.  As GSMA highlights in their 2015 report, 
both types of savings account have shown significant growth over a 1-year period, 
growing from 22 million accounts in 2014 to 32 million in 2015 (GSMA, 2016a).  
The most popular and easiest method of savings through mobile for the poor is by 
using their mobile money accounts, or mobile wallets, to store cash.  Although 
growth in mobile savings accounts has been impressive, it is still relatively small 
when compared to the individuals which do not yet have a savings account.  A key 
challenge is understanding the consumers’ behaviors and ways they currently save in 
order to design products that truly meets their needs. Morawczynski & Krepp (2011) 
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performed a survey in Kenya in 2011 of the use of M-PESA accounts for mobile 
savings to get a better understanding on how consumers were using their mobile 
phones to save.  The authors uncovered that the respondents had different ways on 
how they saved with their mobile money accounts.  The first method was a temporary 
accumulation of cash in their M-PESA account before transferring the amount to a 
recipient.  Since there are no transaction costs for deposits, this alternative was very 
attractive to individuals.  In addition, by setting aside the funds in the mobile money 
account, rather than having it in cash, it acted as a deterrent from spending the money.  
The second method is referred to as “saving down”, and this involves the regular 
withdrawal of small increments of money from the mobile money account which had 
accumulated cash received from a relative or family member.  The final method is 
using the mobile money wallet to save for a particular goal, such as education, 
healthcare and other important life events including weddings.  Typically, the 
individual would develop a savings schedule indicating the frequency and amount of 
their deposits. 
 A study in Bangladesh evaluated the informal savings methods used by the 
poor in the country, and provided guidance on how digital technology can help 
improve the number of savings accounts and make the process more efficient (Parvez 
& Chowdhury, 2016).  The authors recommend that mobile savings products should 
be designed to be customer centric and experience centric.  In essence, these new 
mobile savings products should try to replicate the customers’ current experience to 
lower any resistance to adopting an entirely new process.  The findings from the 
study in Bangladesh confirm that psychology plays an important role in saving 
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behavior.  In particular, researchers have studied how limited attention influences the 
savings behavior of the underbanked in emerging markets.  Karlan, McConnell, 
Mullainathan, & Zinman (2016) performed field experiments in three developing 
countries where they showed that sending monthly SMS reminders to customers at 
three different banks helped them meet their savings goals, compared to a control 
group.  Therefore, tapping into the consumers’ psychology via mobile devices can be 
an effective tool to encourage them to save and meet their goals. 
Digital Insurance 
 Mobile phones have become an essential distribution channel for providing 
microinsurance to the poor, delivering significant benefits over traditional insurance 
products.  Essentially, insurance providers partner with MNOs to offer 
microinsurance products – the mobile phone is used to enroll clients, collect 
premiums, communicate with clients and insurance staff as well as capture data on 
clients.  By using the mobile phone infrastructure, the process becomes more efficient 
thereby lowering costs and reducing turnaround times for enrollment, claims 
processing and collection of premiums.  What makes mobile microinsurance (as it is 
commonly referred) so attractive is the ability to reach significant scale at lower costs 
when compared to traditional methods.  By lowering operational costs and reducing 
inefficiencies, mobile-phone-based processes make it possible for insurers to carry 
out low value, high-volume transactions in a financially viable way (Microinsurance 
Network, 2016).  The mobile microinsurance market has expanded significantly over 
the last 5 years.  At the end of 2015, there were 120 mobile insurance live services 
available in 33 emerging markets, with a total of 31 million policies issued 
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representing a 68% increase from 2014 (GSMA, 2016a).  The GSMA report describes 
three main business models that are used in mobile microinsurance: (i) Loyalty, 
which encourages the customer to spend a certain amount of airtime or keep a certain 
balance in their mobile money account to qualify for insurance; (ii) Premium, where 
customers pay a premium for coverage; and (iii) Freemium, which is a combination 
of Loyalty and Premium.  An innovative feature that makes the mobile 
microinsurance product easy to adopt is the ability to pay for the insurance premiums 
using mobile airtime, in addition to mobile money.  This feature provides 
convenience to the customers, since they can easily allocate airtime without any 
significant hassle.  In addition to providing significant benefits to the customers, 
mobile microinsurance has had a positive impact on the MNOs.  Specifically, mobile 
customers who are subscribed to a mobile microinsurance product tend to have 
greater average revenue per user (ARPU), a key performance metric for MNOs, over 
time when compared to average mobile customers (GSMA, 2016a).  The MNOs also 
benefit by reducing churn, which is the number of customers that leave the MNO to a 
competitor, as well as differentiate themselves from other MNOs by offering 
microinsurance as a value-added service.  In terms of mobile microinsurance products 
offered, the top 3 products are life insurance, combined life and health insurance, and 
health or hospital insurance.  Currently, there are more than 8 mobile microinsurance 
providers which have issued more than 1 million policies in developing countries 
(GSMA, 2016a).  In general, the mobile microinsurance value chain consists of the 
following players: 
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 Insurance company – these firms underwrite the microinsurance products, and 
pay any claims 
 Mobile Network Operator (MNO) – serves as the main distribution channel to 
the customers 
 Technology Service Provider (TSP) – technology firms that partner with both 
the insurance companies and MNOs to develop and design microinsurance 
products that meet the exact needs of customers.  These firms manage the 
client relationship, the collection of premiums, and the claims management 
process.  Effectively, these firms bridge the gap between the MNOs and the 
insurance providers, since they have a good understanding of the insurance 
industry (which MNOs lack) and the low-income customers (which insurance 
firms lack).  The two largest TSPs globally are BIMA and MicroEnsure, and 
they serve more than one third of all of the customers currently signed up for 
mobile microinsurance.  BIMA and MicroEnsure have become essential 
players in the value chain, by developing customized software platforms that 
simplify the entire process and get involved in the education of customers as 
well as the training of the agents 
 Agents – individuals who actually sell the microinsurance products to 
potential customers. The agents may be a part of the MNO, the TSP or the 
insurer 
 Prashad, Saunders, & Dalal (2013) evaluated the mobile microinsurance 
sector through a selection of 13 schemes that are using mobile phones in emerging 
markets.  The authors offer some interesting insights and key lessons for insurers.  
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For instance, the authors advise the insurers and MNOs to gauge the maturity of their 
insurance market and assess the customers’ perceptions in order to determine which 
business model to use (freemium, loyalty or premium).  Initially, it makes sense to 
start with loyalty-based business model that includes free insurance embedded within 
the MNO’s core service; as markets mature, then it makes to move to a freemium 
business model.  Although the mobile microinsurance market has been growing very 
fast, there are a few challenges.  One of the biggest barriers is educating the consumer 
on the benefits of having insurance, especially when explaining it to the poor who 
may also be illiterate.  Therefore, policies need to be very simple to fill out and 
understand (without the traditional exclusions, terms and conditions that may be 
irrelevant and confusing), and the communication to customers’ needs to be in a 
language they can comprehend.  By spending time to explain the mobile 
microinsurance products to the customers, it also helps build trust and credibility. 
Another major challenge is the distribution of mobile microinsurance, since a lot of 
insurance companies may have inadequate database management systems to cope 
with high volumes of information, analysis and dissemination.  In addition, in the 
rural areas, it becomes harder to track the receipt of premiums and track claims 
submitted.  TSPs can help overcome these challenges. 
 Empirical evidence supporting the benefits of mobile microinsurance are 
limited.  Beck (2015) outlines a few studies conducted in India and Ghana, where the 
use of weather and crop insurance through the use of mobile devices has led farmers 
to increase the plantation of higher risk, higher yielding crops which result in higher 
income.  Goldboom (2010) reviewed the empirical evidence on the use of 
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microinsurance by the poor, and although the studies were limited, the author 
concludes that mobile microinsurance not only helps reduce poverty, but it can also 
improve social inclusion and partially substitute for deficient public social security 
schemes.  In summary, more work needs to be done to empirically demonstrate how 
technology is improving the lives of the poor through the use of microinsurance. 
Blockchain Technology – Latest Innovation for Financial Inclusion 
 In the previous sections, I have addressed how technology innovations such as 
mobile phone and big data analytics, as well as new business models such as P2P 
lending and microinsurance, are accelerating financial inclusion in emerging markets.  
The effects of these technology innovations and new business models pales in 
comparison to the potential of blockchain technology to completely transform almost 
every aspect of our lives.  Blockchain technology is being viewed by many as one of 
the most innovative technologies that has emerged over the last 10 years; some argue 
that within 20 years, blockchain will disrupt society more profoundly than the internet 
disrupted communication and media (Hernandez, 2017).  Academics and researchers 
claim that blockchain will disrupt the financial services system with a cheap and 
secure form of banking, which does not have to rely on financial intermediaries.  
Certainly, blockchain has caught the attention of global institutions (banks, 
corporates), development organizations and regulators.  In 2016, IBM surveyed 200 
banks in 16 countries around the world, and roughly 65% of the banks expect to have 
blockchain solutions in production in the next three years.14  The consequences for 
                                                            
14 Leading the Pack in Blockchain Banking. IBM. September 2016. 
https://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/gb/en/gbp03467usen/GBP03467USEN.PDF 
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banks and other financial intermediaries can be massive; according to analysts at 
Santander InnoVentures, they estimate that by 2022, blockchain technology could 
save banks more than $20 billion in annual costs.15  In addition, more than $1 billion 
has been invested in startups that are developing different applications using 
blockchain technology.  Also, the tech giants such as Microsoft, IBM, Google and 
many others have blockchain projects underway.  The potential benefits for financial 
inclusion are significant, including the lowering of transaction costs for international 
remittances, providing a digital identity to the poor, and making it possible to track 
aid funds in near real-time to ensure that is being spent as intended.   
 Blockchain technology, a form of distributed ledger technology, is a vast, 
global decentralized database that is cryptographically secure and running on millions 
of devices – open to anyone.  The transactions in the distributed ledger are immutable 
and verifiable, therefore, making it transparent and easy to track.  Like the internet, 
blockchain is effectively a protocol upon which applications can be built.  One of the 
most powerful features of blockchain technology is the fact that it does not require 
traditional intermediaries when doing a transaction between two parties, thereby 
significantly lowering or even potentially eliminating transaction costs.  Dahan & 
Casey (2016) discuss the issue of trust in mediating financial transactions, and how it 
has evolved over time.  Since the early days of mankind, centralized trust protocols 
have evolved to keep track of exchanges of value between individuals and companies.  
However, these centralized trust mechanisms have caused problems periodically – 
                                                            
15 Blockchain: what it is, how it really can change the world. World Economic Forum Blog. June 2016. 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/the-blockchain/ 
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most recent example is the global financial crisis of 2008/2009.  Blockchain 
technology represents a new paradigm - decentralized trust - since the validation of 
transactions is no longer done by a centralized trust body, but by a network of 
autonomous computers which confirm and validate the content by following a unique 
algorithm that compels them to act in the common interest (Dahan & Casey, 2016).  
Another important feature of blockchain technology is smart contracts, which are 
software programs that automatically execute complex instructions when certain 
conditions are met.  These smart contracts are on the blockchain, and have the 
potential to significantly lower the costs of enforcing contracts and making payments.  
Tapscott & Tapscott (2016) discuss this concept further, by describing autonomous 
agents, which are bundles of smart contracts acting together as an application on the 
blockchain, as a way to eliminate agency and coordination costs, and could eventually 
lead to highly distributed enterprises with little or no management. 
 Multiple use cases have been explored for blockchain technology to accelerate 
financial inclusion.  I will describe three of the most important applications, which 
have gained significant traction over the last few years, namely: (i) Digital identity; 
(ii) Remittances and international payments; and (iii) Smart-aid contracts. 
 Blockchain technology can be used to create a digital identity for individuals.  
As discussed previously, millions of people in developing countries lack a legal 
identity, which precludes them from receiving social benefits and have access to 
formal financial products.  By developing a digital identity using blockchain 
technology, a permanent, immutable record can be created, which can serve as the 
main way to identify an individual.  The identity data remains the ownership of the 
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individual and individuals can give permissions on who can see what data for what 
purpose and for how long.  A wide variety of companies, both startups and large 
technology firms, are looking at ways to develop digital identity systems based on 
blockchain technology.  An example is BanQu, a Fintech startup led by Ashish 
Gadnis and Hamse Warfa, which is providing an economic identity through 
blockchain technology to the unbanked and refugees in order to drive social and 
financial inclusion.  The company first creates an identity for the individuals through 
distributed ledger technology, and then allows them to connect to others to perform 
transactions and effectively build their economic identity.  Another example is the 
partnership announced by Microsoft, Consensys, and Blockstack Labs in June 2016 
to create a blockchain-based, open-source digital identity system.16   
 One of the earliest use cases of blockchain technology is for cross-border 
payments and remittances.  Initially, Bitcoin has been used as the vehicle currency, 
and so far has demonstrated tremendous growth over the last 3 years, more than 
doubling from $68 million in 2014 to $212 million in the first two months of 2017 
(Gallo, Jumamil, & Aranyawat, 2017).  The advantage of blockchain technology for 
international remittances is the fact that it can significantly lower transaction costs.  
The global average cost of remittance as of June 2017 is 7.32%, according to the 
World Bank.  However, by using blockchain technology, transaction costs can be 
lowered to approximately 1 to 3 cents!  Another advantage of using blockchain is that 
the remittance process is almost instantaneous, whereas the traditional methods 
                                                            
16 https://cointelegraph.com/news/id2020-how-blockchain-could-be-used-to-solve-global-identity-
crisis. 
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typically take between 2 to 5 days.  Coins.ph, a Fintech startup based out of the 
Philippines, is a good example of a company that is offering a mobile, blockchain-
based platform to allow Filipinos to send money at a faster and more affordable rate.  
Blockchain technology gives Coins.ph the ability to facilitate remittances between 
individuals around the world without relying on existing bank infrastructures. 
 The use of smart contracts enabled by blockchain technology can be applied 
for donor funds to help people during a natural disaster, emergency relief or 
development programs.  The smart contracts can automatically disburse funds once 
predetermined conditions are met, such as objectives and milestones.  Moreover, the 
smart contract eliminates the need of middlemen and leakage along the way, which 
can make the process more transparent and efficient.  Due to blockchain technology, 
the aid delivery can be easily tracked, showing the location in the supply chain and its 
ultimate delivery.  An example of using blockchain for the disbursement of donor 
funds is Disberse, a startup which enables donors, governments and NGOs to transfer 
and trace funds through the whole chain, from donor to beneficiaries, by using smart 
contracts. 
 While blockchain technology can be a big enabler to accelerate financial 
inclusion, there are risks and challenges that need to be addressed.  At the moment, 
scalability of blockchain technology in some use cases has been difficult.  For 
instance, using bitcoin for the payment of goods and services can take approximately 
10 minutes, which does not work when traditional payments can happen in real time.  
Moreover, some of the use cases require users to be connected to the internet, which 
can be problematic in developing economies where most users do not have access to 
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the internet.  Finally, regulators around the world have taken different approaches on 
how to regulate blockchain and virtual currencies, with no consistent approach.  Some 
countries such as Bolivia have banned bitcoin, one of the earliest forms of 
blockchain, while others such as Russia and Thailand have become more open (Gallo 
et al., 2017).  Many countries, such as India, China, South Africa, Singapore and 
others have taken a neutral stance on the issue.  While these countries do not ban the 
technology, they have not yet set regulations and are experimenting with ways to see 
how it can help.  Philippines has taken the approach of understanding blockchain 
technology first, educate the public and then align the regulatory requirements with 
the needs of the unbanked and underbanked.  Overall, blockchain technology will 
continue to expand and it is expected to affect every aspect of our lives in the future. 
 This section has provided a comprehensive review of how digital financial 
services is helping drive financial inclusion through innovative solutions.  Empirical 
evidence confirms the significant benefits that technology brings to help the 
unbanked and underbanked in emerging markets.  New technology ventures are 
taking the lead in this effort, and while the literature highlights case studies of 
successful companies such as M-PESA, bKash, M-Shwari, no one has empirically 
investigated the key factors that these new ventures need to have in order to drive 
higher financial inclusion, while at the same time delivering higher financial 
performance.  My research study attempts to address this gap in the literature. 
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2.3 Social Entrepreneurship and Entrepreneurship  
 
2.3.1 Social Entrepreneurship 
 
Social entrepreneurship is the first stream of research that I review in this 
section, specifically on how a social enterprise is defined, how the field of social 
entrepreneurship has evolved and some of the key shortcomings and limitations.  
This field is relevant to my research study since I view the small subset of 
Fintech startups that I am evaluating as social enterprises using technology to 
drive the social impact objective of higher financial inclusion.  The field of social 
entrepreneurship is an emerging field in academia, and the literature is still at an 
embryonic stage; therefore, my research study can provide important contributions to 
the field, specifically as it relates to empirical studies.  Even though researchers in the 
field of entrepreneurship have extensively studied the key characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and what makes their new ventures a success or failure, there have only 
been a limited amount of empirical work published.  I will review the 
entrepreneurship literature and how academic researchers have connected strategic 
management theories such as Resource Based View (RBV), Network and Social 
Capital and Industrial Organization Economics to define key success factors for new 
ventures.  In addition, I will examine how different characteristics of a startup’s 
business model can impact the performance of new ventures.  More importantly, my 
research study will aim to cover the gap in empirical studies conducted in the 
entrepreneurship literature. 
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 The young field of social entrepreneurship has garnered significant interest 
within the academic research community over the last 25 years.  Short et al. (2009) 
conducted a review of the existing literature in this area and showed there was a 
750% increase in the number of academic publications related to social 
entrepreneurship from 1991 to 2009.  Although there has been a lot of interest in this 
field, there are a few basic challenges that need to be addressed, which demonstrate 
its nascent stage.  Given the wide variety of views of what is considered social 
entrepreneurship from the public sector, non-profit and for-profit organizations, there 
is currently no unified/consensus on its definition (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006).  
This lack of common definition has made it difficult to establish a theoretical 
framework which would further help legitimize this field of study within academia. 
 Various authors have offered different views on the definition of social 
entrepreneurship.  Initially, social entrepreneurship was equated with non-profit 
organizations, which help solve a social problem that the government or other social 
institutions have failed to address efficiently.  Over the last 15 years, the definition 
has evolved to recognize that social entrepreneurship is more than just meeting a 
social goal.  There has been a debate on whether social entrepreneurship is considered 
part of entrepreneurship, or it is defined as its own separate category.  Dees (1998) 
argued that social entrepreneurs are a subset of the general classification of 
entrepreneurs, therefore alluding that social entrepreneurs are very closely related to 
entrepreneurs.  Peredo & McLean (2006) agreed with Dees, offering a definition of 
social entrepreneurs that is very similar to commercial entrepreneurs, but the only 
difference is that social entrepreneurs pursue goals almost independently of resources.  
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Battilana & Lee (2012) offered a slightly different but somewhat similar perspective, 
describing the social enterprise as a hybrid between commercial ventures and social 
sector organizations.  However, Santos (2012) argued that, rather than being closely 
interrelated to commercial entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurship is a separate 
category, and social enterprises are organizations that play both a societal and 
economic role which is distinct from other organizations. 
To define social entrepreneurship, it is logical to compare it to entrepreneurship, 
and then try to identify the areas of similarities and differences. Abu-Saifan (2012) 
took this approach by performing a detailed comparison of the definitions and 
characteristics of entrepreneurs with those of social entrepreneurs based on what 
different authors have outlined in their past research.  From this detailed comparison, 
the author developed the following definition of the social entrepreneur: “The social 
entrepreneur is a mission-driven individual who uses a set of entrepreneurial 
behaviors to deliver a social value to the less privileged, all through an 
entrepreneurially oriented entity that is financially independent, self-sufficient or 
sustainable” (p. 25).  The author goes a step further by delineating boundaries for 
what encompasses social entrepreneurship.  He maintains that social entrepreneurs 
operate within two business strategies: 
 Non-profit with earned income strategies - refers to organizations that are set 
up as non-profit in structure and mainly provide social impact.  Profits 
generated are secondary priority, and are used to provide more social impact 
 For-profit with mission-driven strategies - refers to organizations that are for-
profit in structure, but also provide a social impact.  This dual goal makes the 
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organization financially independent (i.e., does not rely on grants or charitable 
donations), and the founders/shareholders benefit from a return on their 
investment 
Seelos & Mair (2005) concur with Abu-Saifan’s definition, and they provide their 
own view of social entrepreneurship: "combining the resources of traditional 
entrepreneurship with a mission to change society" (p. 241).  The authors view social 
entrepreneurship as essential because it serves the unmet needs for people who are 
poor and cannot afford different services, or the services that the government 
provides are inefficient/lacking.  Social entrepreneurs create novel business models, 
organizational structures and strategies for brokering between very limited and 
disparate resources to create social value.  Effectively, social entrepreneurs have a 
priority to create social value, but it is tightly coupled with economic value creation.  
My research study views Fintech startups that are serving the unbanked and 
underbanked as social enterprises, having the same characteristics as outlined 
above by Seelos & Mair and Abu-Saifan – specifically, they are for-profit ventures 
with mission-driven strategies, which have a dual goal of creating social and 
economic value.  This definition of social entrepreneurship has received the most 
attention over the last few years and has become widely accepted by investors and 
shareholders, since it offers a social value without sacrificing economic benefits.   
 The wide variety of definitions of social entrepreneurship has made it 
challenging to develop theoretical frameworks that can help determine the 
antecedents and consequences that impact this field, which results in a lack of 
empirical research.  In fact, most studies that have been conducted over the last 25 
 68 
 
years have been qualitative in nature, using case studies and interviews.  In their 
review of the social entrepreneurship literature published from 1989 to 2009, Short et 
al. (2009) found that 72 out of 152 articles published were empirical in nature.  
However, out of the 72 empirical articles, only two of them had operational 
hypotheses that could be rigorously tested.  The limited number of studies with 
operational hypotheses makes it very difficult to determine the potential antecedents 
of social entrepreneurship, as well as the factors that may impact the performance of 
social enterprises.  A recent study published by Martinez & Krauss (2015) is one of 
the few papers that addresses the dearth of empirical research with operational 
hypotheses in the social entrepreneurship area, and is highly relevant to my research 
study.  The authors attempt to develop causal drivers for financial inclusion at the 
BoP by analyzing microfinance data for 109 countries from 2003 to 2012.  The 
authors equate microfinance penetration rate with financial inclusion and develop a 
quantile regression model using measurable variables.  Some of the key findings from 
this study are that the drivers of financial inclusion vary across different stages of 
market development, and technology can help overcome entry barriers and enable 
higher financial inclusion.  Similar to Martinez and Krauss' study, my research study 
will develop a model using regression analysis that can help quantify the factors 
impacting financial inclusion, where financial inclusion is a key measure of success.  
However, my study will only focus on technology-based ventures given the critical 
role that technology is playing to expand financial inclusion.  More empirical 
research in social entrepreneurship is needed, and my research study aims to close 
this gap by developing an empirical, data-driven model to help understand the main 
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factors that impact the financial performance and social impact of new technology 
ventures which are targeting the financial inclusion area.  Specifically, I plan to 
operationalize different factors, develop formal hypotheses and test them using 
regression analysis to determine which factors have the largest impact on new venture 
performance and financial inclusion.  My research expands on the limited 
empirical work on social entrepreneurship, but does not necessarily address any 
social factors that these new ventures need to have in order to drive higher 
financial inclusion. 
2.3.2 Entrepreneurship 
 
Understanding what drives the success of new ventures is an important part of 
the academic research published in the field of entrepreneurship.  The reason is 
straight forward: most new ventures fail, so it is essential to identify what factors lead 
to their success since it has important implications for entrepreneurs, as well as their 
advisors and investors.  The research on the success factors of new ventures has 
evolved over the last 40 years, with initial studies laying out theoretical frameworks 
for the factors that impact new venture performance (Gartner, 1985; Sandberg & 
Hofer, 1987; W. Gartner, Starr, & Bhat, 1999; and Chrisman, Bauerschmidt, & Hofer, 
1998) to empirical studies that develop formal hypotheses and detailed models to try 
to predict the performance of new ventures (C. Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001; Adcroft, 
Lasch, Le Roy, & Yami, 2007; Jian, Jun, Yuan, & Shude, 2010; and Miloud, 
Aspelund, & Cabrol, 2012).  Given the extensive number of publications on success 
factors for new ventures, a number of issues have become apparent, which can 
undermine the validity of some of the studies.  Cooper (1993) outlined some of these 
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challenges, such as the great variation of study designs, different measurements and 
methodologies used, variety of performance measures used to measure success, and 
the lack of well-developed theoretical frameworks to try to explain causality.  These 
issues make it difficult to compare and interpret prior research publications, leading 
to inconsistent and contradictory results.  Frese, Bausch, Schmidt, Rauch, & Kabst 
(2012) introduced the concept of evidence-based entrepreneurship, which encourages 
the use of meta-analyses, as a way to solve some of these issues.  A data-driven, 
empirical approach, evidence-based entrepreneurship uses meta-analyses in 
entrepreneurship research to establish relationships which can then be summarized in 
objective theories that can be applied to practice.  Song et al. (2008) is an example of 
a recent meta-analysis which evaluated 31 empirical studies on success factors in new 
ventures.  Out of 24 factors that appeared in the different studies, 8 of them were 
found to significantly impact new venture performance.  Moreover, the authors were 
able to develop a theoretical framework of new entrepreneurial firm performance 
based on their findings.  Another meta-analysis on success factors for new ventures 
was conducted by Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch (2011), where the authors 
reviewed 70 empirical studies on the effects of human capital on new venture 
performance.  The research showed that the outcomes of human capital (knowledge, 
skills) had a more significant effect on new venture performance than the investments 
in human capital (education, experience).  The concept of evidence-based 
entrepreneurship makes sense, however, the limited number of empirical studies on 
success factors for startups still remains an issue.  Although my research study will 
not use a meta-analysis, I will extend the limited entrepreneurship literature on 
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empirical studies by using a data-driven approach in my research design to minimize 
some of the challenges presented above.  Specifically, I plan to operationalize the 
factors that lead to the success of new ventures with variables that can be measured 
objectively, as well as use secondary data sources to collect and verify data on the 
new ventures. 
A wide variety of factors that can impact the success of new technology 
ventures have been evaluated in the entrepreneurship literature.  In most cases, 
authors have organized the factors into different categories.  The categorization 
provides a multi-level conceptual framework for describing new venture creation, 
which integrates the major perspectives in entrepreneurship research (W. B. Gartner, 
1985).  Applying one or more of these academic theoretical frameworks to explain 
the factors that lead to the success of new technology ventures, using different 
groupings/categories, has been popular among the entrepreneurship literature (Roure 
& Keeley, 1990; Herron & Robinson, 1993; Chrisman, Bauerschmidt, & Hofer, 1998; 
C. Lee et al., 2001; and Miloud, Aspelund, & Cabrol, 2012).  The multi-level 
frameworks are based on different firm-level theories such as the resource-based view 
of the firm, social capital and network theory and industry organization economics 
(Miloud et al., 2012).  My research study adopts the approach of a multi-level 
framework for the factors that impact the success of new technology ventures in 
financial inclusion, which is then used to develop the theoretical model and 
operational hypotheses.   
My research study defines 4 major categories of factors that impact the 
success of Fintech startups serving the unbanked and underbanked: (1) Resources / 
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Capabilities, (2) Business Models, (3) Networks & Strategic Partnerships, and (4) 
Market / Environment.  These categories have been studied in prior academic 
research and are supported by the Resource Based View (RBV) theory, Social Capital 
and Network theory and Industry Organization (IO) economics.  This approach is 
similar to the research study from Miloud et al. (2012), where the authors show these 
three theories look at firm performance from different perspectives.  Specifically, 
RBV views the firm as having unique resources which can lead to a competitive 
advantage and thus drive higher value.  On the other hand, industry organization 
economics focuses on the external factors such as the market and industry, and how 
these factors impact business performance.  Finally, network theory serves as glue 
between these two bookends, since it evaluates how external relationships contribute 
to a firm’s strategy and ultimately its business performance. 
The Resource Based View (RBV) theory of strategy management has been 
applied to new ventures by numerous academic researchers.  RBV theory views the 
firm as a collection of resources, and those resources that are inimitable, scarce and 
imperfectly tradeable provide a competitive advantage when the firm is able to 
exploit them in the external environment (Barney, 1991).  According to C. Lee, Lee, 
& Pennings (2001), RBV suggests that startups pursue entrepreneurial strategies that 
focus on the accumulation of intangible resources in order to grow and survive.  
Some of the firm specific resources refer to the attributes of the founder and founding 
team, which assume that the new venture is an extension of the founder.  However, 
other studies cover characteristics of the startup as a whole, such as entrepreneurial 
orientation, technological capabilities and financial resources.  Out of the different 
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resources mentioned above, most entrepreneurship researchers agree that the 
characteristics of the founder and the venture team play a critical role in the success 
of new technology ventures.  In fact, within the field of entrepreneurship research, 
more empirical studies involving characteristics of the entrepreneur have been 
conducted than have almost any other kind (Churchill & Lewis, 1983).  Macmillan, 
Zemann, & Subbanarasimha, 1987 famously quoted: "There is no question that 
irrespective of the horse (product), horse race (market), or odds (financial criteria), it 
is the jockey (entrepreneur) who fundamentally determines whether the venture 
capitalist will place a bet at all." (pg. 119) 
Some of the main factors related to the founder and founding team include: 
 Psychological and behavioral characteristics of the founders (Kakati, 
2003;Timmons & Spinelli, 1999; Groenewegen & de Langen, 2012; 
and Schwarzkopf, 2016) 
 Relevant industry and prior startup experience (A. Zacharakis & 
Shepherd, 2005; Song, Podoynitsyna, Van Der Bij, & Halman, 2008; 
Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2011; and Miloud, Aspelund, & 
Cabrol, 2012) 
 Founding team size (Song, Podoynitsyna, Van Der Bij, & Halman, 
2008; and Schwarzkopf, 2016) 
Although the psychological and behavioral characteristics of founders have been 
shown to be important in determining new venture success, one limitation of my 
research study will be the fact that I do not study these factors.  Similar to Adcroft, 
Lasch, Le Roy, & Yami (2007), I argue that these behavioral characteristics are 
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already embedded in the different entrepreneurs when they start up new technology 
ventures, therefore, it is unlikely that there will be significant differences observed 
between new ventures, resulting in minimal or no impact on new venture 
performance.  
Social capital and network theory suggests that a firm’s networks and 
partnerships are a large contributor to its performance (Leenders & Gabbay, 1999).  
According to Dubini & Aldrich (1991), the entrepreneur’s network will influence the 
start, growth and expansion of new ventures.  Essentially, the more developed the 
network, the easier it will be for the entrepreneur to start and grow their business.  In 
addition, the network is important since it allows the entrepreneur to search for new 
opportunities and gain access to new resources at potentially lower prices than if they 
were to pursue them on their own.  T. E. Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels (1999) highlight 
that the entrepreneur’s network can also add legitimacy to the new venture, which is 
essential for companies that are starting and have limited track record.  Additional 
benefits from networks include management know-how, trust, and connections to 
more resources (i.e. financial and technological).  In a study of biotechnology 
startups, Zheng, Liu, & George (2010) demonstrate that a firm’s network influences 
its performance, and ultimately impacts its valuation.  Essentially, the quantity and 
quality of network connections for a startup are important factors that are used by VC 
firms to value them.  Network size plays an important role in new venture 
performance and valuation; Deeds & Hill (1996) found that the larger the size of the 
network, the more benefits accrue to the new venture.  Miloud, Aspelund, & Cabrol 
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(2012) confirm these results in their empirical study by showing that network size of 
a new venture is positively related to its valuation by VC firms. 
Industry organization economics theory brings an external perspective by 
looking at the industry conditions in which a new venture competes.  Specifically, 
academic studies focus on the market structure and key exogenous factors, which 
may be outside of the company’s control, and may influence the startups’ 
performance.  In their study, Miloud et al. (2012) showed how the industry growth 
rate and degree of product differentiation in the market positively impact the 
valuation of new ventures.  In addition to these two factors, other academic 
researchers have demonstrated that additional factors have a significant impact on 
new venture success: 
 Market growth rate:  MacMillan et al. (1986); W. Gartner et al. (1999); 
Song et al. (2008) 
 Industry structure:  Sandberg & Hofer (1987); Miloud et al. (2012) 
 Competition intensity:  Roure & Keeley (1990); Zahra & Bogner 
(2000) 
 Technology Infrastructure:  Martinez & Krauss (2015) 
While I have discussed the extensive literature that is related to success factors 
for new ventures, I have not covered the research on the factors that can lead to the 
failure of startups, since the academic literature in this area is limited to non-existent.  
One potential explanation is that most authors believe that if any or some of the 
factors of success they have outlined are not met, this implicitly means that the new 
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venture may not succeed.  A recent study published in Harvard Business Review 
(Onyemah, Pesquera, & Ali, 2013) highlights the key mistakes that entrepreneurs 
often make, which may lead to the demise of their startups.  Another interesting study 
looked at the different perspectives between VC firms and founders on what leads 
new ventures to fail (A. L. Zacharakis, Meyer, & DeCastro, 1999).  The authors 
found that the perceptions of the entrepreneur regarding the factors of failure were 
quite different than the perceptions of VC firms.  While my research study will try to 
incorporate failed new ventures as part of the research design in order to determine 
whether the lack of a success factor is truly leading to failures, it is important to note 
that there is a survivorship bias in the data for new ventures.  Therefore, this will be a 
limitation which can be addressed in subsequent research studies. 
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Chapter 3: Research Hypotheses and Model 
 
This chapter elaborates on the theoretical framework for the empirical model 
and presents the different hypotheses that I plan to test. 
3.1 Definition of Success in Research Study 
 
Before I present the theoretical framework for the empirical model, I first 
define the concept of success for Fintech startups in financial inclusion that I use in 
my research study.  Success is a vague term, which is hard to define and can take 
many different meanings.  Although some authors have developed subjective 
assessments of success, such as likelihood of success (A. Zacharakis & Shepherd, 
2005; Chrisman et al., 1998), employee satisfaction (R. Stuart & Abetti, 1987), or 
likelihood of VC investment (Hall & Hofer, 1993), many academic researchers in 
entrepreneurship have equated success to a new venture’s performance, and 
have used a wide variety of objective measures to quantify it.  The advantage of 
objective measures is that they are easily identifiable and leave less room for 
misinterpretation.  Predominantly, the academic literature has measured new venture 
performance, and hence success, by looking at financial, return and growth measures.  
However, survival has also been viewed as a measure of success for technology 
startups by some academic papers (W. Gartner et al., 1999).  Other authors (Cooper, 
1993) argue that using survival as a measure of success is misleading, since a firm 
may be able to marginally survive, but without delivering any performance.  Given 
that there are numerous performance measures that have been used to equate to 
success, it is difficult to determine which one may be the most effective.  To 
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overcome the deficiency in relying in just one performance measure, many authors 
have used a combination of different measures in their models.  For instance, Kakati 
(2003) used 7 performance measures in their analysis: 5 financial measures and 2 
return measures.  My research study will follow the approach of a combination of 
different factors in measuring the success of Fintech startups. 
As discussed in the Literature Review chapter, I view Fintech startups that are 
serving the unbanked and underbanked as enterprises founded by social entrepreneurs 
which have a dual objective: (1) Financial Performance and (2) Social Impact.  
Specifically, I follow the definition of social entrepreneurs developed by Abu-Saifan 
(2012): “The social entrepreneur is a mission-driven individual who uses a set of 
entrepreneurial behaviors to deliver a social value to the less privileged, all through 
an entrepreneurially oriented entity that is financially independent, self-sufficient, or 
sustainable” (p. 25).  Hence, I propose that the Fintech startups in my research 
study are for-profit new ventures that have a mission-driven strategy to provide 
social impact/value by driving higher financial inclusion to the poor, marginalized 
and underbanked.  Please refer to the Data Collection area of the Research 
Methodology chapter for more details on the different ways that the new technology 
ventures in my research study are considered social enterprises.  
Based on the definition above, the success of Fintech startups in my research 
study is measured by using two key criteria: 
(A) Financial Performance = the following objective metrics have been 
studied in prior academic research: 
 Revenue 
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 Growth – both revenue and transaction growth 
 Profitability – gross margin and cost measures such as burn rate 
 Valuation and Funding – post-money valuation and funding from 
VCs and other sources 
(B) Social Impact = the main measure of social impact that I will study is 
financial inclusion.   
I define financial inclusion in my research study by using three key factors: (1) 
providing access to financial services and products through digital methods to all 
people irrespective of their economic status; (2) products / services which are 
affordable and convenient to all, and (3) are actively used by customers.  My 
research study measures these 3 factors; however, I select active usage as the main 
way to measure financial inclusion.  The Research Methodology chapter will expand 
on the reasons for selecting active usage and how I operationalize it in my empirical 
model. 
 Assuming specific values for the two criteria above to represent “success” can 
be challenging, since I am studying Fintech startups in many different sub-segments 
of the market which are at different stages of development; thus, there will be 
significant variation in the results and difficult to determine one value that represents 
success.  To address this issue, success will be measured on a relative basis in my 
research study.  Specifically, I will evaluate the startups’ success based on their 
financial performance and social impact/value, and then rank the startups so that 
those companies that demonstrate the highest financial performance and highest 
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financial inclusion figures will be considered to be more successful than the ones with 
lower values.  
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
Figure 1 presents the theoretical model based on a multi-level framework 
consisting of four main categories: (1) Resources/Capabilities, (2) Business Models, 
(3) Networks & Partnerships, and (4) Market/Environment.  Within each category, I 
define the most important factors that I consider will drive higher financial 
performance and higher financial inclusion.  I draw on three key strategy 
management theories to support my model: RBV theory, Social Capital and Network 
theory and Industry Organization Economics theory.  This approach is similar to the 
research study from Miloud et al. (2012), where the authors show how these theories 
look at firm performance from different perspectives.  In this case, I also focus on the 
different characteristics of a startup’s business model to execute its strategy, which is 
central to strategic management, and investigate how these characteristics directly 
impact the company’s performance.   
In the following pages, I will draw from these theories to review the main 
factors on each category and hypothesize how they impact financial performance and 
financial inclusion for new technology ventures. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model of Key Factors that Impact Financial Performance and Financial 
Inclusion in New Fintech Ventures 
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3.3 Hypotheses 
 
Resources / Capabilities 
 The characteristics of the founder and founding team have been extensively 
studied by entrepreneurship researchers, and many have found that these 
characteristics play an essential role in the success of new technology ventures.  In 
my research study, I focus on prior industry experience of the founder / founding 
team as a key factor that new technology ventures need in order to drive higher 
financial performance and higher financial inclusion. 
 Having prior industry experience and expertise is important for the success of 
new technology ventures in the financial services sector.  In my research study, I 
define prior industry experience as having prior work experience in the financial 
services sector.  Given the complexities and the highly-regulated nature of the 
financial services industry, it is essential for the founding team to have an in-depth 
knowledge of the industry so that they can effectively develop new products/services 
that meets the customers’ needs and fill the gap that is currently not covered by 
existing financial institutions, as well as able to more easily navigate through the 
intricacies of the regulatory process.  Therefore, I expect that these prior work 
experiences should help drive higher financial inclusion and higher financial 
performance.  Support from prior academic research (Miloud et al., 2012) shows that 
a new venture is valued higher if its founder has prior industry experience before 
founding the new venture.  From a VC perspective, a key criterion that they look at 
when evaluating funding decisions is the entrepreneur’s experience, which is a 
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combination of industry, technical and startup experience.  This experience is 
important since it provides a “track record”, and gives comfort to the VC firm that the 
founding team has proven experience and a good understanding of the sector.  Based 
on these arguments, I propose two hypotheses linked to prior financial services 
industry experience: 
H1a: A new technology venture will have higher financial inclusion if its 
founder / founding team have prior financial services industry experience. 
H1b: A new technology venture will have higher financial performance if 
its founder / founding team have prior financial services industry 
experience. 
Business Models  
The academic literature on entrepreneurship has evaluated a wide variety of 
business models and strategies and their impact on the success of new ventures.  
Sandberg & Hofer (1987) were one of the first to develop a model for new venture 
success which used Strategy as a main factor.  The authors argued that the 
performance of startups is a function of the Entrepreneur, Industry Structure and their 
Business Strategy.  Regarding business strategy, the authors applied Porter's (2008) 
classification schemes of strategy as it relates to his Five Forces Model, and Abell's 
(1980) classification of business strategy into focused, differentiated and 
undifferentiated, to describe the strategic framework used by new ventures.  The 
results of their study showed that the interactive effect of strategy, the entrepreneur 
and industry structure had a greater impact on new venture performance than any of 
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the variables independently.  Zahra & Bogner (2000) also consider strategy as a key 
success factor for new ventures.  The authors evaluated the technology strategy of 
new ventures and demonstrated that a technology strategy with radical new products 
and intensive product upgrades has a significant effect on startup success, especially 
when moderated by the environment.  Ultimately, to develop a sustainable 
competitive advantage, it is essential to implement a business strategy that allows the 
company to leverage its resources/capabilities.  In this research study, I focus on the 
operationalization of the Fintech startups’ strategies by looking at different 
characteristics of their business models and how they impact the new venture’s 
financial performance and social impact. 
Customer centricity and interoperability are two key characteristics of a 
startup’s business model that I suggest are main predictors of financial performance 
and financial inclusion for new technology ventures which are serving the unbanked 
and underbanked.  Below I address each one in more detail. 
Customer Centricity 
Providing access to affordable financial services and products to the unbanked 
and underbanked is the first step towards achieving financial inclusion.  However, 
equally as important, is making sure that customers actively use these products and 
services.  Conde, Bykere, Cheston, & Rhyne (2016) discuss the challenges that 
Fintech startups face with customers at the BoP, such as high levels of account 
dormancy (more than 67%), customer dropouts and limited service usage.  Customers 
have negative experiences because in many cases they do not understand the 
products/services that are being offered to them, do not see the value that the 
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products/services provide and/or the products/services do not really meet their needs.  
In addition, Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper (2012) cite in the World Bank Findex report 
that unbanked consumers have an inherent lack of trust in financial institutions, which 
is a major reason to avoid their usage.  Adopting a customer-centric business model is 
the main solution to solve these issues.  Customer centricity is a business model that 
companies follow where the customer experience is its main product.  Burritt & 
Coetzee (2014) describe customer centricity in the following manner: “At the center 
of customer centricity is the customer experience, and a fundamental value 
proposition or solution that solves a customer problem” (p. 1).  The concept of 
customer centricity is not new; it has been discussed for more than 50 years, and 
numerous marketing academic papers have attempted to define the construct and 
operational antecedents (Lamberti, 2013); how it positively impacts financial 
performance (Kumar & Petersen, 2005; Lenskold, 2004) and the challenges of 
implementing customer centricity in an organization (Gummesson, 2008; Shah, Rust, 
Parasuraman, Staelin, & Day, 2006).  Large corporations such as Southwest Airlines, 
Procter & Gamble, Jet Blue and many others have adopted “customer first” strategies 
which have resulted in higher growth and profitability; however, the concept is now 
being applied to new technology ventures.  Widely used in many different sectors, 
customer-centricity becomes an essential business model in financial inclusion, since 
the behavior of BOP customers is unique and quite different from other customers at 
higher levels of the financial pyramid.  Specifically, BoP customers have informal, 
irregular incomes, tend to spend a relatively high proportion of their income on basic 
needs, and their financial needs differ by life stage and/or gender.  Kilara & Rhyne 
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(2014) provide guidelines for financial institutions on the main building blocks 
required to successfully implement a customer-centric business model.  Specifically, 
the building blocks include: conducting detailed market research on customer 
behaviors; reorienting the company’s operations and culture around customers; and 
shifting towards measuring total customer profitability.  
By adopting a customer-centric business model, Fintech startups gain an in-
depth understanding of the unbanked and underbanked customers and design 
products/services that solves their problems, meets their needs and delivers value 
above and beyond the existing products/services they used.  Offering the right 
products builds customer loyalty and trust, which leads to higher active usage of 
financial products and thereby increasing financial inclusion, driving higher customer 
growth.  Moreover, as mentioned above from the marketing academic literature, by 
having a customer-centric focus, Fintech new ventures can develop more value-added 
products for customers which ultimately drive higher financial performance through 
higher revenue and/or lower customer acquisition costs.  Therefore, I propose two 
hypotheses linked to customer centricity: 
H2a: Financial inclusion, as measured by active customers, of new 
technology ventures is positively related to the degree of customer-centricity 
in the new venture’s business model. 
H2b: The financial performance of new technology ventures is positively 
related to the degree of customer-centricity in the new venture’s business 
model. 
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Interoperability 
 Interoperability refers to the ability of different systems to be interconnected, 
so that all participants are able to operate across all systems.  Fintech startups that 
adopt an interoperable business model can potentially lead to higher financial 
inclusion and profitability since it introduces economies of scale and scope, creates 
network effects, and allows customers to more easily perform desired transactions 
(Arebehety, Chen, Cook, & McKay, 2016).   
 To expand on the benefits of interoperability, by having a business model 
where the startup establishes interconnections with other companies in the value 
chain, it allows customers to use the startup’s product/service across different 
operators and competitors, making it easier to use and potentially cheaper from a 
transaction perspective.  More importantly, it can also lead to positive network 
externalities for all.  Adopting an interoperable business model means that the Fintech 
startup may partner with its competitors and different aspects of the value chain, and 
together they can realize the mutual benefits they can achieve by reaching out to more 
customers, crystallizing higher financial performance and driving higher financial 
inclusion.  According to Bourreau & Valletti (2015), three different interoperable 
business models can be implemented by Fintech startups in financial inclusion: 
(1) Agent-level interoperability – in this business model, interconnections happen 
at the agent level.  Specifically, customers of one mobile money provider are 
able to use the agent network of another mobile money provider for cash-
in/cash-out services.  This business model is the most common for 
interoperability, since it is easiest one to adopt. 
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(2) Mobile network level interoperability – here, the Fintech startup providing the 
product/service has established interconnections with all of the different 
mobile network operators (MNOs), so that the customer can access their 
mobile money account through any SIM card / MNO.  This business model is 
more complex than the agent-level model, since it requires connections and 
negotiated agreements with all of the different MNOs. 
(3) Platform level interoperability – in this business model, interconnections are 
established between mobile money platforms.  Specifically, a customer with 
an account from one Fintech startup offering mobile money can send or 
receive money to another customer which may have a different mobile money 
platform.  This model is the most difficult and complex to achieve. 
Overall, by adopting an interoperable business model, it can result in higher network 
effects and thus lead to increased access to more customers, resulting in higher 
financial inclusion.  In addition, an interoperable business model can lead to 
economies of scope and scale, which will enhance financial performance.  Therefore, 
I propose two hypotheses linked to interoperability: 
H3a:  There is a positive relationship between new technology ventures that 
adopt an interoperable business model and financial inclusion; namely, new 
ventures with an interoperable business model will have higher financial 
inclusion. 
H3b:  There is a positive relationship between new technology ventures that 
adopt an interoperable business model and their financial performance; 
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namely, new ventures with an interoperable business model will have higher 
financial performance.  
Networks & Strategic Partnerships 
 Prior research has evaluated and distinguished between different types of 
networks that the entrepreneur may have.  For instance, Ostgaard & Birley (1996) 
studied the effects of social networks, which are made up of family and friends, and 
professional networks, which consists of business acquaintances and other 
professional services, on new venture performance.  In my research study, I will focus 
on professional networks, and in particular, the strategic partnerships that the Fintech 
new ventures have developed. 
 Strategic partnerships are defined as alliances, both formal and informal, that 
the new technology ventures have set up with other enterprises which are typically 
larger and more established corporations. The alliances could be with suppliers, 
customers and other firms with complementary resources.  Moreover, these alliances 
are viewed as strategic because they can potentially influence the startup’s financial 
performance.  Strategic alliances can lead to higher new venture performance by 
assisting startups in the following manner: 
 Sharing of information and knowledge 
 Providing essential resources – such as managerial, technical and financial 
 Providing enhanced legitimacy 
As discussed in the Literature Review chapter, numerous academic papers have 
demonstrated that the size of the network and the number of alliance partners play an 
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important role in new venture performance and valuation (Deeds & Hill, 1996; 
Miloud et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2010).  
In the financial inclusion sector, I argue that strategic partnerships are 
essential for the success of Fintech startups.  George et al. (2012) discuss the 
importance of collaboration between startups and large corporations in social 
entrepreneurship.  The authors highlight the paradox of size and scale: the social 
entrepreneur typically will have the innovativeness and motivation to work in the 
financial inclusion area, but will have limited resources.  On the other hand, the banks 
do not have the innovativeness or the motivation to go after the unbanked and 
underbanked, but they are flush with resources.  Therefore, setting up strategic 
alliances between the banks and Fintech startups will be able to connect both sides 
together and create synergies to drive more customers, serve the unbanked and 
underbanked more efficiently, and ultimately increase financial performance. 
Similarly, strategic partnerships between Fintech startups and MNOs are also 
helpful, since it opens the access to the MNOs’ massive and highly valued 
distribution networks.  More recently, strategic partnerships with E-commerce 
companies have also emerged, since these alliances provide access to more customers 
through a new distribution channel. Realini (2015) echoes these points in her book, 
Financial Inclusion at the Bottom of the Pyramid, and reaffirms that in order to 
succeed in driving higher financial inclusion, collaboration among the different 
players and stakeholders is needed.  According to Ms. Realini: “What we are 
witnessing today is a new synergy among industries that used to operate in their own 
silos: banks, phone companies, credit bureaus, NGOs, retailers, online players, and 
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governments.  These sectors are working together to re-write the rules of engagement 
in ways that generate profits for them…while creating opportunity for billions of 
people who could not previously afford the price of admission to the financial game.” 
(p. 218) 
Based on these arguments, I propose two hypotheses linked to strategic partnerships: 
H4a: The number of the strategic partnerships (with Financial Institutions, 
MNOs and E-Commerce companies) is positively related to financial 
inclusion of new technology ventures serving the unbanked and 
underbanked. 
H4b: The number of the strategic partnerships (with Financial Institutions, 
MNOs and E-Commerce companies) is positively related to the financial 
performance of new technology ventures serving the unbanked and 
underbanked. 
Market / Environment 
The market / environment is the second most widely studied area in 
entrepreneurship research after the founder / venture team characteristics, as it relates 
to the success of new ventures.  Industrial organization economics provides the 
theoretical framework to support these studies.  As highlighted in the previous 
section, many market/environment factors have been analyzed to show their effect on 
new venture performance.  While I agree that there are numerous market/environment 
factors that could have an impact on new venture success, I argue that there is one 
key factor that has a significant influence on the success of Fintech startups in 
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financial inclusion: Regulatory Framework of a country.  Below I describe it in more 
detail. 
 The regulatory framework refers to the rules and regulations that have been 
established by country’s government for a particular industry sector.  Rules and 
regulations consists of requirements that a government may impose on corporations 
and individuals to achieve the government’s purposes, which may include: protection 
from unfair competition and fraud and provision of better and cheaper services 
(Library of Economics and Liberty; 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Regulation.html).  In the financial services 
industry, the regulatory framework is designed to provide consumer protection and 
also help regulate and identify fraudulent activities.  However, over the last 50 years, 
it has become highly complex, extensive, and in some cases, highly restrictive.  It is 
important to note that the financial regulatory framework varies based on the country; 
there are countries that have more restrictive frameworks in place, while others are 
more open and/or less regulated.  D. K. C. Lee & Teo (2015) recognize that the 
regulatory framework is a key characteristic that drives the success of Fintech 
companies in financial inclusion. In fact, it represents one of the 5 characteristics of 
their LASIC principle, which they label as “Ease of Compliance”.  The authors 
explain that Fintech companies which operate in countries that are not highly 
regulated will tend to be more innovative and have lower capital requirements.  In 
essence, by operating in a lightly regulated environment, these companies do not have 
to spend as much resources on compliance activities.  The authors are not advocating 
for having no regulations, since they view the regulatory framework in the financial 
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industry as essential to provide financial stability, consumer protection and allow the 
financial markets to function properly; however, the authors argue that a regulatory 
framework that is too restrictive can negatively impact the success of Fintech 
companies that are focused on serving the unbanked and underbanked.  Realini 
(2015) echoes this concern, and believes that the level of regulations in the financial 
services industry will impact financial inclusion: "Government regulations can either 
propel an effort forward or hold it back.  If the regulators get the rules governing 
financial services right, there will be a tsunami of new services in the area, and the 
best ones will be adopted and scale" (p. 211).   
 As Donovan (2012) points out, mobile digital financial services, which 
represents the best solution to drive higher financial inclusion, faces regulation from 
both the finance and telecommunications industries.  The author believes that 
regulations should encourage financial inclusion, while at the same time minimize 
fraud and risk; in order to achieve this, the regulations should be incremental and 
proportional, and the regulators should collaborate with the Fintech startups and 
industry players.  In their 2015 Annual Letter, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
discuss that innovations and startups are essential in pursuing digital financial 
inclusion, but regulation is one of the major barriers to achieve this objective.  A 
perfect example of the role that regulations play in financial inclusion is M-PESA, a 
Kenya-based Fintech startup which offers a mobile wallet and mobile money 
transfers in Africa.  The company has become one of the most successful Fintech 
startups in financial inclusion, and its success can be partially attributed to an open 
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regulatory body (Central Bank of Kenya), which worked together with the company 
and allowed it to scale up and grow quickly without imposing restrictions.   
 Financial inclusion is a key priority and enabler to meeting the United 
Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).  In particular, the first SDG – 
ending extreme poverty – is highly dependent on providing access to financial 
services to the BoP.  Given the high priority to achieve financial inclusion in 
emerging markets, governments and policymakers in many countries are working to 
update the regulatory framework to be more open and encouraging in driving higher 
financial inclusion.  Therefore, a having supportive regulatory framework will lead to 
higher usage of mobile financial services for the unbanked and underbanked, 
resulting in higher financial inclusion and ultimately higher financial performance.  
Based on the arguments presented above, I propose the following two hypotheses 
linked to the regulatory framework: 
H5a: An enabling and open regulatory framework that encourages 
financial inclusion is positively related to higher financial inclusion of new 
technology ventures serving the unbanked and underbanked. 
H5b: An enabling and open regulatory framework that encourages 
financial inclusion is positively related to the financial performance of new 
technology ventures serving the unbanked and underbanked. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
 
The main objective of this research study is to develop an empirical model 
that evaluates the main factors that impact the success of Fintech startups in financial 
inclusion.  Therefore, a quantitative research approach will be the primary method 
used to develop the empirical model.  The quantitative approach will be 
complemented by illustrative case studies to highlight and discuss the impact of the 
different factors on the success of these startups.   
This chapter discusses the research methodology that I followed, and is 
divided into three parts: 
A. Data Sample Selection and Data Collection Methods 
B. Measurements 
C. Analytical Methods 
 
4.1 Data Sample Selection and Data Collection Methods 
 
4.1.1 Data Sample 
 
The following criteria were used to select the new technology ventures, or Fintech 
startups, to include in my model: 
 New technology ventures that are either serving the unbanked and/or 
underbanked as their main customers in emerging markets.  If the 
company is mainly serving banked customers, then it was not considered 
to be part of the research study 
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 Similar to the first criteria, technology ventures that are considered to be 
social enterprises, given that they are serving individuals that never had 
access to formal financial products/services before, and/or have a social 
mission or goal 
 Fintech startups based and/or doing business in Africa, South Asia (India 
and Bangladesh) and Southeast Asia (countries in the ASEAN region such 
as Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Cambodia, 
Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand).  These regions were selected since they 
have the largest concentration of unbanked and underbanked populations 
in the world 
 Technology ventures that were founded in 2004 or later. Based on Song, 
Podoynitsyna, Van Der Bij, & Halman, (2008) meta-analysis of empirical 
studies of success factors of new technology ventures, the authors found 
that most studies set the maximum age for new technology ventures at 15 
years, which is in line with the criteria that I have selected 
 Fintech startups that are participating in one or all of the different sub-
segments of the financial services sector.  Specifically, I am interested in 
startups that cover the credit scoring / data analytics, crowdfunding, 
payments, money transfer (remittances), lending, savings and insurance 
sub-segments 
I used various sources such as Internet searches on financial inclusion, 
meetings with industry experts and development organizations (World Bank, 
Omidyar Network, Gates Foundation), as well as meetings with VC firms which have 
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invested in financial inclusion and digital financial services, to identify the different 
Fintech startups that met the criteria defined above.  Some of the VC firms that I met 
include Quona Capital, Village Capital, Aspada Investments, Leapfrog Ventures, 
Golden Gate Ventures and 500 Startups.  Based on these sources and the criteria 
above, I was able to identify 172 Fintech startups in financial inclusion.  Table 1 
provides a summary breakdown of the Fintech startups that I have identified by 
region, customer segment, product segment and year founded.  Please note that this 
list is not exhaustive, and there may be more startups that I was not able to identify, 
as well as new ones that may have been founded since the time I started the research 
study.  However, based on the comprehensive analysis of Fintech startups in financial 
inclusion, this list covers more than 85% of the startups in these regions and meet the 
criteria that I defined. 
The goal was to include as many startups as possible from this list into my 
research study.  After spending more than 2 months contacting Fintech startups, I was 
able to meet in person and/or speak on the phone with 105 startups, or approximately 
60% of the total list of 172 companies.  Out of the 105 Fintech startups that I spoke 
to, 63 startups agreed to participate in my research study, which is about 37% of the 
total startups identified.  Table 2 provides a summary breakdown of the Fintech 
startups that have agreed to participate in my research study by region, sub-segment 
of the market, type of customer, access method of product/service and year founded.  
Out of the 63 Fintech startups that participated in my study, approximately half of 
them are in Southeast Asia, and more than 80% of all of the startups are in the 
payments, money transfer (remittance) and lending (includes P2P lending) sub-
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segments of the financial services sector.  Specifically, about 40% of the startups are 
in the lending sub-segment, which follows very closely to the overall universe of 
startups that I had identified.  In addition, more than 80% of the startups are fairly 
young in their development stage, since they have been founded on or after 2012.  
The mobile phone remains the main way for customers to access the financial 
products/services that these startups offer; Table 2 shows that more than 85% of the 
way these products/services are accessed is through a mobile phone (feature/SMS 
phone and smartphone).  The data sample also shows that approximately 35% of the 
startups offer their financial products/services through all modes, making it easier for 
customers to access.  Finally, smartphone adoption continues to increase at a fast 
pace, with more than 35% of the startups offering their financial products/services 
only through a smartphone (and/or combination with Internet). 
The universe of Fintech startups in emerging markets is sizeable; although 
there is no official estimate of the number of new technology ventures in the financial 
services sector, based on the number of startups that received VC funding within the 
last year, it is estimated that there are more than 2,000 ventures in this sector, and the 
number is continuously growing.  However, it is important to highlight that the 
universe of Fintech startups for my research study is curated to only those 
technology ventures that meet the criteria defined above.  As mentioned in the 
Literature Review chapter, I consider these startups as social enterprises since they 
are serving the unbanked and underbanked – offering financial products and services 
to customers which did not have access to them before at an affordable price.  
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Ultimately, these startups are helping solve the financial inclusion problem in 
emerging markets.   
To gain comfort that the startups in my research study are truly social 
enterprises, Table 3 provides a summary of the data sample based on three key 
characteristics to support my claim: (1) The startup solves a problem specifically for 
the poor or underbanked in an affordable way; (2) The startup has a clear social 
mission/objective; and (3) The product/service offered by the startup helps improve 
the economic livelihood of their customers.  These characteristics were determined 
through interviews with the Fintech startup founders / founding team, as well as 
reviewing secondary data from case studies, news articles and paid subscription 
databases (where available).  However, these characteristics were not verified with 
actual customers, which represents a limitation in my study (please refer to 
Chapter 8 for a detailed discussion of limitations/weaknesses of the research 
study).  All of the startups in my data sample are achieving a social good, while at the 
same time they are for-profit ventures, and thus meeting the definition of a social 
enterprise as proposed by Seelos & Mair, (2005) and Abu-Saifan, (2012), where these 
ventures have a dual goal of creating social and economic value.  Based on the data 
presented in Table 3, we can observe that most startups in the data sample (except for 
one) have one or more of the three characteristics defined above, and approximately 
95% of all of the startups in the sample meet all three of the characteristics. 
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Table 1.  Distribution of Fintech Startups Identified for PhD Research Study 
  Sample % 
By Region Africa 41 23.8% South Asia (India, 
Bangladesh) 
51 29.7% 
Southeast Asia 80 46.5% 
Total 172 100.0% 
   
By Sub-Segment Credit Scoring 19 11.1% Insurance 4 2.3% 
Lending 25 14.5% 
Money Transfer 31 18.0% 
P2P Lending 47 27.3% 
Payments 38 22.1% 
Other 8 4.7% 
Total 172 100.0% 
    
By Customer 
Type 
B2B 104 60.5% 
 B2C 68 39.5% 
 Total 172 100.0% 
    
By Year Founded 2004 6 3.5% 2005 2 1.2% 
2006 1 0.6% 
2007 5 2.9% 
2008 3 1.7% 
2009 10 5.8% 
2010 12 7.0% 
2011 11 6.4% 
2012 14 8.1% 
2013 9 5.2% 
2014 36 20.9% 
2015 44 25.6% 
2016 19 11.1% 
Total 172 100.0% 
Notes:  Other product segment refers to Core Banking Solutions, Savings and Data Analytics.  B2B refers to companies serving 
other businesses; B2C refers to companies serving end users. 
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Table 2.  Distribution of Fintech Startups Participating in my PhD Research 
Study 
  Sample % 
By Region Africa 13 20.6% South Asia (India, 
Bangladesh) 
16 25.4% 
Southeast Asia 34 54.0% 
Total 63 100.0% 
   
By Sub-Segment Credit Scoring 5 7.9% Insurance 2 3.2% 
Lending 11 17.5% 
Money Transfer 14 22.2% 
P2P Lending 16 25.4% 
Payments 10 15.9% 
Other 5 7.9% 
Total 63 100.0% 
    
By Customer 
Type 
B2B 46 73.0% 
B2C 17 27.0% 
Total 63 100.0% 
    
By Access Mode1 Feature/SMS phone 9 14.3% 
Smartphone 14 22.2% 
Internet 9 14.3% 
Smartphone, Internet 9 14.3% 
All modes 22 34.9% 
Total 63 100.0% 
    
By Year Founded 2004 1 1.6% 2005 0 0.0% 
2006 0 0.0% 
2007 1 1.6% 
2008 2 3.2% 
2009 2 3.2% 
2010 1 1.6% 
2011 3 4.8% 
2012 4 6.4% 
2013 7 11.1% 
2014 6 9.5% 
2015 18 28.6% 
2016 16 25.4% 
2017 2 3.2% 
Total 63 100.0% 
Notes:  Other product segment refers to Core Banking Solutions, Savings and Data Analytics.  B2B refers to companies serving 
other businesses; B2C refers to companies serving end users. 
1 Access mode refers to the way customers access the financial product/service. The main options are: Feature/SMS mobile 
phone, Smartphone, Internet or All of the options. 
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Table 3.  Distribution of Fintech Startups in Research Study – Key 
Characteristics of a Social Enterprise 
 
ID# SOLVES A PROBLEM FOR THE 
POOR OR UNDERBANKED IN AN 
AFFORDABLE WAY 
SOCIAL 
MISSION/OBJECTIVE 
HELPS IMPROVE 
ECONOMIC 
LIVELIHOOD OF 
CUSTOMERS 
1   
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
10    
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
17    
18    
19    
20    
21    
22    
23    
24    
25    
26    
27    
28    
29    
30    
31    
32   
33    
34    
35    
36    
37   
38    
39    
40    
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Table 3.  Distribution of Fintech Startups in Research Study – Key 
Characteristics of a Social Enterprise (cont’d) 
 
ID# SOLVES A PROBLEM FOR THE 
POOR OR UNDERBANKED IN AN 
AFFORDABLE WAY 
SOCIAL 
MISSION/OBJECTIVE 
HELPS IMPROVE 
ECONOMIC 
LIVELIHOOD OF 
CUSTOMERS 
41     
42    
43    
44    
45     
46    
47    
48    
49    
50    
51    
52    
53    
54    
55    
56   
57    
58    
59    
60    
61     
62    
63    
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4.1.2 Data Collection Methods 
 
 The primary data collection method has been interviews with Fintech new 
venture founders.  In the event that the venture founders were not available to do the 
interviews, data was collected by sending a survey electronically to each company 
and they were asked to fill it out and return it via email.  More than 80% of the data 
was collected through interviews with the company founders.  The questions in the 
survey were the same ones used in the interviews.  To create the survey/interview 
questions, I conducted personal interviews with CEOs of different Fintech startups, 
partners at VC firms, and also carefully examined the entrepreneurship literature.  
Once the questions were drafted, I conducted pretest interviews with several VC 
firms and CEOs of Fintech startups to identify any problems with question wording, 
length of survey and questionnaire layout.   
 The interview / survey consisted of 117 questions, and mainly collected 
objective data from the different Fintech startups, such as information related to the 
founders, main resources/capabilities, the companies' business models, as well as 
operational and financial metrics.  The questions in the interview and survey were 
designed to collect information in the form of ranges, instead of actual figures; this 
way, the founders felt more comfortable in sharing potentially sensitive and 
confidential information.  Due to this design, a lot of the answers used in the 
empirical model are midpoint estimates based on the ranges supplied.  In some cases, 
multiple questions in the survey were used to measure certain factors, such as 
customer centricity.  Thus, 117 different data points were collected from each Fintech 
startup that participated in the research study, or a total of approximately 7,370 data 
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points.  Please refer to Appendix 1 for the list of interview / survey questions that I 
used in this research study.  Even though I collected a lot of information from the 
different Fintech startups, only a partial amount of the data was used to conduct the 
research study.  Therefore, more information is available to do a follow-up study 
which may examine additional factors.  The interview / survey data was entered by a 
research assistant into an Access database, and checked by me to make sure it was 
properly entered.  The information was then downloaded to Excel and E-Views to 
analyze it. 
 To check the validity and reliability of the data provided by the Fintech 
founders, secondary data sources such as paid/subscription databases, news articles 
and published case studies were used.  Specifically, online databases such as 
Crunchbase and Funderbeam were used wherever possible.  If there was a 
discrepancy compared to what the Fintech startup founder provided, then I 
approached the company to understand the differences and figure out which one was 
correct.   
 Since most of the data provided by startups is confidential in nature, the 
research study has been conducted anonymously - no names of startups have been 
displayed in the results, and all data presented is at an aggregate basis (i.e., by 
region, country, product segment, customer segment) so that the identity of the 
startups will not be revealed.  Given the confidential nature of the information, 
NDAs were executed with about 20% of the startups which felt necessary to do so to 
protect their information.  However, the results of my research study will be 
supported by illustrative case studies of different Fintech startups which have agreed 
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to do so to corroborate the empirical results as well as highlight new insights not 
captured in the quantitative analysis. 
4.2 Measurements 
 
 The proposed model outlined in the Research Hypotheses and Model chapter 
identifies different factors that impact the financial performance and financial 
inclusion of Fintech startups serving the unbanked and underbanked.  To 
operationalize the different factors, I follow the methods used in prior academic 
research, third party sources in financial inclusion as well as methods that I have 
developed to take into account potential constraints on the availability of the data.  
Given the dynamic nature of the data (i.e., the Fintech startups are running their 
businesses as we speak, and thus the numbers are continuously changing), all of the 
information collected from the Fintech startups is as of August 2017, when I finalized 
the data collection process.   
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
 
Success is defined in terms of the business performance of the Fintech startup, 
and two key measurements are used: (1) Financial performance and (2) Social impact.  
Please refer to the previous chapter (Research Hypotheses and Model), which 
provides more details on how I define success in this research study.  To be 
successful, the Fintech startup needs to achieve the highest relative value for these 
two measures within the startups that are being evaluated.  Given that it is a relative 
measure of success, we can mainly say that the startups with the highest values have a 
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higher potential to succeed than those that have lower values of financial performance 
and social impact within the sample of startups that participated in the study. 
The financial performance of the Fintech startup can be measured by using 4 
types of dimensions, which have been commonly studied in entrepreneurship 
research: 
 Absolute and Growth measures:  Revenue and revenue growth; transaction 
growth (Stuart & Abetti, 1987; C. Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001; Ostgaard & 
Birley, 1996) 
 Cost and Profitability measures:  Burn Rate and Gross Margin (Roure & 
Maidique, 1986; Dubini, 1989; Kakati, 2003) 
 Valuation measures:  Post-Money Valuation (Miloud et al., 2012) 
 VC funding measures:  Amount of VC funding raised (Adcroft et al., 2007; 
Groenewegen & de Langen, 2012) 
I selected Annual Revenue as the main Financial Performance measure for my 
research study, since this information is readily available from all companies.  Annual 
Revenue refers to the latest annual revenue figure available from the Fintech startup.  
In case the company has been operating for less than 1 year, an annual run-rate 
revenue is used.  Since most startups may not have, or have negative, profitability, 
gross profit was not selected.  Growth measures for revenue and other financial 
variables were also not selected since the growth patterns for startups tend to follow 
an asymptotic path.  Specifically, startups will have extremely high growth rates in 
the early stages of development, and as the startup matures, the growth rate declines 
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to more normal levels.  The negative relationship between growth and the startup's 
development stage makes it hard to interpret the results, so growth measures were not 
used.  Post-Money Valuation could also be another financial performance measure to 
use, however, I did not select it since the numbers tend to be subjective and lacking 
accuracy at the early stages of a startup's development.   
Financial inclusion represents the main measure of Social Impact that I evaluate 
in my research study. To operationalize financial inclusion, I selected Total Active 
Customers, which refers to the total number of unique customers that are actively 
using the startups' products or services.  Active usage refers to performing at least one 
transaction using the startup’s product/service within a 90-day period.  Most 
development organizations, such as the World Bank, Accion and GSMA use this time 
frame as the standard way to measure active users.  Active Customers is an important 
figure to track financial inclusion since there are many instances of users that are 
registered for digital financial services and products, but never use their accounts, 
or are dormant for a long period of time.  According to GSMA, as of 2015 more 
than two-thirds of mobile money accounts that have been registered worldwide are 
inactive – this represents an active ratio of 32.6% (2015 State of the Industry Report 
on Mobile Money, 2015).  Financial inclusion is not just about providing access to 
affordable financial products or services to the unbanked and underbanked, but also 
making sure that these products/services are actually used by individuals.   
As discussed in the Literature Review chapter, I define financial inclusion as a 
multi-dimensional concept consisting of three main characteristics: ease of access, 
affordability to all, and active usage of financial products and services by all members 
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of society.  Although active usage (in the form of Active Customers) was selected as 
the main way to operationalize financial inclusion in my research study, I also 
measured affordability and accessibility of financial products / services for each 
startup; please refer to Figure 2 below for a summary of the information.  
Specifically, Figure 2.1 shows that 95% of the startups in the data sample are serving 
unbanked/underbanked individuals as their main customers, a key measure of 
accessibility.  Figure 2.2 provides further support to the claim of accessibility, since it 
demonstrates that 89% of the startups in the data sample are providing access to 
financial products/services to individuals for the first time.  From an affordability 
perspective, Figure 2.3 shows that 70% of the startups in the data sample are offering 
financial products/services that are lower (10% to 50%) and significantly lower 
(>50%) in price than traditional financial products/services, therefore making it very 
affordable for individuals.  However, about 30% of the startups are offering financial 
products/services that are either the same or higher price than traditional financial 
products.  Figure 2.4 demonstrates that even though these startups are offering 
financial products/services at the same or higher prices, the most important factor for 
individuals is that it provides access to these products for the first time in their lives.  
Therefore, while affordability is important, individuals may be willing to pay similar 
or higher prices if they are given access when they did not have it before.  Clearly, the 
3 different characteristics of financial inclusion (accessibility, affordability and active 
usage) are inter-related.  Accessibility is an important criterion and it is aided by 
affordability, since it can open the landscape to the poor and marginalized.  However, 
having accessibility does not necessarily mean that it has to be affordable, as 
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demonstrated above.  Active usage is an outcome of having accessibility, and to a 
certain extent, is complemented by affordability.  Nevertheless, other factors may 
affect active usage, which is one of the objectives that my empirical model will try to 
address.  Given the inter-relationships of the different characteristics of financial 
inclusion, active usage, and in particular, active customers, was chosen as the main 
way to operationalize financial inclusion since it is the result of the other two 
characteristics, and it can be objectively measured.   
For startups which target end consumers as their main customers (B2C), the 
measurement of active customers is fairly straightforward.  On the other hand, for 
startups which target other businesses the main customer is another business (B2B), 
these companies sell products/services to other companies which in turn then serve 
end users.  Therefore, measuring active customers is more challenging.  As much as 
possible, I obtained the number of end users that a B2B Fintech startup in my data 
sample will ultimately impact, and used this figure as Active Customers.  This way, 
you can easily compare between B2C and B2B startups.   
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Figure 2.  Summary of Financial Inclusion Characteristics of Fintech Startups in Data Sample 
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4.2.2 Independent Variables 
 
Resources / Capabilities 
Founding Team Prior Financial Services Industry Experience:  As Miloud, 
Aspelund, & Cabrol (2012) correctly point out, any industry experience involves both 
qualitative and quantitative dimensions, but there is no perfect way to capture both of 
these dimensions.  While a lot of academic researchers capture the number of years 
that a founder has worked in a particular industry prior to founding the startup, there 
are a few challenges with this approach.  First, if there are multiple founders for the 
startup, do you use the sum of the total years of financial services industry experience 
for all of the founders, or do you take an average?  Second, it is possible that you only 
have the information available on one of the founders, but not all of them.  To address 
these potential issues, I operationalize the Founding Team Prior Financial Services 
Industry Experience by using a dummy variable, which is coded ‘1’ if any of the 
founders has worked in the financial services industry before the founding of the 
startup, ‘0’ otherwise. 
Business Models 
Customer Centricity:  To measure and operationalize customer centricity, a 
composite score has been developed which is based on the answers to 20 different 
objective interview/survey questions related to this factor.  The interview/survey 
questions highlight a few key features which are essential for any company to be 
customer centric: 
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 Simplicity and ease of use of the product / service – here, a design thinking 
approach when developing a product/service is essential so that the product is 
able to solve the customers’ pain points in a very easy, intuitive manner 
 In-depth understanding of the customers – in order to do so, companies 
perform detailed market research on customer behavior and derive insights to 
better target their customers.  Also, how much does the customers' input 
influence the innovations that the startup has becomes an important feature in 
the role that customers play to define the company's products / services 
 Focus on performance and profitability metrics around customers – how well 
the startup tracks profitability and other operational metrics at the customer 
level, such as Customer Lifetime Value (CLV), Customer Acquisition Cost 
(CAC), and any other customer-related metrics is an essential aspect of being 
customer centric.  It is important to note that a company which demonstrates 
CLV growth will be more customer-centric since it is able to add more value 
to its customers 
 How much customers believe in your product / service – can be defined in two 
ways:  
o Percentage of repeat customers – this metric highlights how much 
customers believe in the company's products/services; higher 
percentage of repeat customers indicates that the customers really 
believe in the product/service and thus the company is more customer-
centric 
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o Customer referrals – by doing referrals to others, the customer shows 
that he/she strongly likes and believes in the product/service so much 
that they are willing to recommend it to others 
The composite score is based on the sum of the answers to each question.  The 
questions have been derived from Kilara & Rhyne (2014) CGAP Brief on Customer-
Centricity for Financial Inclusion article, as well as information from different 
marketing sources on how to best measure customer centricity.  The score represents 
the degree of customer-centricity that a Fintech startup has been able to achieve.  
Given the fact that the answers to three of the questions were all the same for each 
startup, I decided to eliminate these questions from the calculation of the customer 
centricity score.  Appendix 1 provides the list of 20 questions that were used to 
develop the customer centricity score for each startup (please refer to Questions #9, 
#11 through #30).  Since most of the questions have yes/no answers, with a score of 0 
(no) or 1 (yes), the overall customer centricity score is a value between 0 and 17.  A 
score closer to 17 represents a higher degree of customer-centricity, while a score 
closer to zero represents lower or no customer centricity.  It is essential to highlight 
that the answers to the customer centricity interview/survey questions were not 
verified with actual customers, which may be a limitation to this research study.  
Please refer to Chapter 8 for a detailed discussion of limitations and weaknesses in 
my research study. 
Interoperability:  This factor refers to whether a Fintech startup’s business 
model is interoperable or not. Specifically, a dummy variable has been created which 
will assume the value of one if the business model is interoperable, or zero if it is not 
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interoperable.   As discussed in the Hypotheses and Model chapter, interoperability 
refers to the ability of different systems to be interconnected.  In this research study, I 
evaluate whether the startup has an interoperable business model by asking the 
companies whether they share the same agent network with other companies, have 
their product/service work across different MNOs, or have their product/service 
accessible across different and sometimes competing platforms.  If the Fintech 
startups answer yes to any or all of these conditions, then the interoperability dummy 
variable takes the value of one; else, it is assumed that the startup’s business model is 
not interoperable and the dummy variable has a value of zero. 
Networks & Strategic Partnerships 
Following the conventional practice in network literature and other empirical 
academic research (Miloud et al., 2012), strategic partnership is measured as the 
number of alliances, or strategic partners, that the startups currently have formally (or 
informally) set up with the following types of institutions, which are key players in 
the digital financial services ecosystem: 
 Financial institutions – refers to banks, MFIs, cooperatives and 
insurance providers.  In addition, it includes both local and 
regional/multinational companies 
 Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) 
 E-Commerce companies 
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Data on strategic partnerships was collected by directly asking the startup founders to 
provide an estimate of the number of partnerships they have with each type of 
institution, and the length of the relationship. 
Market / Environment Factors 
 Although many factors related to the market and environment could have an 
impact on the business performance of new technology ventures, it has been widely 
documented by development organizations that one of the most important ones in 
financial inclusion is related to the Regulatory Infrastructure.  It is important to note 
that, unlike the factors above, the measurement of the market / environment factor is 
performed at a country level, and I rely on well-established, secondary data sources to 
obtain it value. 
Regulatory Infrastructure.  Index on the Openness of the Regulatory 
Environment to Drive Financial Inclusion:  The Economist Intelligence Unit 
publishes an annual index called “Global Microscope”, which provides a score on the 
openness of the regulatory environment to drive financial inclusion in a particular 
country.  The index consists of a score on 11 indicators, which are qualitative in 
nature, and based on interviews with more than 200 industry experts, practitioners 
and regulators, as well as using secondary data sources such as: texts of laws, 
regulations, and other legal documents, websites of government authorities and 
international organizations, and other scholarly studies.  The index is calculated for 
55 emerging market countries globally, and has been conducted for the last 3 years 
(2014 through 2016).  The different indicators that form the index includes the 
following areas: 
 117 
 
i. Government Support for financial inclusion 
ii. Regulatory and supervisory capacity for financial inclusion 
iii. Prudential regulation 
iv. Regulation and supervision of credit portfolios 
v. Regulation and supervision of deposit-taking activities 
vi. Regulation of insurance targeting low-income populations 
vii. Regulation and supervision of branches and agents 
viii. Requirements for non-regulated lenders 
ix. Available infrastructure for electronic payments 
x. Credit reporting systems 
xi. Existence of a framework to protect the financial consumer 
Given that some of the startups in my model operate in multiple countries, a weighted 
average score was calculated for the index based on the different countries where the 
startup operates.  Moreover, I measured the percent change in the Regulatory 
Environment Index over the last 3 years, since an improvement in the openness of the 
regulatory environment to financial inclusion should provide a better correlation to 
whether the Fintech startup can succeed in driving higher financial inclusion. 
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4.2.3 Control Variables 
 
There is a myriad of factors that may affect the performance of a Fintech startup 
serving the unbanked and underbanked; some of these factors are beyond the scope of 
my theoretical framework.  To avoid making spurious conclusions about the factors 
that I have identified, I need to control for the effects of other factors, and include 
control variables in my model. 
 A startup's age has a direct effect on the dependent variables in my model and 
thus an important control variable.  As the startup matures, the number of active 
customers and total revenue should increase – therefore, a positive linear relationship 
between the startup’s age and the dependent variables should be observed.  I use a 
measure of the startup’s age using the number of months since the launch of the 
company’s first product/service until August 2017. 
Other control variables in my model include macroeconomic and industry factors 
such as GDP average growth rate and mobile phone penetration rate (as measured by 
number of mobile subscriptions per 100 individuals).  C. Lee, Lee, & Pennings 
(2001) look at the average growth rate of the market, as a control variable in their 
study, since the authors believe that it is highly correlated to the performance of new 
ventures.  In my research study, I assume that GDP growth rate and advancements in 
mobile infrastructure (as measured by mobile phone penetration rate) to represent the 
average growth rate of the market. 
Similar to the market/environment factor, the control variables are measured at a 
country level and the figures are available by year.  For each startup, I calculated the 
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weighted average values of GDP growth rate and mobile penetration rate based on the 
different countries that the startups operate and the years they have been operating.  
The reason for weighting by country and year is that each of these variables may 
impact the startup differently depending on the country they are operating and the 
number of years since their founding.   
A key control variable included in my model is related to the customer 
segment that the startup is serving – whether it is serving other businesses (B2B), or 
directly serving consumers (B2C).  The distinction is important since it will impact 
the startup’s business model and its financial performance.  In general, B2B startups 
may have fewer customers, but tend to generate higher revenue and profitability than 
B2C startups.  Moreover, the cost of acquiring customers is significantly higher in 
B2C startups than B2B startups, due to the fact that consumers tend to be fickle and 
not as sticky as compared to serving other businesses.  Therefore, I expect that B2B 
startups will demonstrate higher annual revenue, but maybe not as high active 
customers when compared to B2C startups.  A dummy variable has been incorporated 
in the model to test this effect; the variable will assume the value of 1 if the startup is 
B2B, or 0 if the startup is B2C. 
Table 4 provides a summary of all of the variables that are part of my research 
model.  The table also provides the measurements and sources of data for each 
variable. 
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Table 4.  Summary of Variables, Measurements and Sources 
Variable Sign Measurement Source 
Dependent Variables   
Annual Revenue  Average Annual Revenue (US$ millions) Interview/survey questions; 
secondary sources 
Active Customers   Number of Active Customers, which is defined as unique customers who have performed at least one transaction 
in the last 90 days 
Interview/survey questions 
Independent Variables  
Prior Financial 
Services Industry 
Experience 
+ Dummy variable to represent whether any member of the startup’s founding team had financial services industry 
experience prior to founding the startup.  Variable equals to ‘1’ if any member of the founding team has prior 
financial services industry experience, and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Interview/survey questions; 
secondary sources 
Customer Centricity + Composite score from interview questions, which measures the degree of customer centricity.   Interview/survey questions 
Interoperability + Dummy variable to represent whether the startup’s business model is interoperable or not.  A startup’s business 
model is considered interoperable if: its products can be used across multiple MNOs, shares agent network or can 
work across different platforms.  If interoperable, the variable equals to ‘1’; otherwise, if not interoperable then 
the variable equals to ‘0’ 
Interview/survey questions; 
secondary sources 
Strategic 
Partnerships 
+ Number of alliance partners with three types of institutions: 
 Financial institutions 
 MNOs 
 E-commerce companies 
Interview/survey questions 
Regulatory 
Framework 
+ Percent change in the Index on the Openness of Regulatory Environment to drive financial inclusion.  The 
variable is a weighted average based on the countries that the startup operates in. and captures the change in the 
index value for the years that the startup has been in operations 
The Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s Global Microscope 
Control Variables   
Number of Months 
since Launch 
+ Number of months from the time the startup launched its first product/service and August 2017 Interview/survey questions; 
secondary sources 
Customer Segment  Dummy variable to represent whether the startup’s customers are other businesses (B2B) or consumers (B2C).  If 
B2B, then variable equals to ‘1’, else it equals to ‘0’  
Interview/survey questions; 
secondary sources 
GDP Avg. Growth 
Rate 
+ Weighted average GDP growth rate of the countries that the startup operates and for the number of years that the 
startup has been in operations 
World Bank’s World 
Development Database 
Mobile Phone 
Penetration Rate 
+ Weighted average number of mobile phone subscriptions per 100 individuals of the countries that the startup 
operates in and for the number of years that the startup has been in operations 
World Bank’s World 
Development Database 
 121 
 
4.3 Analytical Methods 
 
An empirical model can be estimated based on the different independent 
variables defined in the previous section: 
࡮࢛࢙࢏࢔ࢋ࢙࢙	ࡼࢋ࢘ࢌ࢕࢘࢓ࢇ࢔ࢉࢋ
ൌ 	ߙ	 ൅	ߚଵሺܥݑݏݐ݋݉݁ݎ	ܥ݁݊ݐݎ݅ܿ݅ݐݕሻ 	൅	ߚଶሺܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݋݌݁ݎܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕሻ
൅	ߚଷሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܨܫݏሻ
൅	ߚସሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܯܱܰݏሻ
൅ 	ߚହሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܧ െ ܥ݋݉݉݁ݎܿ݁ሻ
൅ 	ߚ଺ሺܲݎ݅݋ݎ	ܨ݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ	ܵݒܿݏ	ܧݔ݌. ሻ
൅	ߚ଻ሺܴ݁݃ݑ݈ܽݐ݋ݎݕ	ܨݎܽ݉݁ݓ݋ݎ݇ሻ
൅	ߚଵି௞ሺܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ	݋݂	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏሻ 
where Business Performance represents the two different dependent variables defined 
in Table 2, namely Annual Revenue and Active Customers.  The intercept in the 
equation is α, β1-7 are the coefficients of the theoretical variables to be estimated, and 
β1-k represent the coefficients of the control variables to be estimated, where k equals 
to 4. 
Multivariate linear regression is used to analyze the data, since it is line with 
my theoretical framework that the business performance of a Fintech startup in 
financial inclusion is the additive result of key important factors.  Specifically, two 
types of regression models are used: 
 Multivariate linear regression models to test the effects that each 
independent variable has on the two dependent variables 
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 Binomial logit regression model to determine how the different 
independent variables affect the probability of overall success of the 
Fintech startups 
The key difference between the two types of models is that the multivariate linear 
regression will be able to show how changes in the independent variables lead to 
higher or lower business performance, as measured by Annual Revenue and Active 
Customers of the startup, which are continuous variables.  On the other hand, the 
binomial logit regression model replaces the two continuous dependent variables with 
a dummy variable representing overall success, which has two values: ‘1’ if the 
Fintech startup is successful, or ‘0’ if the startup is not successful.  The binomial logit 
model provides an alternative method to define the success of a Fintech startup in 
financial inclusion, in a more deterministic fashion.  A more detailed discussion of 
the two types of models used to analyze the data is provided below. 
4.3.1 Multivariate Linear Regression Models 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) is utilized for the multivariate regression models 
to analyze the data.  Since there are two different measures of business performance 
(Active Customers and Annual Revenue), two separate linear regression models are 
evaluated using the same independent variables.  Ideally, the models would 
demonstrate that the same independent variables are statistically significant in both 
models.  To confirm whether the dependent variables were normally distributed, I 
reviewed a histogram of the observations for Active Customers and Annual Revenue.  
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Please refer to Figure 3 and Figure 4.  The results show that the Jarque-Bera 
probability is less than 0.05, demonstrating that the data is not normally distributed. 
Figure 3.  Active Customers – Histogram 
 
Figure 4.  Annual Revenue – Histogram 
 
Following Miloud, Aspelund, & Cabrol, (2012) and Gompers (1995), I 
performed a log transformation of the raw data for Active Customers and Annual 
Revenue, and used these transformed variables as the dependent variables in my 
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regression models.  After the transformation, the Active Customer dependent variable 
becomes more normally distributed (p-value of Jarqe-Bera is greater than 0.05), but 
the Annual Revenue variable remains not normally distributed.  Please refer to Figure 
5 and Figure 6 below. 
Figure 5.  Log Transformation of Active Customer – Histogram 
 
Figure 6.  Log Transformation of Annual Revenue – Histogram 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Series: LOG_ACT_CUST
Sample 1 63
Observations 63
Mean       10.29984
Median   10.30899
Maximum  17.21671
Minimum  3.044522
Std. Dev.   3.971622
Skewness   0.080036
Kurtosis   1.805760
Jarque-Bera  3.811062
Probability   0.148744
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Series: LOG_ANN_REV
Sample 1 63
Observations 63
Mean       0.956689
Median   0.693147
Maximum  3.931826
Minimum  0.000000
Std. Dev.   1.010485
Skewness   1.052819
Kurtosis   3.097453
Jarque-Bera  11.66341
Probability   0.002933
 125 
 
A similar exercise is performed for each of the independent variables, and based on 
the histograms, a log transformation of the Strategic Partnership independent 
variables is also implemented. 
 Based on the log transformations, the multivariate linear regression models 
are as follows: 
1) ࡸ࢔ሺ࡭ࢉ࢚࢏࢜ࢋ	࡯࢛࢙࢚࢕࢓ࢋ࢙࢘ሻ ൌ 	ߙ	 ൅	ߚଵሺܥݑݏݐ݋݉݁ݎ	ܥ݁݊ݐݎ݅ܿ݅ݐݕሻ ൅
	ߚଶሺܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݋݌݁ݎܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕሻ ൅	ߚଷ൫ܮ݊ሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܨܫݏሻ൯ ൅
	ߚସ൫ܮ݊ሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܯܱܰݏሻ൯ ൅
ߚହ൫ܮ݊ሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܧ െ ܥ݋݉݉݁ݎܿ݁ሻ൯ ൅
ߚ଺ሺܲݎ݅݋ݎ	ܨ݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ	ܵݒܿݏ	ܧݔ݌. ሻ ൅	ߚ଻ሺܴ݁݃ݑ݈ܽݐ݋ݎݕ	ܨݎܽ݉݁ݓ݋ݎ݇ሻ ൅
	ߚଵି௞ሺܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ	݋݂	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏሻ 
 
2) ࡸ࢔ሺ࡭࢔࢔࢛ࢇ࢒	ࡾࢋ࢜ࢋ࢔࢛ࢋሻ ൌ 	ߙ	 ൅	ߚଵሺܥݑݏݐ݋݉݁ݎ	ܥ݁݊ݐݎ݅ܿ݅ݐݕሻ ൅
	ߚଶሺܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݋݌݁ݎܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕሻ ൅	ߚଷ൫ܮ݊ሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܨܫݏሻ൯ ൅
	ߚସ൫ܮ݊ሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܯܱܰݏሻ൯ ൅
ߚହ൫ܮ݊ሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܧ െ ܥ݋݉݉݁ݎܿ݁ሻ൯ ൅
ߚ଺ሺܲݎ݅݋ݎ	ܨ݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ	ܵݒܿݏ	ܧݔ݌. ሻ ൅	ߚ଻ሺܴ݁݃ݑ݈ܽݐ݋ݎݕ	ܨݎܽ݉݁ݓ݋ݎ݇ሻ ൅
	ߚଵି௞ሺܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ	݋݂	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏሻ 
 
4.3.2 Binomial Logit Regression Model 
 
The binomial logit regression model is an estimation technique where the 
dependent variable has only two values, or most commonly referred to as a dummy 
variable.  The binomial logit model is an extension of the linear probability model 
that avoids the issue of unboundedness of the predicted values of the dependent 
variable by using a variant of the cumulative logistic function: 
ܦ௜ ൌ 11 ൅ ݁ିሾఉబାఉభ௑భ೔ାఉమ௑మ೔ାఢ೔ሿ 
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where ܦ௜ is the dummy dependent variable.   
 Since binomial logit models cannot be estimated using OLS, the Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) technique is used, which is an iterative estimation method that 
selects coefficient estimates that maximize the log of the probability, or likelihood, of 
observing the particular set of values of the dependent variable in the sample for a 
given set of independent variables.  In my research study, I define a dummy 
dependent variable called “Overall Success” which will assume the value of 1 if the 
startup is considered to be successful relative to the other startups evaluated, or 0 if 
the startup is considered not to be successful.  The model will be estimating what is 
the probability of overall success of a Fintech startup in financial inclusion when 
there are changes in the different independent variables.  Ideally, the definition of a 
“successful” startup would be a new venture which demonstrates equal to or higher 
financial performance (as measured by Annual Revenue) AND equal to or higher 
financial inclusion (as measured by Active Customers) when compared to an index, 
or benchmark, of successful startups in the same sub-segment.  Regrettably, there is 
very limited public data available from comparable successful startups to create a 
benchmark.  Moreover, the Fintech startups in my research study are serving many 
different sub-segments, so a benchmark would need to be developed for each product 
sub-segment in order to be accurate; this data is not available.  To solve this issue, I 
compared the startup’s Active Customers and Annual Revenue figures against the 
median values of the other startups in the research study; thus, defining success 
relative to other startups in the study.  To be successful, the startup’s Active 
Customers AND Annual Revenue figures have to be equal to or higher than the 
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median values.  Following this methodology, out of the 63 startups in my research 
study, there are 24 startups that are currently considered to be “overall successful”, 
while there are 39 startups that are currently considered not to be successful. 
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Below is an estimate of the binomial logit model that I evaluate in my research study: 
ܮ: Prሺܦ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ln ൬ ܦ௜ሾ1 െ ܦ௜ሿ൰
ൌ 		ߙ	 ൅	ߚଵሺܥݑݏݐ݋݉݁ݎ	ܥ݁݊ݐݎ݅ܿ݅ݐݕሻ ൅	ߚଶሺܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݋݌݁ݎܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕሻ
൅	ߚଷ൫ܮ݊ሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܨܫݏሻ൯
൅	ߚସ൫ܮ݊ሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܯܱܰݏሻ൯
൅ ߚହ൫ܮ݊ሺܵݐݎܽݐ݁݃݅ܿ	ܲܽݎݐ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ݏ	ݓ݅ݐ݄	ܧ െ ܥ݋݉݉݁ݎܿ݁ሻ൯
൅ ߚ଺ሺܲݎ݅݋ݎ	ܨ݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ	ܵݒܿݏ	ܧݔ݌. ሻ
൅	ߚ଻ሺܴ݁݃ݑ݈ܽݐ݋ݎݕ	ܨݎܽ݉݁ݓ݋ݎ݇ሻ
൅	ߚଵି௞ሺܸ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ	݋݂	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏሻ 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Results 
 
Table 5 reports the means, standard deviations and minimum and maximum of 
all variables used in the different models.  Table 6 provides similar information, but it 
includes the log transformation of the dependent variables Active Customers and 
Annual Revenue, as well as the log transformation of the independent variables 
related to Strategic Partnerships. 
Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables without Log Transformations 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Active Customers 2,313,603 5,976,633 20 30,000,000 
Annual Revenue ($m) $3.94 $7.86 $0.00 $50.00 
Number of Months Since 
Launch 
42.98 32.19 5.00 163.00 
Overall Success (dummy) 0.381 0.490 0.000 1.000 
Avg. GDP Growth Rate (%) 5.79% 1.26% 2.00% 7.44% 
Avg. Mobile Subscriptions 
per 100 
101.07 26.15 53.80 146.14 
Customer Segment (dummy) 0.730 0.447 0.000 1.000 
Prior Financial Svcs. 
Industry Experience 
0.841 0.368 0.000 1.000 
Customer Centricity Score 11.241 2.291 5.300 15.920 
Interoperability (dummy) 0.571 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Strategic Partnerships with 
FIs 
15.000 23.760 0.000 160.000 
Strategic Partnerships with 
MNOs 
3.492 16.407 0.000 130.000 
Strategic Partnerships with 
E-Commerce 
1.984 3.066 0.000 14.000 
Regulatory Environment 
Score 
63.757 12.679 40.000 78.000 
Percent Change in Reg Env. 
Score 
9.10% 11.70% -6.70% 27.90% 
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Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables with Log Transformations 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Ln (Active Customers) 10.300 3.972 3.045 17.217 
Ln (Annual Revenue) 0.957 1.010 0.000 3.932 
Overall Success (dummy) 0.381 0.490 0.000 1.000 
Number of Months Since 
Launch 
42.98 32.19 5.00 163.00 
Avg. GDP Growth Rate (%) 5.79% 1.26% 2.00% 7.44% 
Avg. Mobile Subscriptions 
per 100 
101.07 26.15 53.80 146.14 
Customer Segment (dummy) 0.730 0.447 0.000 1.000 
Prior Financial Svcs Industry 
Experience 
0.841 0.368 0.000 1.000 
Customer Centricity Score 11.241 2.291 5.300 15.920 
Interoperability (dummy) 0.571 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Ln (Strategic Partnerships 
with FIs) 
2.170 1.083 0.000 5.081 
Ln (Strategic Partnerships 
with MNOs) 
0.605 0.939 0.000 4.875 
Ln (Strategic Partnerships 
with E-Commerce) 
0.694 0.851 0.000 2.708 
Regulatory Environment 
Score 
63.757 12.679 40.000 78.000 
Percent Change in Reg Env. 
Score 
9.10% 11.70% -6.70% 27.90% 
 
The tables show the large variability in the data collected from the different Fintech 
startups in financial inclusion.  For instance, the dependent variable Active Customers 
varies from a minimum of 20 to a maximum of 30,000,000.  Similarly, Annual 
Revenue varies from a minimum of $0 million to a maximum of $50 million.  These 
figures are supported by the fact that the age of the startups, as measured by the 
number of months since launch, ranges from the very early stage ventures with a 
minimum of 5 months to more mature companies that have a maximum of 163 
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months, or 13 years and 7 months.  Given the large variations in the dependent 
variables, it is clear to see that a log transformation is necessary to analyze the data.  
Log transformations are also performed on the strategic partnerships variables, due to 
the large variability in the data.  
Table 7 displays the correlation matrix of all of the variables used in the 
different regression models.  A few important points can be highlighted from this 
table.  First, the correlation of Number of Months Since Launch with the three 
dependent variables is fairly high at above 0.5; therefore, as expected, this variable 
should have a significant effect in all of the regression models.  Second, the log 
transformation of Strategic Partnerships, specifically Strategic Partnerships with FIs, 
has a significant positive correlation with Active Customers, Annual Revenue and 
Overall Success, which would suggest that this variable can help explain the changes 
in the different dependent variables.  Third, the Interoperability dummy variable 
shows a high correlation with Active Customers at 0.4912, but a lower correlation 
with Annual Revenue at 0.2755, suggesting it is highly likely that the regression 
model for Active Customers may have different independent variables that are 
statistically significant when compared to the regression model for Annual Revenue.  
A similar pattern can be observed with the Customer Centricity Score variable, which 
shows a moderately high correlation with Active Customers and Overall Success 
dependent variables, but significantly lower correlation with Annual Revenue.  
Finally, there are fairly large negative correlations (below -0.6) between the control 
variables Avg. GDP Growth and Avg. Mobile Subscriptions per 100, which would 
suggest that these variables would move against each other in the regression models.  
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The Percent Change in Regulatory Environment Score is an additional independent 
variable where there are negative correlations with the dependent variables as well as 
some of the independent variables.  The negative correlation with the dependent 
variables is somewhat concerning since I expected the effects to be positively related 
to the dependent variables. 
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Table 7.  Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) LOG_ACT_CUST 1.0000
(2) LOG_ANN_REV 0.6228 1.0000
(3) OVERALL_SUCCESS 0.7599 0.7150 1.0000
(4) NUM_MTHS_LAUNCH 0.6372 0.6797 0.5244 1.0000
(5) CUST_SGM -0.0855 0.0280 -0.1122 0.1094 1.0000
(6) GDP_AVG_GRWTH 0.0876 -0.0143 0.1415 0.1590 0.0008 1.0000
(7) AVG_MOB_SUBS -0.2793 -0.2317 -0.2867 -0.4354 -0.0341 -0.5899 1.0000
(8) CC_SCORE_NEW 0.2994 0.2588 0.3619 0.1691 -0.0617 -0.0009 -0.0778 1.0000
(9) INTEROP 0.4912 0.2755 0.3491 0.2366 -0.2374 -0.0106 -0.2605 0.1335 1.0000
(10) LOG_STRAT_PART_FI 0.4373 0.5165 0.4413 0.3460 -0.0095 0.0229 -0.0652 0.1373 0.1923 1.0000
(11) LOG_STRAT_PART_MNO 0.4059 0.3203 0.2802 0.3729 -0.0948 -0.1707 -0.0913 0.1214 0.3365 0.3847 1.0000
(12) LOG_STRAT_PART_ECOM -0.0031 0.0519 0.1513 -0.1467 -0.0804 0.0501 0.0647 0.0385 0.0175 -0.0769 0.0277 1.0000
(13) FIN_EXP -0.0162 -0.0828 -0.0170 -0.1852 0.0295 0.1593 -0.0874 -0.2565 0.2382 -0.1963 -0.1069 -0.2460 1.0000
(14) P_CHG_REG_ENV_SCORE -0.1205 -0.0947 0.0816 0.0215 0.1477 0.5715 -0.6437 0.0193 -0.0518 0.0819 -0.1767 -0.0750 0.0417 1.0000
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When running the regression models, I test for two key effects which may 
distort the results: (1) Multicollinearity and (2) Heteroskedasticity.  To test for 
multicollinearity, I looked at the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) in each regression 
model; the average VIF for each independent variable in the regression models was 
below 3.00, which is far lower than the conventional threshold of 20.  Therefore, 
according to Nachtsheim, Neter, Li, & Kutner (2004), there is no multicollinearity 
problem in the data.  To test for the presence of heteroskedasticity, I ran the Breusch-
Pagan-Godfrey Test (Breusch & Pagan, 1979) on all regression models and the 
results show that there is no heteroskedasticity in the regression models where the 
dependent variable is Active Customers, but marginal heteroskedasticity (Prob. Chi 
Square between 0.04 to 0.10) in the regression models where the dependent variable 
is Annual Revenue.  To confirm the marginal effect of heteroskedasticity, I ran the 
Harvey-Godfrey Test, which is another test method to measure heteroskedasticity and 
regresses the log of squared residuals from the original regression against the original 
regressors, for the models where Annual Revenue was the dependent variable.  The 
results of the Harvey-Godfrey Test show no presence of heteroskedasticity, which 
leads to my conclusion that the effect of heteroskedasticity is small; therefore, no 
corrections were made to the regression models to account for this marginal effect. 
 
5.1 Results of the Multivariate Linear Regression Models 
 
I follow a similar analytical methodology as C. Lee, Lee, & Pennings (2001) 
and Miloud, Aspelund, & Cabrol (2012) to develop the linear regression models.  I 
test the additive effects of the different independent variables by running various 
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models for each set of dependent variables.  Please refer to Table 8 and Table 9 for a 
summary of the results of the regression models. The first model is run with only the 
control variables (Model 1), and serves as a benchmark against which to test the 
effects of the independent variables on Active Customers and Annual Revenue.  
Then, five additional regression models, one for each of the different independent 
variables together with the control variables (Models 2 - 6), have been run to examine 
the relative influence of the different independent variables on the two dependent 
variables.  Model 2 tests the Customer Centricity effects, Model 3 tests the 
Interoperability effects, Model 4 tests the Strategic Partnership effects, Model 5 tests 
the Prior Financial Services Industry Experience effects, and Model 6 is the full 
model (which also tests the effects of the Regulatory Environment Framework), 
comprising all of the variables.  Model 7 is a variation to Model 6, where I remove 
any variables that are considered redundant based on the redundant coefficient 
diagnostic test, and also test for any omitted variables.  The redundant coefficient 
diagnostic test results show that the Customer Segment dummy variable is redundant, 
and thus it is removed from the regression model.  After removing Customer 
Segment, Adjusted R-Squared slightly increases from 0.55 to 0.56 in the Active 
Customers regression model, and slightly increases from 0.59 to 0.60 in the Annual 
Revenue regression model.  Therefore, Model 7 provides the best representation to 
explain the behavior of the dependent variables in my research study. 
The regression results of Model 1 for both dependent variables show that the 
only control variable that is statistically significant is Number of Months Since 
Launch.  In fact, this control variable is highly significant (p < 0.01) across all of the 
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regression models.  The addition of the different independent variables demonstrates 
an improvement in Adjusted R-Squared across the different models, increasing from 
0.392 and 0.444 in Model 1 for Active Customers and Annual Revenue, respectively, 
to 0.56 and 0.60 in Model 7 for Active Customers and Annual Revenue, respectively.  
However, as predicted earlier from the correlation matrix, there are differences on 
which independent variables are statistically significant in the regression models. In 
the following pages I provide a more detailed explanation reviewing the effects of the 
main independent variables on the dependent variables. 
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Table 8.  Log Transformation of Active Customers – OLS Regression Models 
(N=63) 
 
  
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Business Models
Customer Centricity Score 0.3209*† 0.2803* 0.2509 0.304575*† 0.3100** 0.3110**
(0.1713) (0.1563) (0.1551) (0.1595) (0.1566) (0.1552)
Interoperability (dummy) 2.8051*** 2.5080*** 2.0490** 1.8776** 1.9460***
(0.7835) (0.7973) (0.8662) (0.8561) (0.8504)
Partnerships
Ln (Strategic Partnerships - FIs) 0.6499* 0.7462** 0.9128*** 0.9139***
(0.3630) (0.3680) (0.3741) (0.3708)
Ln (Strategic Partnerships - MNOs) 0.1604 0.1476 0.0410 0.0491
(0.4488) (0.4459) (0.4421) (0.4376)
Ln (Strategic Partnerships - E-Commerce) 0.2834 0.4842 0.3845 0.3784
0.4189 (0.4435) (0.4393) (0.4350)
Resources / Capabilities
Prior Financial Svcs Experience (dummy) 1.5184 1.2704 1.2117
(1.1604) (1.1482) (1.1236)
Market / Environment
Percent Change in Score of Regulatory 
Env. Openness to Financial Inclusion -8.1039* -8.3994*
(4.7135) (4.5816)
Control Variables
Number of Mths Since Launch 0.0804*** 0.0765*** 0.0703*** 0.0616*** 0.0662*** 0.0554*** 0.0542***
(0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0151) (0.0145)
Customer Segment (dummy) -1.3968 -1.2628 -0.4486 -0.3896 -0.5388 -0.2619
(0.8848) (0.8692) (0.8231) (0.8166) (0.8192) (0.8201)
Avg. GDP Growth -0.0792 -0.0510 0.2072 0.1700 0.0547 0.2173 0.2360
(0.3888) (0.3809) (0.3541) (0.3635) (0.3717) (0.3770) (0.3692)
Avg. Mobile Subs per 100 -0.0024 -0.0014 0.0167 0.0111 0.0099 -0.0152 -0.0157
(0.0206) (0.0202) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0237) (0.0234)
Constant 8.5686** 4.7669 -0.7227 -0.1298 -1.3906 1.2218 1.0433
(4.1459) (4.5382) (4.3428) (4.3153) (4.3935) (4.5730) (4.4993)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3915 0.4168 0.5169 0.5288 0.5351 0.5519 0.5597
F-Statistic 10.9741 9.8607 12.0573 8.7314 8.1351 7.9425 8.8799
Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p  < 0.10;  ** p  < 0.05;  *** p  < 0.01 (two-tailed test).
† p -value at 0.0675, therefore marginal statistical significance at 0.05.
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Table 9.  Log Transformation of Annual Revenue – OLS Regression Models 
(N=63) 
 
  
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Business Models
Customer Centricity Score 0.0624 0.0593 0.0456 0.0694* 0.0702* 0.0704*†
(0.0421) (0.0422) (0.0385) (0.0381) (0.0381) (0.0377)
Interoperability (dummy) 0.2174 0.1491 -0.0545 -0.0800 -0.0683
(0.2116) (0.1977) (0.2069) (0.2081) (0.1996)
Partnerships
Ln (Strategic Partnerships - FIs) 0.3131*** 0.3558*** 0.3806*** 0.3808***
(0.0900) (0.0879) (0.0909) (0.0901)
Ln (Strategic Partnerships - MNOs) -0.1184 -0.1241 -0.1400 -0.1386
(0.1113) (0.1065) (0.1075) (0.1063)
Ln (Strategic Partnerships - E-Commerce) 0.2075** 0.2966*** 0.2818*** 0.2807***
(0.1039) (0.1059) (0.1068) (0.1063)
Resources / Capabilities
Prior Financial Svcs Experience (dummy) 0.6736*** 0.6367*** 0.6266***
(0.2772) (0.2791) (0.2730)
Market / Environment
Percent Change in Score of Regulatory 
Env. Openness to Financial Inclusion -1.2065 -1.2572
(1.1456) (1.1130)
Control Variables
Number of Mths Since Launch 0.0221*** 0.0214*** 0.0209*** 0.0190*** 0.0211*** 0.0194*** 0.0192***
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0035)
Customer Segment (dummy) -0.1107 -0.0847 -0.0216 -0.0200 -0.0862 -0.0449
(0.2152) (0.2138) (0.2223) (0.2025) (0.1957) (0.1993)
Avg. GDP Growth -0.1016 -0.0961 -0.0761 -0.1346 -0.1857 -0.1615* -0.1583*
(0.0946) (0.0937) (0.0956) (0.0902) (0.0888) (0.0916) (0.0897)
Avg. Mobile Subs per 100 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0058 -0.0059
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0058) (0.0057)
Constant 0.6823 -0.0574 -0.4298 -0.2597 -0.8190 -0.4301 -0.4607
(1.0084) (1.1160) (1.1729) (1.0702) (1.0494) (1.1114) (1.0930)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.4439 0.4551 0.4556 0.5523 0.5902 0.5911 0.5986
F-Statistic 13.3713 11.3570 9.6492 9.4985 9.9308 9.1478 10.2445
Prob (F-Statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p  < 0.10;  ** p  < 0.05;  *** p  < 0.01 (two-tailed test).
† p -value at 0.0675, therefore marginal statistical significance at 0.05.
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Prior Financial Services Industry Experience Effects 
 Hypotheses 1a and 1b test the effects of the founding team’s prior financial 
services industry experience on the financial inclusion and financial performance of 
new technology ventures serving the unbanked and underbanked.  The regression 
models show that prior financial services industry experience is not statistically 
significant in the Active Customer regression model, providing no evidence to 
support Hypothesis 1a.  The relationship between founder prior industry experience 
and number of customers has not been studied before, and based on the results of the 
regression model, it seems that having prior financial services industry experience 
does not lead to higher number of active customers. 
Prior financial services industry experience has a strong statistical 
significance in the Annual Revenue regression model, providing support for 
Hypothesis 1b.  The results indicate that the founders’ prior financial services 
industry experience can help the company drive higher financial performance due to 
the fact that the founder/founding team has a better understanding of the intricacies 
and complexities of the financial services industry, and thus is able to figure out how 
to achieve profitability in a faster manner when compared to a founder that does not 
have the prior financial services experience.  Prior research studies (Song et al., 2008) 
have confirmed the positive relationship between new venture financial performance 
(as it relates to revenue and profitability) and founder prior industry experience, 
which is in line with the results above.   
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Customer Centricity Effects 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b suggest that Customer Centricity is positively 
associated with a Fintech startup’s ability to drive higher financial inclusion, as 
measured by Active Customers, and financial performance, as measured by Annual 
Revenue.  Customer Centricity has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
Active Customers in Models 6 and 7, while Model 5 has a marginal statistical 
significance, with p-value of 0.065.  Therefore, for Active Customers, the regression 
results provide good support for Hypothesis 2a.  The effect of Customer Centricity 
on Active Customers can be interpreted as follows (based on Model 7):  All else 
being equal, a 1-unit increase in Customer Centricity Score leads to a 31% increase in 
Active Customers.  Given the size of the coefficient, Customer Centricity has a large 
effect on the percent change in Active Customers. 
The results are slightly different for Annual Revenue; although the 
coefficients are positive (which was the expected direction), they are marginally 
statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.0675.  Therefore, the regression model for 
Annual Revenue modestly supports Hypothesis 2b.  The effect of Customer 
Centricity on Annual Revenue can be interpreted as follows (based on Model 7):  All 
else being equal, a 1-unit increase in Customer Centricity Score leads to a 7% 
increase in Annual Revenue.   
Overall, Customer Centricity is statistically significant across both 
regression models, with higher significance in the Active Customer model, and only 
modest significance in the Annual Revenue model.  The strong effect of Customer 
Centricity on Active Customers is expected, since the goal of a customer-centric 
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business model is to focus on the customer and help solve their problems, which 
would result in higher customer adoption rate.  On the other hand, Customer 
Centricity has a lower effect on Annual Revenue due to the fact that there is a weak 
relationship between customers and revenue as it relates to financial inclusion in 
emerging markets.  Typically, revenue has a direct relationship with the number of 
customers because the more customers you have usually translates into more 
product/services sold and thus higher revenue.  However, when dealing with the 
unbanked and underbanked in emerging markets, this relationship is lower because a 
lot of times the financial products/services are offered for free initially, or at an 
extremely low price, in order to quickly gain customer adoption and scale up.  
Therefore, while the number of customers may increase significantly, revenue will 
grow at a slower rate since the product price is very low. 
Interoperability Effects 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b propose that a Fintech startup with an interoperable 
business model will have higher financial inclusion, as measured by Active 
Customers and higher financial performance, as measured by Annual Revenue, than a 
startup that does not have an interoperable business model.  For the regression models 
where Active Customers is the dependent variable, Interoperability is highly 
significant at a 1% confidence level, providing strong support for Hypothesis 3a.  
By having an interoperable business model, a startup can now access more customers 
since it allows the company to be able to operate across different channels, resulting 
in higher Active Customers.  The effect of Interoperability on Active Customers can 
be interpreted as follows (using Model 7):  All else being equal, if the startup’s 
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business model moves from not being interoperable to becoming interoperable, then 
its Active Customers will increase by 195%.  Similar to Customer Centricity, the 
coefficient for Interoperability is large, resulting in a large effect on the dependent 
variable.   
For the regression models where Annual Revenue is the dependent variable, 
Interoperability is not statistically significant, and thus the results do not provide 
enough evidence to support Hypothesis 3b for Annual Revenue.  Similar to the 
argument for Customer Centricity, by having access to more customers does not 
necessarily translate to higher Annual Revenue. 
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Strategic Partnerships Effects 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b propose that strategic partnerships are positively 
associated with the Fintech startup’s financial inclusion, as measured by Active 
Customers and financial performance, as measured by Annual Revenue.  I tested 
these hypotheses on three types of alliances, or partnerships: financial institutions 
(FIs), mobile network operators (MNOs) and e-commerce companies.  Based on the 
results, Strategic Partnerships with FIs is statistically significant for both Active 
Customers and Annual Revenue dependent variables.  These results render strong 
support for Hypothesis 4a and 4b – namely, that Strategic Partnerships are 
positively correlated to financial inclusion and financial performance.  To interpret 
the results using Model 7 for the dependent variables, we can say the following:  All 
else being equal, a 50% increase in Strategic Partnerships with FIs will result in a 
46% increase in Active Customers, and a 19% increase in Annual Revenue.  Based on 
the results, the effect on Active Customers is very high, while the effect on Annual 
Revenue is more modest. 
When looking at the regression results for Strategic Partnerships with MNOs, 
the coefficients are not statistically significant for Active Customers and Annual 
Revenue, providing not enough evidence to support Hypotheses 4a and 4b.  These 
results are somewhat surprising because the mobile phone is the main method to 
provide access to financial products and services to the unbanked and underbanked, 
and thus MNOs represent a very important distribution channel.  It is possible that 
due to the market dynamics of mobile operators in emerging markets, the number of 
partnerships with MNOs is not significant.  In a lot of emerging market countries, one 
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MNO dominates the mobile phone market (i.e., with more than 60% market share), 
and thus it makes sense to mainly partner with the dominant MNO and not seek 
partnerships with the rest.   
Equally, Strategic Partnerships with E-Commerce companies does not appear 
to be statistically significant for Active Customers, but it is statistically significant for 
Annual Revenue.  Therefore, Strategic Partnerships with E-Commerce companies 
provides support for Hypothesis 4b, when looking at Annual Revenue as the 
dependent variable.  To interpret the effect of Strategic Partnerships with E-
Commerce on Annual Revenue, we can say the following (based on Model 7):  All 
else being equal, a 50% increase in partnerships with E-Commerce firms will result in 
a 14% increase in Annual Revenue.  Interestingly, the effect that Strategic 
Partnerships with E-Commerce has on Annual Revenue is very similar in magnitude 
as the effect that Strategic Partnerships with FIs has on Annual Revenue. 
Based on these results, it is clear to see that the type of strategic partnerships 
that the Fintech startup selects will be essential to determine its potential to generate 
higher number of customers and higher revenue, and thus have higher chances to 
succeed.  One potential reason why Strategic Partnerships with E-Commerce is not 
statistically significant for the Active Customers regression model is due to the fact 
that most unbanked and underbanked customers access these new financial 
products/services through a mobile phone, rather than the internet, which is the most 
common method used by e-commerce platforms.  However, customers that are using 
e-commerce platforms tend to be more established and technologically savvy, so they 
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would be fine paying the different fees for e-commerce transactions, which in turn 
can lead to higher Annual Revenue figures. 
Regulatory Framework Effects 
Prior studies from development organizations have shown that the regulatory 
environment, and specifically the regulatory framework in a country, will have an 
influence in the way that Fintech startups are able to operate.  As a country becomes 
more open to financial inclusion and digital financial services, it will help enable the 
Fintech startups in financial inclusion to have a higher potential to succeed. 
Therefore, Hypotheses 5a and 5b propose that positive changes in the regulatory 
framework of a country towards financial inclusion, as measured by the Percent 
Change in the Regulatory Environment Score, should lead to higher business 
performance for Fintech startups, as measured by Active Customers and Annual 
Revenue.  The results of the regression models show that the Percent Change in the 
Regulatory Environment Score is not statistically significant for Active Customers 
or Annual Revenue, thereby providing not enough evidence to support Hypotheses 
5a and 5b.  Although I expected to see a statistically significant positive relationship 
given prior research studies from development organizations, it is possible that the 
measurement chosen to represent the regulatory framework may not be the most 
relevant.  In addition, the measurement chosen may not show enough variation across 
the countries, which may result in the factor not being statistically significant. 
Effects of the Control Variables 
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 Number of Months Since Launch is the only control variable that is 
statistically significant across all models, with a p-value < 0.01 and a positive 
coefficient.  To interpret the effect of this variable (Model 7):  All else being equal, a 
1-monh increase in the Number of Months Since Launch will result in a 5.4% 
increase in Active Customers and a 1.9% increase in Annual Revenue.  The statistical 
significance of this variable confirms the results that Song, Podoynitsyna, Van Der 
Bij, & Halman, (2008) found in their meta-analysis of empirical studies of success 
factors of new technology ventures.  In their research study, the authors demonstrate 
that Firm Age, which is another way of representing Number of Months Since 
Launch, is statistically significant across all of the 31 different studies they evaluated.   
 
5.2 Results of the Binomial Logit Model 
 
Table 10 shows the binomial regression models that were run for the dummy 
dependent variable Overall Success.  As you can see, the table only displays two 
models, which correspond to the same numbering system as the linear regression 
models above: 
 Model 6 – the full model with all of the independent variables that I am 
evaluating, together with the 4 control variables 
 Model 7 – optimized version of Model 6, which removes Customer 
Segment dummy variable, since it is found to be redundant after running a 
redundant diagnostic analysis 
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As discussed in the previous section, the binomial logit regression model 
measures the effect that the different independent variables have on the probability of 
success of Fintech startups in financial inclusion.  Essentially, the logistic regression 
models are fitted using the method of maximum likelihood – i.e., the parameter 
estimates are those values which maximize the likelihood of the data which have been 
observed.  A different measure from Adjusted R-Squared is used, which is sometimes 
referred to as a “pseudo R-squared”, or McFadden’s R-Squared.  This measure is 
calculated as follows: 
ܴெ௖ி௔ௗௗ௘௡ଶ ൌ 1 െ	 log	ሺܮ௖ሻlog	ሺܮ௡௨௟௟ሻ 
where ܮ௖ denotes the (maximized) likelihood value from the current fitted model, and 
ܮ௡௨௟௟ denotes the corresponding value for the null model – the model with an 
intercept and no independent variables.  Based on this equation, if the model has no 
predictive ability, then the likelihood value of the current model will be close to equal 
to the likelihood value of the null model, which results in the ratio being close to 1, 
and the ܴெ௖ி௔ௗௗ௘௡ଶ  will be close to, or equal to zero, as expected.  Therefore, the 
higher the value of ܴெ௖ி௔ௗௗ௘௡ଶ , the higher is the maximum likelihood (or probability) 
that the independent variables are able to predict the dependent variable.  Models 6 
and 7 in Table 10 show that the McFadden’s R-Squared are 0.60 and 0.57, 
respectively, which demonstrate the strong predictive power of the independent 
variables in these models.  Finally, to interpret the effect of the independent variable 
coefficients on the dependent variable, the concept of Odds Ratio (OR) is used in 
binomial regression models.  OR is calculated as the exp (coefficient of independent 
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variable), or another way to show it is that the coefficient of the independent variable 
is equal to log(OR).  Therefore, for every increase of 1 unit in the independent 
variable, the odds of the dependent variable being equal to 1 increases by exp 
(coefficient of independent variable). 
The binomial regression models show that Prior Financial Services Industry 
Experience is marginally statistically significant (p = 0.0675), providing modest 
support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b.   
Conversely, the binomial regression models show that the Customer 
Centricity independent variable has a high statistical significance (p < 0.05), 
providing strong support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  The coefficient of Customer 
Centricity can be interpreted in the following manner:  All else equal, for every 
increase of 1 unit in the startup’s Customer Centricity score, the odds of overall 
success for the Fintech startup increase by exp(b), or 1.87 times, where b is the value 
of the independent variable coefficient – in this case, b is equal to 0.6242.  Therefore, 
the model is highly sensitive to increases in the Customer Centricity score.   
The results show no evidence to support Hypotheses 3a and 3b, and 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b, since the coefficients for Interoperability and Percent 
Change in Regulatory Environment score are not statistically significant.  These 
results are similar to the linear regression models for Annual Revenue for Hypothesis 
3 (Annual Revenue) and for Active Customers and Annual Revenue for Hypothesis 5. 
The coefficients for the Strategic Partnerships variables show high 
statistical significance for alliances with FIs as well as alliances with E-Commerce 
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companies (p < 0.01), supporting Hypotheses 4a and 4b.  These results are 
consistent with the linear regression models, specifically as it relates to Strategic 
Partnerships with FIs.  Moreover, it provides additional support to the statistical 
significance of alliances with E-Commerce companies, which was significant in the 
Annual Revenue linear regression model.  To interpret these variables: 
 All else being equal, the odds of overall success for a Fintech startup 
increase by 4.5 times for every additional Financial Institution strategic 
partner that the startup is able to add 
 All else being equal, the odds of overall success for a Fintech startup 
increase by 6.1 times for every additional E-Commerce company strategic 
partner that the startup is able to add 
Finally, as observed in the regression models, Number of Months Since 
Launch is the only control variable that demonstrates statistical significance in the 
binomial logit model.  Having a p-value < 0.01, this variable is highly significant and 
has a positive coefficient, which is expected.  To interpret the effect of this variable 
(Model 7):  All else being equal, the odds of overall success increase by 1.1 times for 
every additional month increase in the Number of Months Since Launch. 
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Table 10.  Overall Success – Binomial Logit Regression Models (N=63) 
 
Independent Variable Model 6 Model 7
Business Models
Customer Centricity Score 0.6216*** 0.6242***
(0.2874) (0.2831)
Interoperability 0.9108 1.2566
(1.2468) (1.2004)
Partnerships
Ln(Strategic Partnerships - FIs) 1.4071*** 1.4944***
(0.6209) (0.6164)
Ln(Strategic Partnerships - MNOs) -0.9357 -0.6265
(0.8444) (0.7968)
Ln(Strategic Partnerships - E-Commerce) 1.8633*** 1.8089***
(0.7661) (0.7986)
Resources / Capabilities
Prior Financial Svcs Experience (dummy) 4.8891** 4.0711*†
(2.4983) (2.2125)
Market / Environment
Percent Change in Score of Regulatory Env. 
Openness to Financial Inclusion 4.6588 2.6026
(5.9697) (5.3651)
Control Variables
Number of Mths Since Launch 0.0967*** 0.0758***
(0.0359) (0.0278)
Customer Segment (dummy) -1.7769
(1.2684)
Avg. GDP Growth -0.5947 -0.5664
(0.5877) (0.5820)
Avg. Mobile Subs per 100 -0.0040 -0.0140
(0.0313) (0.0293)
Constant -16.0308*** -15.2118***
(6.7978) (6.3500)
McFadden R-Squared 0.5953 0.5698
LR statistic 49.85 47.71
Prob(LR statistic) 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p  < 0.10;  ** p  < 0.05;  *** p  < 0.01 (two-tailed test).
† p -value at 0.0675, therefore marginal statistical significance at 0.05.
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Table 11.  Summary Statistics for Overall Success – Binomial Logit Regression 
Model 
 
Note: Total column displays average and median values of all samples for the average and median measures; for 
all other measures, it is the sum of Successful and Not Successful columns.  
 
To corroborate the results of the hypotheses testing for the binomial logit 
regression model, Table 11 displays average values for the different independent 
variables as it relates to the dependent variable Overall Success.  As discussed earlier, 
a startup has been categorized as Successful if its Annual Revenue and Active 
Customers were equal to or above the median values of all of the startups evaluated in 
Yes No Total
Number of Samples 24 39 63
Median Active Customers 1,725,000 1,955 30,000
Median Annual Revenue ($m) $6.00 $0.14 $1.00
Avg. Number of Months since Launch 63 30 42
Avg. Customer Centricity Score 12.29 10.60 11.24
Avg. Num of Strategic Partnerships with FIs 26 8 15
Avg. Num of Strategic Partnerships with MNOs 7.67 0.92 3.45
Avg. Num of Strategic Partnerships with E-
Commerce
2.71 1.54 2.02
Number of Startups
B2B 16 30 46
B2C 8 9 17
Interoperable 19 17 36
Not Interoperable 5 22 27
Prior Financial Svcs Experience 13 16 29
No Prior Financial Svcs Experience 11 23 34
By Product Segment:
Credit Scoring 4 1 5
Insurance 2 0 2
Lending 1 10 11
Money Transfer 10 5 15
P2P Lending 1 15 16
Payments 3 6 9
Other 3 2 5
Overall Success
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my study.  The table indicates that the Successful startups have significantly higher 
median Active Customers and Annual Revenue, as well as higher Avg. Number of 
Months since Launch, which is in line with what I had expected.  Additionally, 
Successful startups have a higher Avg. Customer Centricity Score at 12.29 vs.10.60 
for the startups that are classified as Not Successful.  A similar pattern can be 
observed for Avg. Strategic Partnerships (with FIs, MNOs and E-Commerce) – 
Successful startups tend to have significantly higher average values for all of these 
variables when compared to Not Successful startups. 
The lower part of Table 11 also provides some interesting insights on the 
number of startups that are classified as Successful vs. Not Successful based on 
different categories, such as Customer Segment (B2B vs. B2C), Interoperability, Prior 
Financial Services Experience and Product Segment.  From a Customer Segment 
viewpoint, the results show that the number of B2B startups in my study is 2.7 times 
larger than the number of B2C startups.  Due to this large difference, it is expected 
that most of the Successful startups would be B2B.  However, there are almost an 
equal number of B2C startups that are classified as Successful and Not Successful, 
whereas in the case of B2B startups, the number of Not Successful is almost twice as 
large as the number of Successful startups.  This discrepancy leads me to believe that 
the Customer Segment does not impact the Success of Fintech startups, confirming 
the lack of statistical significance for this variable in the regression and binomial logit 
models.  For Interoperability, there is an almost equal split between startups that have 
an interoperable business model and those that do not have an interoperable model.  
The results are comparable to the mixed results for Customer Segment, where there is 
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an almost equal number of startups that are Successful with an Interoperable business 
model, and startups that are Not Successful with an Interoperable business model.  
Consequently, the variable Interoperability is not statistically significant in the 
binomial logit model.  Lastly, the breakdown of Successful vs. Not Successful 
startups by Product Segment reveals that the Successful startups are mainly in 3 
product areas: Credit Scoring, Money Transfer, and Insurance.  There are Successful 
startups from other product segments such as P2P Lending, Lending, and Payments in 
my research study, however, the number of startups in these segments classified as 
Not Successful is significantly higher than those classified as Successful. 
Table 12 provides more details by product segment on the startups that were 
classified as Successful in the binomial logit model.  The table demonstrates that the 
average Customer Centricity Score is fairly similar for all Successful startups, 
irrespective of the product segment.  Credit Scoring, Payments and Insurance startups 
tend to have higher average Customer Centricity Scores, while Other, Lending and 
P2P Lending startups tend to be on the lower end.  In addition, the data shows that 
average number of Strategic Partnerships with FIs is fairly similar across the 3 main 
product segments: Credit Scoring, Payments, and Money Transfer.  Startups in the 
Insurance and Other product segments have unusually high average number of 
Strategic Partnerships with FIs, but the number of successful startups in these two 
areas is fairly limited, and thus the numbers are not reliable.  On the other hand, 
startups in the Lending and P2P Lending product segments have the lowest average 
number of Strategic Partnerships with FIs.  Regarding Average number of Strategic 
Partnerships with E-Commerce and MNOs, it seems that the numbers are also highly 
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dependent on the product segment.  Thus, Successful startups in Money Transfer and 
P2P Lending product segments tend to have more Strategic Partnerships with E-
Commerce, while startups in Money Transfer and Insurance tend to have higher 
Strategic Partnerships with MNOs.  In summary, the table highlights the fact that 
the number of Strategic Partnerships that Successful startups develop will be highly 
dependent on the product segment that they serve.  The number of Strategic 
Partnerships with FIs tends to be highest with startups in Credit Scoring, Money 
Transfer and Payments, while it is the lowest in Lending and P2P Lending startups.  
One reason could be the fact that financial institutions are essential to facilitate the 
money transfer, credit scoring and payments processes for the customers of these 
startups since most of them require a connection with a bank to carry out these 
transactions.  Conversely, the Lending and P2P Lending startups may not see a lot 
value to partner with financial institutions because their business model is effectively 
competing with banks.  Partnerships with MNOs are greatest in the Money Transfer 
and Insurance startups, mainly due to the fact that the mobile phone is the main 
distribution channel for these products, and thus it makes sense to partner with 
MNOs.  Finally, Partnerships with E-Commerce companies are highest in Money 
Transfer and P2P Lending startups since it serves as a new source of customers for 
the startups.  E-Commerce firms provide access to potential small businesses that are 
selling through the e-commerce platform, which allows the P2P Lending startups to 
offer loans to them.  For Money Transfer startups, partnerships with E-Commerce 
firms is also important because it allows the users of the E-Commerce platform to 
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have an alternative way to pay for the goods and services through mobile wallets 
offered by the Money Transfer startups. 
Table 12.  Successful Startups from Binomial Logit Model – Summary of Key 
Factors by Product Segment 
 
 
5.3 Overall Summary of Results 
 
Table 13 provides a high-level summary result of the hypotheses testing for 
the different models in my research study.  The table is organized in the following 
manner.  For each hypothesis, there are 3 columns representing the 3 different 
regression models that were run: (1) Active Customers; (2) Annual Revenue; and (3) 
Overall Success.  For each independent variable, there were two hypotheses tested, 
which correspond to the Active Customers and Annual Revenue regression models.  
For example, prior financial services industry experience has two hypotheses: 1a 
(Active Customers) and 1b (Annual Revenue), which are displayed in different 
Product Segment
Strategic 
Partnerships 
w/FI
Strategic 
Partnerships 
w/E-Comm
Strategic 
Partnerships 
w/MNO
Customer 
Centricity 
Score
Credit Scoring 16 1 3 13.08
Money Transfer 18 5 14 12.33
Payments 16 2 0 12.89
Lending 11 0 4 10.00
P2P Lending 3 3 0 10.70
Insurance 110 0 12 13.07
Other 35 1 2 11.26
Overall Median 16 1 3 12.29
Average Values of Factors
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columns.  The results for each hypothesis are labeled as “Yes” if the independent 
variable is statistically significant and supports the hypothesis.  Alternatively, it is 
labeled “No” if the independent variable is not statistically significant and does not 
support the hypothesis.   
The results show that Customer Centricity Score and Strategic Partnerships 
are statistically significant across all of the models, while Prior Financial Services 
experience is statistically significant in 2 out of the 3 models, making it an important 
variable to consider.  Interoperability is only statistically significant in the Active 
Customers regression model, while Percent Change in Regulatory Environment Score 
is not statistically significant in any of the models.  Finally, even though it is not 
highlighted in Table 13, the control variable Number of Months since Launch of a 
startup is highly statistically significant across all of the models, which was expected.  
Please refer to Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of the results and the main 
conclusions.   
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Table 13.  Hypotheses Testing Summary for All Models – Statistical Significance 
  Linear Regression Models Binomial Logit 
Hypotheses 
Independent 
Variables Tested 
Active 
Customers Annual Revenue Overall Success 
Hypothesis 1 Prior Financial Svcs Experience No Yes 
Yes 
(modest) 
Hypothesis 2 Customer Centricity Score Yes 
Yes 
(modest) Yes 
Hypothesis 3 Interoperability (dummy) Yes No No 
Hypothesis 4 Strategic Partnerships Yes (Strat. Part. with FIs) 
Yes (Strat. Part. 
With FIs, E-Comm) 
Yes (Strat. Part. 
With FIs, E-Comm) 
Hypothesis 5 Percent Change in Regulatory Env. Score No No No 
Notes: “Yes” means that the independent variable tested for the corresponding regression model is statistically 
significant and provides support for the hypothesis.  On the other hand, “No” means that the independent variable 
tested is not statistically significant and does not provide support for the hypothesis. 
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Chapter 6: Illustrative Case Studies 
 
To support the quantitative results of my research study, illustrative case 
studies of 4 Fintech startups that are classified as Successful in the binomial logit 
regression model are presented below.  The case studies provide qualitative 
perspectives and key insights which complement the empirical results.  Table 14 
summarizes some of the key characteristics of the startups that are showcased in the 
case studies.  Two startups were chosen from each customer segment (B2C and B2B), 
and each company serves a different product segment.  To tie it back to the regression 
models, I show qualitatively how the values of the main factors compare to the 
average values of all of the startups classified as Successful in the binomial logit 
regression model, using the following categories: Equal to Average, Above Average 
and Below Average.  For instance, Above Average classification refers to the factor 
having a value above the average value for all of the Successful startups in the data 
sample.  Therefore, an Equal to Average and/or Above Average classification 
refer to the factor being statistically significant and supporting the 
corresponding hypotheses tested.  A Below Average classification refers to the 
factor not being statistically significant and thus providing not enough evidence 
to support the corresponding hypotheses tested.  This classification system is used 
to protect the confidentiality of the data provided by these companies.   
The case studies are structured in the following 4 segments: 
 Background / Overview – provides an overview of what the company does, 
when it was founded and key products/services it offers 
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 Business Model – discusses the company’s business model from two 
perspectives: (1) social impact and (2) financial performance 
 Support for Quantitative Results – provides evidence on how the company 
supports the quantitative results of the main factors of the empirical models 
 New Insights – discusses unique insights that are gained in addition to the 
quantitative results 
Table 14.  Overview of Key Variables for Startups Highlighted in Case Studies 
  JUMO Wave Money Mobisol 
Micro-
Ensure 
Product Segment  Credit Scoring Money Transfer Lending Insurance 
Customer Segment  B2B B2C B2C B2B 
Region  Africa, South Asia Southeast Asia Africa 
Africa, South 
Asia 
Number of Months 
Since Launch 
 31 10 67 67 
      
Comparison to Avg. 
Values of Successful 
Startups 
Corresponding 
Hypotheses 
    
Customer Centricity 
Score  2a, 2b ++ ++ – ++ 
Strategic 
Partnerships with FIs 
4a, 4b 
+ – – ++ 
Strategic 
Partnerships with 
MNOs 
– – – ++ 
Strategic 
Partnerships with E-
Commerce 
+ ++ – – 
      
Other Key Factors  
Founder/Founding 
Team Prior Financial 
Svcs. Experience 
1a, 1b Yes Yes No Yes 
Interoperable 
Business Model 3a, 3b Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: “+” refers to equal to the Average value of Successful startups; “++” refers to Above the Average value of 
Successful startups; and “–“ refers to Below the Average value of Successful startups.  Number of Months since 
Launch refers to the number of months from the time the startup launched its first product/service up to August 
2017. 
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JUMO Case Study 
Background / Overview 
 Founded in South Africa in 2015, JUMO is a predictive technology company 
that uses behavioral data from mobile usage to create financial identities for, and offer 
financial products to, micro, small and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs) that do 
not have access to formal financial services before.  The company was born out of 
global financial services company afb; however, within the past year, JUMO sold afb 
and became an independent entity.  JUMO partners with mobile network operators 
across Africa and South Asia to gain access to customers’ data (GSM and mobile 
money transactional data) – the company analyzes more than 10,000 behavioral 
signals – to assess creditworthiness and offer real-time, customized loans and savings 
products to MSMEs over their mobile phones.  JUMO’s focus is on providing these 
financial products and services to the unbanked and underbanked in emerging 
markets. 
Business Model 
 JUMO’s business model is a three-sided marketplace where the company sits 
in between a mobile wallet operator and financial institutions to integrate their 
technology and offer end-to-end services to microentrepreneurs.  On one side of the 
marketplace, the company partners with mobile wallet operators, which may be run 
by a financial institution, MNO or a startup, to gain access to the customers as well as 
their mobile data.  Through advanced data analytics, machine learning and other 
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technology solutions, JUMO has developed its own KYC/identity verification and 
credit risk models to assess the identity and creditworthiness of microentrepreneurs in 
order to determine how much they can borrow.  On the other side of the marketplace, 
JUMO partners with financial institutions which provide affordable financial 
products, such as loans and savings, to the customers.  Although JUMO does not 
assume the credit risk on the loan products, the company takes care of the 
onboarding, servicing and loan collection processes.  Essentially, JUMO provides 
important benefits to both sides of the marketplace.  For the mobile wallet operators, 
JUMO is able to decrease churn, increase activity and offer additional 
products/services (loans, savings products) through their distribution channel.  For the 
financial institutions, JUMO provides access to a customer base that the banks have 
largely ignored in the past.  JUMO earns a fee from the financial institutions, and 
through its credit scoring algorithms and KYC/ID verification systems, is able to 
qualify the customers and make it easier for the financial institutions to lend to these 
individuals.   
 To prove the accuracy of their data analytics and credit risk scoring model to 
the financial institutions, JUMO initially provided loans to the unbanked and 
underbanked using its own capital.  Now that the model has been proven, JUMO 
partners with financial institutions to provide the loans and savings products to the 
unbanked and underbanked.  Overall, the default rate for loans offered to the 
unbanked and underbanked using JUMO is below 2%. 
 JUMO’s mission is to serve the small and microentrepreneurs that do not have 
access to formal financial products and services before, and provide them with 
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affordable products to help them grow their businesses and improve their economic 
livelihood.  In fact, for 80% of JUMO’s customers, it is the first time that they are 
interacting with a bank or financial institution.17  The use of technology makes it 
possible for JUMO to offer extremely affordable loans to individuals and 
entrepreneurs, while at the same time being a sustainable, for-profit company.  
Moreover, the loans that JUMO offers are used by the microentrepreneurs to expand 
their businesses and ultimately help them get out of poverty.   
 In the short time frame that JUMO has been operating, the company has 
scaled up very quickly to become one of the largest fintech companies in Africa 
helping the unbanked and underbanked.  In the first 3 months of operations, JUMO 
granted 6 million loans to 2.25 million unique customers, and was managing between 
30,000 to 50,000 loans a day, with loans as low as US$0.30 in value.18  Currently, 
JUMO has 5 million unique customers across 6 countries in Africa, and has disbursed 
more than 20 million loans since its inception. JUMO is also working to broaden its 
product offering to include savings and insurance products.  The company is actively 
looking to expand geographically; and recently launched in Pakistan and is exploring 
additional expansion opportunities in Asia.19  Finally, the company has grown from 7 
employees in 2015 to 380 employees, with development offices in Cape Town and 
Nairobi.   
  
                                                            
17 https://www.jumo.world/about.htm. 
18 https://thenextweb.com/insider/2015/12/16/helping-africans-improve-their-lives-by-tracking-their-
smartphone-usage/#.tnw_GDUee9PJ. 
19 http://ventureburn.com/2017/05/jumo-first-african-startup-selected-google-launchpad-accelerator/ 
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Support for Quantitative Results 
Helping customers and designing products that truly meets their needs has 
been at the heart of the company’s mission since its inception.  According to JUMO’s 
CEO, Andrew Watkins-Ball, traditional banks offer customers standard products that 
most times do not fit the customer’s needs.  JUMO is reversing this process, and the 
way to do it is to use the customer’s digital footprint to better understand their needs 
and develop customized products that solves their credit requirements.  Thus, 
customer centricity is key to JUMO’s success. Based on my research study, JUMO 
has one of the highest Customer Centricity Scores of all of the startups that I 
evaluated.  The company spends a lot of time researching their end customers in order 
to gain qualitative and quantitative insights on how to best serve them.  In fact, the 
company created a “customer intelligence team” which is dedicated to understanding 
the customer.  Based on this information, the company is able to make modifications 
on its product offering and the services it provides.  Moreover, the company tracks 
essential metrics such as Customer Lifetime Value (CLV) and Customer Acquisition 
Cost (CAC), aiming to optimize them (increase CLV while decreasing CAC) with 
sustainable unit economics.  Over the last 2 years, JUMO has seen a healthy growth 
in CLV, which is proof that they are delivering on what the customers need.  Two 
additional metrics that highlight the company’s customer centric model are its strong 
customer referral rate, and its more than 80% customer repeat rate. Both demonstrate 
that the customers trust JUMO and highly value their products/services. 
 Strategic partnerships with financial institutions, MNOs and e-commerce 
companies/digital ecosystems are critical for JUMO to deliver its products and 
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services.  As mentioned above, MNOs provide access to the customers through 
mobile wallets, while financial institutions provide the capital for the loans and other 
financial products offered to the unbanked and underbanked.  Based on the results 
presented in Table 14, the number of partnerships that JUMO has established with 
financial institutions are equal to the average number of partnerships that other 
successful startups have forged with financial institutions in my data sample.  On the 
other hand, the number of partnerships with MNOs is below the average of other 
successful startups.  The low number may be due to the fact that MNOs are no longer 
the only providers of mobile wallets, and given the growing penetration rate of 
smartphones, accessing the data does not require to set up partnerships with MNOs.  
Another interesting partnership that also helped JUMO increase its distribution 
channel is the number of alliances with e-commerce companies, which is equal to the 
average when compared to other successful startups in my research study.  These 
partnerships allow JUMO to apply its predictive capability to broader segments 
(beyond MNOs). 
 From an interoperability perspective, JUMO is agnostic to the data ecosystem 
– its products and services can be accessed across different MNOs and mobile wallet 
providers, allowing more flexibility to customers and at the same time increasing the 
number of potential customers that it can target. 
 Finally, JUMO’s founding team brings significant experience from the 
financial service industry.  The company’s CEO and founder, Andrew Watkins-Ball, 
worked for more than 7 years at Salomon Brothers in London and New York.  The 
other 3 co-founders also bring strong financial services experience in both developed 
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and emerging markets, resulting in a team that has more than 25 years of combined 
experience in the financial services industry sector.  This experience is invaluable 
because the company can better understand the problems that need to be solved for 
customers and how to best navigate in a highly regulated environment. 
New Insights 
In the LASIC principles developed by Lee & Teo (2015), the authors 
highlight Scalability as a key factor that Fintech companies need to have in order to 
drive higher financial inclusion and be successful.  Having a scalable business model 
is vital in order to be able to reach to the large population of unbanked and 
underbanked, and do it in a quick manner.  My research study does not address 
scalability as a main factor in the empirical model, since it is difficult to measure and 
quantify; however, it is an important factor that is needed to drive higher financial 
inclusion and higher financial performance.  Clearly, JUMO demonstrates that it has a 
scalable business model; as mentioned earlier, in the first 3 months of operations, the 
company served more than 2.25 million unique customers, and managed between 
30,000 to 50,000 loans per day.  This high growth rate is very similar to the growth 
demonstrated by M-PESA, one of the most successful new technology ventures in 
financial inclusion, in its first year of operation.  In the 2 years that the company has 
been in existence, JUMO now serves 5 million unique customers across 6 African 
countries.  In addition to geographic expansion to Asia and other emerging markets, 
the company is also offering savings products, and plans to introduce insurance 
products in the near future. 
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 Another interesting insight from my interaction with JUMO is the fact that the 
founders also bring extensive experience in founding new companies and technology 
ventures prior to founding JUMO.  For instance, the CEO successfully built an event 
production business in Cape Town that included work for Nelson Mandela.  In 
addition, he also built several successful technology ventures including Gateway 
Telecommunications, a satellite provider, which was sold to Vodafone for $675 
million in 2008.  By having this experience, the founders are able to take the 
learnings from prior ventures and be more effective and efficient with their new 
ventures, thereby increasing their chances of being able to succeed.  More 
importantly, the prior startup experience also lends significant credibility with VC 
funds and other sources of funding for the new venture, demonstrating that the 
founding team has experience doing startups before and should be able to apply what 
they learned in the new venture. 
 Overall, JUMO has been able to successfully deliver strong social impact and 
financial performance by providing access to financial products and services to 
millions of people that did not have it before.  This point is reinforced by the fact that 
in its largest markets more than 80% of the company’s customers were completely 
unbanked before.  The combination of a highly customer-centric and interoperable 
business model, partnerships with numerous FIs, MNOs and E-Commerce/digital 
ecosystems, and extensive prior financial services industry experience for the 
founding team has led the company to perform very well financially and attract a 
significant amount of funding from VC funds.  These factors are complemented by 
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the highly scalable business model and the prior startup experience for the founders, 
which are essential for the company to continue to grow and be successful. 
 
Wave Money Case Study 
Background / Overview 
 Founded in 2016, Wave Money is a mobile financial services company that 
provides a mobile wallet, money transfer services (send/receive money within the 
country), and the ability to pay bills on your mobile phone at anytime and anywhere 
for the unbanked and underbanked in Myanmar.  The company is a joint venture 
between Yoma Bank, Telenor (MNO) and First Myanmar Investment.  Although the 
ownership structure consists of two relatively large corporations, Wave Money is run 
as a startup, with complete independence from Yoma Bank and Telenor.   
Business Model 
 Wave Money’s business model is very similar to other successful mobile 
wallet / mobile money transfer businesses such as M-PESA in Kenya and bKash in 
Bangladesh.  Specifically, the company uses a broad agent network to reach as many 
target locations and customers as possible.  Money transfers either take place over the 
counter from agent-to-agent or through mobile phones.  The company charges a small 
transaction fee on every transaction and shares the revenue with the agents.  
Individuals can send as little as 1 MMK ($0.00074) to anywhere in Myanmar who 
has a mobile phone.  Moreover, the money transfer service can be used by anybody 
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regardless of sender or recipient mobile network, and the service is available long 
after the banks have closed and during weekends. 
 The agent network forms a strong backbone for Wave Money’s business and 
allows the company to be able to reach its customers in rural areas.  The company 
leverages on Telenor’s network of agents, as well as its own agents to assist with 
onboarding clients.  According to Brad Jones, Wave Money’s CEO, one of the 
biggest challenges in the money transfer business is the distribution network, 
especially in a country as large as Myanmar, which is mostly rural and with poor 
infrastructure.  Currently, Wave Money has more than 8,500 agents (also known as 
Wave Shops) in about 70% of townships around the country, and also present in 
extremely remote places, so that it is easier for people to access the company’s 
products.  The company claims that the availability of Wave Shops across Myanmar 
far outnumbers the number of bank branches and ATMs combined.20   
 Wave Money has a very clear social mission and objective: to provide 
reliable, simple, affordable, and trustworthy financial services which can be 
conveniently accessed via mobile phones.  The company empowers all people in 
Myanmar, especially those that have never had a bank account, with the freedom to 
manage their money the way they most prefer.  More than 90% of Wave Money’s 
customers have never had a bank account.  Equally important, Wave Money wants to 
make sure that its customers can transfer money quickly, safely and conveniently 
throughout Myanmar, freeing customers from the hassles and worries of traditional 
                                                            
20 https://www.wavemoney.com.mm/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/htd_Wave-Money-new-slab-shwe-
Press-Release-Eng.pdf 
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methods.  According to Wave Money’s CEO, money transfers in Myanmar usually 
take place through banks, even when the individual does not have a bank account, 
which is highly inefficient.21  Therefore, it makes sense for companies like Wave 
Money to come in and move customers to a more convenient and efficient channel.  
Since its founding less than 1 year ago, Wave Money has been able to help a lot of 
people to be able to conveniently, safely and instantaneously send money to loved 
ones in remote, rural parts of Myanmar which used to take days and a lot of time and 
money wasted in the process. 
 In the short time frame that the company has been in operations, Wave 
Money’s customer base has grown steadily.  In the first two months after launch, the 
company acquired 100,000 customers, and it has an ambitious target to achieve 
around 1 million customers by end of 2017.  According to Vibeke Siljan Krohn, 
Wave Money’s head of sales, marketing and distribution, understanding customers’ 
needs, delivering the right products at affordable prices, easy access and convenience 
play a decisive role in the company’s success.22  Although money transfer and bill 
payments are the company’s only products at the moment, Wave Money is looking to 
expand to other financial products such as loans, savings and microinsurance in the 
future. 
Support for Quantitative Results 
 Wave Money’s current success can be partially attributed to its highly 
customer-centric business model.  Based on my research study, Wave Money’s 
                                                            
21 http://sea-globe.com/dethroning-cash-in-myanmar/.  
22 http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/business/6630. 
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Customer Centricity score is the second highest out of all of the startups that were 
classified as successful.  From its inception, Brad recognized that serving the 
unbanked requires you to really understand their behavior and needs.  Customer 
centricity becomes more important in Myanmar because there is a big issue of trust in 
the financial system.  Consumers have had a terrible experience, with three 
demonetizations in the last 60-70 years, as well as a bank failure in 2003.23  With the 
help of consultants and development firm CGAP, Wave Money has leveraged the 
principles of human-centered design to build their mobile application for their 
customers.  Similar to JUMO, Wave Money conducts regular research on their 
customers to get better insights on how to serve them, and design new 
products/services that meets their needs.  Ultimately, it is all about the customer 
experience – making it easy and intuitive for the customer to use, and solving their 
pain points.  Recently, the company adopted the use of Facebook to help with the 
customer registration process, since it is one of the most popular applications 
accessed by the Burmese in their mobile phones.  The customer is at the heart of 
everything that Wave Money does, including the company’s profitability; the 
company tracks CLV and CAC, making sure that the CLV is significantly higher than 
the CAC.  Moreover, users are increasingly trusting the company with their money 
transfer and other financial needs, as shown by strong referrals and a repeat customer 
rate of 25% to 30%, which is very good given that most of the people that Wave 
                                                            
23 https://consult-myanmar.com/2017/07/01/grab-is-adding-myanmars-wave-money-to-its-mobile-
wallet/ 
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Money targets are in rural and remote communities and have never used mobile 
money services. 
 From a strategic partnerships’ perspective, Wave Money has below average 
values in the number of partnerships with FIs and MNOs when compared to other 
startups classified as successful in my research study.  At the moment, Wave Money 
has only one partnership with a financial institution (Yoma Bank) and one partnership 
with a mobile network operator (Telenor).  However, these partnerships are different 
from other alliances because the two partners are actual equity owners of Wave 
Money.  When Wave Money was founded, Brad Jones knew that having a MNO as a 
partner was necessary in order to provide the customer base and distribution channel.  
At the same time, the partnership with a bank was also important, since it makes it 
easier to obtain the necessary regulatory approvals as well as add more customers.  
Although Wave Money only has one partnership with a financial institution, the 
company is open to forging more alliances with other banks.  On the other hand, 
given that Telenor has more than 70% market share of the Myanmar mobile phone 
market, Wave Money seems to be fine to have only one partnership in this area at the 
moment.   
 Strategic partnerships with E-Commerce companies is an interesting area that 
has helped Wave Money increase its customer base.  When compared to other 
startups classified as successful in my research study, Wave Money has one of the 
highest number of strategic partnerships with E-Commerce firms.  Similar to JUMO, 
the e-commerce channel opens access to more customers, and in Wave Money’s case, 
it allows users to pay for the goods they purchase online by using their Wave Money 
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mobile wallet.  In addition to E-Commerce companies, Wave Money is also open to 
other partnerships to increase its customers.  For instance, on July 1, 2017, the 
company announced a partnership with Grab in Myanmar.24  Drivers will be able to 
sign up for e-money accounts/mobile wallets that let them cash their earnings at one 
Wave Money’s agents throughout Myanmar. 
 Wave Money’s business model is interoperable in a number of ways.  As 
mentioned earlier, the company has its own agents which are called Wave Shops, and 
in order to increase access to more customers, it also shares Telenor’s agent network.  
Moreover, although Wave Money is only offered to Telenor customers, anyone with a 
mobile account can receive money from Wave Money and/or send money to a Wave 
Money account.   
 Brad Jones, the founder and CEO of Wave Money, has extensive financial 
services industry experience, having worked at ANZ and National Australia Bank for 
more than 10 years, and 2 years at Visa, heading the mobile money and innovation 
group in Southeast Asia.  These experiences are essential to understand the key 
customer issues and pain points, and thus develop solutions that truly meet the 
customers’ needs. 
New Insights 
 A key insight that Wave Money shares with JUMO is the fact that the 
founder, Brad Jones, also brings extensive experience in successfully founding prior 
startups.  Prior to founding Wave Money, Brad was one of the founders of Wing, a 
                                                            
24 Ibid. 
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successful mobile money transfer business in Cambodia.  Brad was able to take the 
learnings from Wing and apply it to found Wave Money.  One key learning was the 
idea of partnering with both a MNO and a financial institution from inception.  At 
Wing, Brad had only set up a partnership with ANZ, but realized that there were 
major challenges in the distribution process and access to customers.  Therefore, 
partnering with a MNO and a bank was an important consideration when founding 
Wave Money.  Taking the learnings from prior startups allows Wave Money to avoid 
potential pitfalls and make processes more efficient, which in turn can lead to higher 
customers and higher financial performance. 
 The environment and culture of the country where the Fintech startup operates 
will affect the company’s business model and ultimately how customers adopt the 
products and services offered.  Myanmar is a unique environment; even though more 
than 80% of the population is unbanked, the smartphone penetration rate is between 
70% to 80%, one of the highest in the world, with users accessing data regularly; 
Telenor data usage is about 3.5GB a month in Myanmar, which is higher than 
Thailand and Malaysia.25  Given these characteristics, the opportunities to serve the 
unbanked are enhanced since data can be more easily obtained and applications can 
be simplified so that they are easier to understand.  For instance, the company 
adopted the use of Facebook to help with the customer registration process, since it is 
one of the most popular applications accessed by the Burmese in their mobile phones.  
On the other hand, the 3 previous demonetizations over the last 60-70 years, as well 
as a bank failure in 2003, has created a high level of mistrust in the financial service 
                                                            
25 http://sea-globe.com/dethroning-cash-in-myanmar/. 
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sector.  According to Brad Jones, convincing individuals to use mobile money or a 
formal financial product has been more challenging in Myanmar that what he 
experienced with Wing in Cambodia. 
 In summary, Wave Money’s success revolves around its highly customer-
centric business model and its strong partnerships, especially with E-Commerce 
companies, opening new distribution channels.  These factors are complemented by 
an interoperable model that revolves around the agent network, making it easier and 
providing flexibility for customers to access the company’s products and services.  As 
shown with JUMO, having prior startup experience, and specifically founding another 
mobile money transfer company as Brad Jones did at Wing in Cambodia, is extremely 
helpful to avoid potential pitfalls, build credibility with funding sources, and take the 
learnings and improve on them to increase the probability of success in the new 
venture. 
 
Mobisol Case Study 
Background / Overview 
Mobisol is a German-based technology venture founded in 2010 that focuses 
exclusively on solving a vexing social problem in Africa: lack of access to electricity 
for all citizens.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, approximately 590 million people lack access 
to electricity, including 85% of rural populations.26  Similar to other African 
companies such as M-KOPA and Off-Grid Solar, Mobisol combines solar energy, 
                                                            
26 http://light.lbl.gov/library/LA-Mkt-Synthesis.pdf 
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mobile payments technology and microcredit by offering large solar home systems 
(80 watts to 200 watts) on a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) basis to rural, remote areas in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  The solar panels can power a range of household appliances 
such as TVs, stereos, refrigerators, mobile phone charging stations, sewing machines, 
water pumps and other tools.  Mobisol is present in 3 African countries (Tanzania, 
Rwanda and Kenya) and has supplied more than 80,000 solar panels directly 
benefiting more than 400,000 individuals. 
Business Model 
 Mobisol’s PAYG business model offers the solar panel to households on a 
loan basis which they can pay off in 3 years, transferring instalments via mobile 
wallets in a flexible manner – they can make payments via SMS in daily (as low as 
$0.50), weekly or monthly rates.  The flexibility is useful for farmers and 
microentrepreneurs which may have seasonal businesses; this way, they are able to 
pay a larger portion of their loan when they have the money available.  The financing 
scheme only works with mobile wallets/mobile banking, so there is no need for a 
bank account.  Those without a personal bank account can purchase a system, and 
relatives from other locations can help finance it.  Once the payment is transferred via 
SMS, the system is switched on remotely via mobile connection.  When the customer 
finishes making all of the payments, they become owners of the solar panel.  The 
company also uses innovative remote monitoring technology, tracking technical data 
regarding the solar panel, battery, energy consumption and payment patterns.  The 
data is critical to solve potential maintenance problems in a fast and efficient manner, 
and lock systems in case of overdue payment or theft. 
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 Mobisol does not manufacture the solar panels, batteries or the smart meters 
for remote monitoring, but purchases the components in bulk from various 
manufacturers and assembles them.  The value that Mobisol brings is the technology 
they have developed to seamlessly connect the different components, the software to 
track a wide variety of data points on the effectiveness of the solar system, and the 
connectivity to the mobile wallets for the lease payments.  
 The company is a true social enterprise since it is delivering an essential social 
good for the poor:  access to electricity for the first time.  Specifically, more than 60% 
of Mobisol’s customers have a household income of less than $2/day per household 
member, and more than 90% are having access to electricity for the first time.  
Numerous studies have shown that providing electricity to rural communities leads to 
increased safety from the elimination of accidental fires caused by kerosene lamps 
and better health due to lower levels of indoor air pollution.  Most importantly, 
having access to electricity increases household productivity and ultimately raises the 
standard of living.  In addition to providing credit to individuals in order to raise their 
standard of living, Mobisol is also creating socioeconomic opportunities by 
empowering entrepreneurs to start their own businesses.  Based on my conversations 
with the company’s CIO, people who have leased a solar panel are setting up 
businesses to serve as mobile phone charging stations in villages.  Since electricity is 
scarce in these remote areas, charging a mobile phone would require people to travel 
for many miles before they can find a place to do so. By having a charging station in 
their village, it saves the travel time and inconvenience.  Other productive uses 
include the use of sewing machines for making clothing and power tools for 
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construction.  Over the last 5 years, Mobisol has supplied more than 80,000 solar 
systems directly benefiting more than 400,000 people living in newly electrified 
households in Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya.  Notably, the company has enabled 
more than 25,000 new entrepreneurs to start businesses related to solar power and 
created more than 1,200 new jobs for installation contractors and sales agents.   
Another way to provide a social impact is by enabling customers to have 
future access to expanded financial inclusion.  For instance, once a Mobisol customer 
has fully paid their solar home panel lease, now they have formal credit history which 
allows them to obtain more loans to finance other ancillary products such as 
appliances and goods. 
Support for Quantitative Results 
 Based on the information presented on Table 14, Mobisol has below average 
values for all of the factors when compared to other startups that were classified as 
Successful in my research study.  Thus, it is very likely that there may be other 
factors that are contributing to the company’s success (please refer to New Insights 
section below for more information).  Although customer centricity score is low, the 
company understands that it is extremely important to educate the sales agents and 
installation workers so that it makes it easier to sell to customers.  A major challenge 
that the company faces is the lack of skilled workers in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 
off-grid solar industry is still nascent.  To address these issues, Mobisol created the 
Mobisol Akademie, an in-house training institute that trains employees and 
contractors on the installation and operation of solar panels and other solar-powered 
products.   
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 Regarding partnerships with FIs, MNOs and E-Commerce companies, 
Mobisol sees the value of developing these alliances, especially with financial 
institutions and MNOs.  Since the payment of the leases are done through mobile 
wallets, partnering with MNOs is important.  However, Mobisol currently operates in 
3 African countries where the largest MNO in each country controls more than 70% 
of the market share.  Therefore, Mobisol has partnered with the largest MNO, but it is 
not as critical to partner with all of the other smaller players.  Strategic partnerships 
with financial institutions have been essential for Mobisol’s success.  Currently, the 
company has built partnerships and alliances with more than 10 different financial 
institutions in Africa; the numbers may seem low in comparison to other successful 
startups in my research study, but they are vital to provide debt capital for the solar 
panel systems since it is a capital-intensive business.  By using debt financing, it 
allows Mobisol to grow and scale faster than if it were to use equity financing, which 
is significantly more expensive. 
 Mobisol’s interoperable business model is an important factor contributing to 
the company’s success.  The company’s mobile payment technology works with all 
MNOs, giving the flexibility for any customer to use their solar panels.  Moreover, 
Mobisol shares an agent network, so it can efficiently target more customers without 
having their own dedicated agents. Having interoperability through MNOs and agents 
provides the opportunity to access more customers and ultimately generate higher 
financial performance. 
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New Insights 
 Similar to JUMO, Mobisol has a highly scalable business model that has 
allowed the company grow quickly and expand into multiple countries.  Although the 
company is mainly supplying solar panel systems in Tanzania, Kenya and Rwanda, it 
recently introduced DC-current electrical appliances that it sells and finances to its 
customers. These appliances are more efficient than traditional AC-current ones, and 
ultimately are more cost effective since there is no need for an alternator, an 
expensive component in the solar panel systems.  In addition, in March 2017, the 
company announced a partnership with MTN Rwanda to offer high performance, 
affordable smart phones to its customers to be purchased through an instalment 
plan.27  The company is also exploring expansion opportunities to Uganda and 
Nigeria in the next two years.   
 A new insight that Mobisol provides to my research study is how the type of 
product sold can impact the financial performance and financial inclusion of new 
technology ventures serving the unbanked and underbanked.  In the recent Deloitte 
report “Reaching Deep into Low-Income Markets”, the authors distinguish between 
“push” vs. “pull” products, and hypothesize that pull products tend to be more 
valuable than push products since there is ready demand for them and can be used 
immediately with little risk (Reaching deep in low-income markets: Enterprises 
achieving impact, sustainability, and scale at the base of the pyramid, 2017).  Pull 
products include transportation, electricity and food items, which are necessities that 
                                                            
27 http://www.biztechafrica.com/article/mobisol-mtn-rwanda-launch-smart-phone-affordable-p/12280/. 
 180 
 
people need and use on a daily basis.  In contrast, push products are goods and 
services that have less obvious value or that provide uncertain benefits in the future, 
such as loans, savings, insurance, etc.  Organizations that sell pull products do not 
have to spend a lot in marketing to convince customers to adopt the products.  In 
Mobisol’s case, providing electricity to customers via solar panel systems is 
effectively a pull product, and thus a key reason why the company has been 
successful.  Due to the high demand of pull products, a highly customer centric 
business model is not necessary since it is quite easy to show the product’s value to 
potential customers.  Therefore, I argue that pull vs. push product preference is an 
important consideration for new technology ventures that are serving the unbanked 
and underbanked in emerging markets.  To drive higher financial inclusion, it may be 
necessary to do so by offering a push product (i.e., a loan) through a pull product, 
such as electricity in the form of solar panels. 
 Another important insight gained from Mobisol which may contribute to its 
success is the fact that the company has received funding from well-known and 
highly recognized development organizations such as IFC, the private arm of the 
World Bank.  In 2016, IFC invested €5.4 million in Mobisol, and Investec Asset 
Management’s African Private Equity Fund invested €9.2 million alongside IFC.28  
While the amount of funding is helpful, the brand name and recognition from these 
development organizations increases Mobisol’s credibility and boosts its brand, 
resulting in higher customer trust and increased number of customers.  Moreover, the 
                                                            
28 https://techmoran.com/pay-go-solar-firm-mobisol-raises-16-million-deliver-decentralized-solar-
energy-east-africa/ 
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development organizations also help open doors to more resources that the firm may 
need which ultimately boosts its financial performance. 
 In summary, interoperability and strategic partnerships are clearly some of the 
most important factors for Mobisol’s success.  Pull vs. push products becomes a key 
factor that also needs to be considered when offering financial products/services to 
the unbanked and underbanked.  Similar to JUMO’s case study, a scalable business 
model is highly emphasized in order to drive higher financial inclusion and higher 
financial performance. 
 
MicroEnsure Case Study 
Background / Overview 
MicroEnsure is a technology service provider that facilitates microinsurance 
products to the unbanked in emerging markets.  The company is not an insurance 
underwriter but an intermediary, providing extremely affordable health insurance, or 
also commonly referred to as microinsurance, for the poor and marginalized; over 
85% of customers are new to insurance.  MicroEnsure develops and markets a wide 
range of innovative and customized insurance products such as crop, political 
violence, health, and life insurance, with premiums as low as $1.50 per month.  Based 
in London, UK, the company was initially set up in 2008 as a non-profit enterprise, 
receiving grants from a wide variety of development organizations including the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation.  In 2012, MicroEnsure converted to a for-profit social 
enterprise.  The company serves customers in Africa, India and Southeast Asia. 
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Business Model 
MicroEnsure has a unique business model where the company sits between 
the distributor of the insurance product and the insurance underwriter.  Essentially, 
the company develops insurance products that truly meet the customers’ needs and 
partners with insurance providers that will originate and underwrite the products.  The 
insurance providers are typically large corporations with a strong brand, have the 
ability to transact in cash and with distribution points that are accessible to the low-
income markets.  To access the customer base and distribute the products, 
MicroEnsure partners with the largest MNOs (typically 1 or 2 in a particular country) 
and bundles the insurance product as part of the MNO’s offering to their customers.  
Payments of insurance premia (and to some extent, claims payments) are done via 
airtime deductions and/or credits.  MicroEnsure provides end-to-end services to 
customers by using technology for the design of innovative insurance products, 
enrolment of customers, the collection of insurance premiums and the payment of 
claims.   
MicroEnsure utilizes a “freemium” model, whereby it initially offers its 
insurance products for free to the MNO and banking customers.  Once the customers 
see the significant value of the insurance product, the company then upsells them by 
charging a small fee, which may be for adding coverage to an additional family 
member.  According to the CEO, the customer conversion rate is usually above 40%, 
which is very positive.  Once they become paid customers, MicroEnsure can then 
introduce higher margin products which can lead to direct revenue to their partners.  
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Based on conversations with the CEO, he claims to generate double-digit profit 
margins.   
MicroEnsure has significantly impacted the lives of the poor in many 
countries in Africa, as well as in India and Southeast Asia.  By offering very low 
priced, highly valued insurance products to people who have never had insurance 
before, the company is able to help low-income individuals meet their healthcare 
costs and other needs when there are financial shocks or emergency, which can have 
devastating long-term consequences.  In the book Financial Inclusion at the Bottom 
of the Pyramid, Realini (2015) devotes an entire chapter to MicroEnsure, and she 
quotes Richard Leftley saying the company’s mantra: “No one wakes up in the 
morning and says, ‘Today I want to buy insurance’.  But you do wake up in the 
morning and wonder what will happen if your spouse dies or your kids get sick” 
(pg.110).   
Since its founding, the company has demonstrated tremendous growth and 
scale, serving more than more than 28 million active customers and present in 15 
countries across Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia. 
Support for Quantitative Results 
Statistics indicate that approximately 1% of people in Africa and Asia 
purchase insurance; clearly, it shows that the insurance companies’ product centric 
approach does not work well in these markets.  MicroEnsure has upended the 
traditional insurance model by focusing on the customer, not the product.  
Specifically, the company figures out what are the customers’ needs and then designs 
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an insurance product that meets them.  MicroEnsure aims to end the big deficiencies 
in the existing insurance market by offering products that are very easy and simple to 
understand, with the minimum amount of paperwork and/or verification needed.  The 
payment mechanism is also intuitive – the company uses mobile wallets and 
essentially deducts airtime minutes as payments for the insurance premiums.  The 
company spends considerable time educating the customers, so they understand the 
benefits of having insurance and why it is essential for them.  Finally, the company 
prides itself in fast turnaround times, processing and paying claims within 72 hours.  
All of these points support an above average Customer Centricity score when 
compared to other successful startups in my research study.  Interestingly, the 
company is able to achieve a high customer-centric business model with a minimal 
amount of staff on the ground, relying on technology and calling back customers 
when they have questions or issues. 
Strategic partnerships are an essential ingredient for MicroEnsure’s success.  
In particular, partnerships with MNOs is the main way to access customers.  The 
mobile phone infrastructure serves as an ideal distribution channel to access the 
unbanked and the poor.  As stated in the Statement of Research Problem section, out 
of the 2 billion people who are unbanked, 1.7 billion have a mobile phone.  
MicroEnsure views MNOs as both partners and customers; currently, the company 
has partnerships with 12 MNOs in different countries; this number is significantly 
higher than the average of other startups that were classified as successful in my 
research study.  Similarly, partnerships with financial institutions, in this case 
insurance providers, is also critical, since these companies underwrite the insurance 
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products that are developed by MicroEnsure.  Currently, MicroEnsure partners with 
90 insurance providers globally, which supports the claim that the company has 
above average number of strategic partnerships with FIs when compared to other 
successful startups in my model. 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that MicroEnsure’s CEO and founder, Richard 
Leftley, has extensive prior experience in the insurance industry, working as a 
reinsurance broker for more than 6 years, and then introducing insurance products to 
the Opportunity International Network, a non-profit organization that provides 
microfinance loans, savings and insurance to over 14.3 million people in 24 countries 
who are working their way out of poverty.  These experiences allowed Richard to 
have an in-depth understanding of the customer pain points with insurance, and led 
him to design and develop a unique business model to provide insurance to the poor. 
New Insights 
MicroEnsure has demonstrated it has a highly scalable business model, which 
is a big contributor to the company’s success.  As mentioned above, the company is 
present in 15 countries in Africa and Asia, including India, and currently serves more 
than 28 million active customers.  Although the company offers one type of product, 
insurance, it has created more than 200 different insurance products that are tailored 
for the customers’ needs. 
Similar to Mobisol, MicroEnsure has also received significant financial 
support from development organizations – specifically, IFC, Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation and Omidyar Network.  The support from these organizations help build 
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higher brand awareness and credibility for MicroEnsure, which in turn enhances 
customer trust and leads to higher number of customers and potentially higher 
financial performance. 
To conclude, MicroEnsure has transformed the insurance market, making it 
available and affordable to everyone.  The company is a true innovator in financial 
inclusion, especially in a financial product which does not get much attention, but is 
essential for our daily lives.  Customer centricity, strategic partnerships and prior 
financial services experience have been key contributors to the company’s success.  
The case study also confirms that the type of partnership is highly dependent on the 
company’s products and services.  As the regression models in my research study 
demonstrate, strategic partnerships with MNOs were not statistically significant; 
however, in MicroEnsure’s case, they are absolutely necessary.   
The following quote from Realini (2015) summarizes best the company’s 
products and how revolutionary it is compared to traditional insurance: 
“As opposed to selling insurance in an industrialized economy, what 
MicroEnsure does for microinsurance is not just taking a standard insurance policy 
and knocking off some benefits and lowering the premium – they are fundamentally 
redesigning the product and making it extremely simple.  MicroEnsure sells some life 
insurance products that have absolutely no exclusions.  They do not demand to know 
about pre-existing conditions.  They do not consider cause of death, whether it be 
disease, civil war, or suicide…with microinsurance, if you die, MicroEnsure pays – 
no questions asked” (pg.111). 
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The 4 illustrative case studies presented above provide support for the 
quantitative results of the regression models.  Specifically, the Fintech new ventures 
demonstrate strong support for having a customer centric business model (Hypotheses 
2a and 2b) – namely, JUMO, Wave Money and MicroEnsure have above average 
customer centricity scores when compared to other Fintech startups that were 
classified as successful in the binomial logit model.  In addition, the case studies also 
provide support for strategic partnerships – in particular, partnerships with Financial 
Institutions and E-Commerce companies (Hypotheses 4a and 4b).  More importantly, 
the new insights gained from the case studies highlight new factors that should be 
evaluated in future research.  For instance, a scalable business model was a new 
factor highlighted in JUMO, Mobisol and MicroEnsure, which has been essential for 
the success of these companies.  To achieve higher financial inclusion, it is important 
to have a business model that can quickly scale up and reach as many customers as 
possible.  Another important factor that has emerged from the case studies (JUMO 
and Wave Money) is having a founder / founding team with prior startup experience, 
which complements the prior financial services industry experience.  Prior startup 
experience has been studied extensively in the entrepreneurship literature and has 
been shown to positively impact business performance (Duchesneau & Gartner, 1990; 
Miloud et al., 2012; Song et al., 2008; A. Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2005).  Mobisol’s 
case study also emphasized the role of the type of product offered to customers – 
whether it is a “pull” vs. “push” product, and how it can affect the strategy and 
business model that the Fintech startup adopts.  In essence, by using a pull product 
strategy, the Fintech startup may not need to have a high customer centricity score in 
 188 
 
order to be successful.  Finally, funding from well-known investment firms and 
highly recognized development organizations have also contributed to the success of 
Mobisol and MicroEnsure by adding credibility and access to other sources of capital 
and potentially new distribution channels.  In summary, the case studies provide 
valuable qualitative insights that complement the quantitative analysis and highlight 
additional factors that should be analyzed in future research. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Academics and development organizations unanimously agree that digital 
technologies such as mobile phones, cloud, big data analytics and blockchain are the 
biggest enablers to financial inclusion – providing access to affordable financial 
products and services to the 2 billion poor and marginalized adults globally that are 
excluded from the formal financial sector.  Most studies have focused on policy 
issues and performed experiments to demonstrate how digital financial services aid 
the financially excluded by making it economically possible to serve them.  My 
research study takes a different approach by addressing this topic from the 
perspective of new technology ventures, or Fintech startups, that are introducing 
innovative ways to drive financial inclusion.  A small subset of Fintech startups, 
which are serving the unbanked and underbanked, play a vital role in solving this 
important global issue, and my research study is one of the first empirical studies that 
investigates the most important factors that these new ventures need to have in order 
to succeed in their social mission, while at the same time driving higher financial 
performance. 
This research study develops a multi-level framework based on established 
strategic management theories and examines how factors related to different aspects 
of a company’s business model, resources/capabilities, networks & strategic 
partnerships and market/environment affect the success of new ventures, as measured 
by financial performance and financial inclusion.  Research from academics, 
consulting firms and development organizations have qualitatively studied the factors 
in my empirical model, but none have performed a quantitative study with actual, 
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objective data from startups to verify and quantify the effects of these factors – this is 
the main goal of my research study. 
Multivariate linear regression and binomial logit regression models were run 
to study the effects of these factors from different perspectives of defining success.  
The multivariate linear regression models analyzed two separate dependent variables 
that represent the dual goal of these Fintech startups: (1) Financial inclusion, as 
measured by Active Customers; and (2) Financial performance, as measured by 
Annual Revenue.  Using Annual Revenue as a dependent variable addresses the issue 
that is frequently observed in large firms and new ventures related to Price and 
Quantity, where Quantity may be directly related to number of customers.  The 
general equation for Revenue is equal to Price multiplied by Quantity, and in a lot of 
cases, it can be observed that firms seek to maximize Revenue by increasing Price, 
while keeping Quantity constant.  However, in the case of Fintech new ventures that 
are serving the unbanked and underbanked, these firms are aspiring a social goal and 
may keep Price at a low level, while increasing the Quantity, or customer base, over a 
period of time.  Therefore, these new ventures are effectively addressing the dual goal 
of financial inclusion and financial performance.  
The second type of analysis performed, the binomial logit regression model, 
used an Overall Success binary dependent variable, defined as having Active 
Customers and Annual Revenue values above the median values relative to the 
startups in my data sample.  This measure is more deterministic, and looks at how the 
changes in the independent variables affect the probability of success of these Fintech 
new ventures.  Due to the limitations in the data, the Overall Success variable had to 
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be defined as a relative measure, as opposed to using a benchmark value of success, 
which is not ideal.   
The results demonstrate that the factors that I analyzed significantly explain 
the variation in financial performance, financial inclusion and overall success in the 
sample of Fintech startups that I studied.  The Adjusted R-Squared for the linear 
regression models were 0.56 and 0.60 for the Active Customers and Annual Revenue 
models, respectively, while the “pseudo” R-Squared, or McFadden’s R-Squared, for 
the binomial logit model was 0.57.  In particular, founders/founding team with prior 
financial services experience, customer centricity, and strategic partnerships with 
financial institutions and e-commerce firms, significantly affect the performance of 
these firms in the different regression models.   
Prior financial services industry experience by the founder/founding team is 
positively related and statistically significant to Annual Revenue in the regression 
model, and to Overall Success in the binomial logit model.  The results partially 
support my hypothesis, showing that this factor will impact the financial performance 
of a new technology venture, and confirms the findings from prior empirical 
entrepreneurship studies (Song, Podoynitsyna, Van Der Bij, & Halman, 2008; 
Miloud, Aspelund, & Cabrol, 2012)  Having a founder/founding team with prior 
industry experience gives them an upper hand to better understand the key issues and 
problems that need to be solved, and thus develop products that customers really 
need.  However, this factor was not statistically significant in the Active Customer 
linear regression model, which means that it may not lead to higher number of 
customers, and hence higher financial inclusion.  As discussed previously, the weak 
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relationship between Revenue and Customers could potentially explain why this 
factor did not have a significant effect on the Active Customer linear regression 
model. 
Customer centricity has a positive and statistically significant effect on Active 
Customers, the main measure used for financial inclusion in the linear regression 
model, and only modest statistical significance on Annual Revenue, the main measure 
for financial performance in the linear regression model.  In addition, customer 
centricity has a highly significant effect on Overall Success in the binomial logit 
regression model.  Since customer centricity focuses on the customer, it is obvious to 
see that it would have a higher impact on the Active Customer dependent variable 
than on the Annual Revenue dependent variable.  As discussed in the Analysis of 
Results chapter, the weak relationship between customers and revenue when offering 
financial products to the poor and marginalized confirms the results from the 
regression models.  The positive effects of having a customer centric business model 
have been studied extensively in the marketing field, as well as for large corporations.  
Furthermore, CGAP, IFC, Accion and other development organizations have 
established that adopting a customer-centric business model is important in driving 
higher financial inclusion, since there is a large disconnect between poor people who 
have registered for formal bank accounts and those who actively use them.  In fact, 
CGAP recently launched the Customer Centric Guide, a web-based collection of 
toolkits and experiments to help financial service providers deliver products and 
services that better meet the needs of low-income customers.29  My research study 
                                                            
29 http://customersguide.cgap.org/why-go-customer-centric/customer-centricity. 
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expands on the work that CGAP has done by developing an objective measure of 
customer centricity that startups and other financial service organizations can use, and 
empirically demonstrating its impact on financial inclusion.   
Given the exploratory nature of this research study, it is challenging to address 
the likely motivation of these Fintech new ventures, specifically whether they want to 
“Do well by doing good” or “Doing good by doing well”.  Customer centricity may 
provide a signal to the strategy of these Fintech startups – by focusing on solving the 
customers’ problems and needs, these startups acquire a larger customer base and 
achieve financial sustainability in the future.  As opposed to traditional marketing 
strategies used by commercial enterprises, the Fintech startups serving the unbanked 
and underbanked may not resort to a “bait and switch” strategy to maximize profit. 
This research study provides empirical support for the importance of strategic 
partnerships on the performance of new ventures.  Partnerships with financial 
institutions had the strongest impact across all of the models, while partnerships with 
e-commerce firms was significant in the Annual Revenue and Overall Success 
models, and partnerships with MNOs was not significant at all.  Since mobile phones 
are the main tool to help drive financial inclusion for the poor, and given the success 
of M-PESA through its ownership by Safaricom, I expected to see that alliances with 
MNOs would significantly impact the startup’s financial performance and drive 
higher financial inclusion; however, this was not the case.  An explanation for this 
result may be due to the significant growth in smartphone adoption rate in most 
emerging markets, de-emphasizing the importance of partnering with the network 
operator, and instead focusing on the data generated through apps and mobile internet 
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connection.  Another way to explain this result is based on the size of the MNO; if the 
MNO has a significant, controlling market share (more than 60%) in a country, 
partnerships with multiple MNOs may not be necessary.   
The partnerships between Fintech startups and financial institutions is a topic 
that has received a lot of attention recently, with the announcement that the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS) and IFC have set up the ASEAN Financial Innovation 
Network (AFIN) to help build collaboration between Fintech startups and financial 
institutions which are focused on driving higher financial inclusion in the region.30  
Strategic partnerships with financial institutions and MNOs are dependent on the 
product segment that the Fintech startup serves; the results of my model show that the 
average number of partnerships with financial institutions and MNOs is different 
depending on the product segments for successful startups.   
An interesting outcome of the research study is that strategic partnerships with 
e-commerce firms is statistically significant, highlighting a new distribution channel 
that Fintech startups should exploit to access more customers and drive higher 
financial performance. 
The results of the regression models show mixed support for Interoperability.  
This factor was highly statistically significant in the Active customers linear 
regression model, but not significant in the Annual Revenue linear regression or the 
binomial logit model.  The reason for the mixed results may be that this factor may 
act as a mediator, rather than as a main effect in the models, which I was unable to 
                                                            
30 http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2017/IFC-and-Monetary-Authority-
of-Singapore-Collaborate-to-Advance-FinTech-Innovation-in-Asia.aspx 
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test due to the limited sample size.  Please refer to Chapter 9 for more details on areas 
of future research. 
Numerous studies have shown that the regulatory environment plays an 
important role in financial inclusion.  On the other hand, the results of my research 
study demonstrate that the measure of openness of the regulatory environment to 
financial inclusion is not statistically significant in any of the models, which 
contradicts prior research.  In my view, it is likely that the measurement I selected to 
measure how enabling the regulatory environment is to financial inclusion is not the 
correct one, making the results not relevant.  Moreover, it is highly likely that the 
regulatory environment is a mediator / moderator, not a main effects variable.  
Finally, while a proactive and enabling regulatory environment may lead to higher 
financial inclusion and higher financial performance, a reactive regulatory framework 
might actually be detrimental to financial performance – for instance, the introduction 
of Sarbanes-Oxley in the U.S. (Cao, Ghosh, Goh, & Tschang, 2016) 
Illustrative case studies of four Fintech startups classified as successful from 
my data sample were presented to support and complement the results of the 
empirical models.  The case studies also highlighted interesting and new insights that 
the regression models did not capture.  Specifically, additional factors such as 
scalability, funding from well-known investment firms and development 
organizations and prior startup experience could also contribute to driving higher 
financial inclusion and higher financial performance for Fintech startups serving the 
unbanked and underbanked.  Pull vs. Push products also can influence the customer 
adoption rate and ultimately impact the company’s financial performance. 
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This research study significantly contributes to expanding the limited 
empirical work done in the entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship academic 
literatures, and offers quantitative support to new factors such as customer centricity, 
which plays a key role in financial inclusion.  The research study also provides strong 
confirmation on the importance of other factors such as strategic partnerships.  The 
binomial logit model of overall success is a useful contribution to VC firms and 
investors; unlike the linear regression models for Annual Revenue and Active 
Customers, this model provides an empirical, deterministic, easy to understand, 
independent assessment on how to evaluate Fintech startups in financial inclusion that 
complements their internal methods.  Finally, for Fintech founders, it gives them clear 
guidelines on what factors they should be focusing to increase their chances of 
success.   
Ultimately, this exploratory research study represents the start of more 
academic research that should be done on startups that are serving the unbanked and 
underbanked in emerging markets.  The results highlight that a mix of quantitative 
and qualitative insights is important to move research forward on the vital role 
that Fintech startups play in driving financial inclusion in emerging markets.  
More work is needed to help these social enterprises to continue their dual mission of 
driving higher financial inclusion and higher financial performance.  The next two 
chapters address the weaknesses and limitations of this research study, and the main 
areas of future research that I envision. 
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Chapter 8: Weaknesses and Limitations 
 
My research study has several methodological weaknesses and limitations.  
First, due to the lack of data on failed new ventures, there is survivorship bias in the 
data.  To partially address this issue, I ran a binomial logit model that classifies 
startups as successful or not successful based on their relative financial and social 
impact performance when compared to other startups in the data sample.  Given the 
limited amount of data available on successful startups in financial inclusion, it is not 
possible to create a benchmark / index of success which I could use to compare a 
startup’s performance to determine whether it is successful or not; hence, success and 
failure is a relative measure against the startups evaluated in my research study.  To 
expand on this point, the startups that achieve the highest business performance in 
terms of financial metrics and financial inclusion, when compared to the other new 
ventures in the dataset, can be considered more successful than those startups that 
have lower business performance.  Therefore, there will be different degrees of 
‘success’, and those startups which have the lowest business performance will be 
considered ‘least successful’.   
As noted in the Research Methodology chapter, the research study is static, 
and only focuses on the effect that the independent variables have on the performance 
of Fintech startups up until August 2017, the date when I completed the data 
collection process.  Consequently, the study will look at the success of these startups 
only up to that date, even though the startups are continuously changing. 
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Another potential weakness is the limited sample size, which can make it 
challenging in performing different statistical analyses, and more importantly, making 
sure that I have sound statistical results.  Although there are thousands of Fintech 
startups globally, the number of Fintech startups that are serving the unbanked and 
underbanked is a small subset of the Fintech startup universe.  I identified 172 
Fintech startups in Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia regions to contact for my 
research study, but as expected, I did not contact all of them (due to limited time), and 
out of the ones that I contacted, it was expected that some of them would not be 
interested in participating in the research study.  Out of the total identified, I 
contacted (met in person and/or spoke to over the phone) 105 Fintech startups, or 
about 60% of the total.  Out of the 105 Fintech startups that I met, 63 of them agreed 
to participate in my research study.  It is important to note that only 20 startups 
declined to participate, while the rest were in progress to provide a decision on 
whether they would be interested in participating or not.  A sample size of 63 
companies is relatively small when compared to other empirical studies on new 
ventures such as C. Lee, Lee, & Pennings (2001), where the authors analyzed 137 
Korean technology companies, and Miloud, Aspelund, & Cabrol (2012), where the 
authors analyzed 102 new ventures.  Even though the sample size is relatively small 
when compared to other empirical studies, the size is considered acceptable to 
provide sound statistical results.  The research study can be expanded by spending 
more time and resources to collect data on the missing startups in order to increase 
the statistical validity and predictive power of the empirical model.   
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Due to the limited sample size, this research study uses an exploratory 
approach to understand the main effects of the most important variables that I 
hypothesized would have the largest impact on financial performance and financial 
inclusion.  However, there are other variables that should be considered to extend the 
model developed in this research study, such as the factors discussed in the New 
Insights section of the illustrative case studies.  Other consequences of the limited 
sample size are that interaction effects could not be studied in this research, and I did 
not have enough data points to test the predictive power of my empirical model. 
A common weakness that is present in my study is self-reporting bias, since I 
am conducting interviews/surveys as the primary method to collect data.  To mitigate 
this issue, I checked the reliability and validity of the data supplied by the Fintech 
founders by looking at secondary data sources on a random set of samples, to confirm 
that the data supplied by the Fintech startups are correct; this approach is consistent 
with prior academic research (Miloud, Aspelund, & Cabrol, 2012; Zahra, Ireland, & 
Hitt, 2000).  Some of the data that I was able to verify through paid subscription 
databases and other secondary sources include revenue, number of countries present, 
number of different products offered, number of customers served, amount of funding 
received and post-money valuation.  Common method bias is also possible when 
conducting interviews and surveys to gather data, which can inflate the regression 
coefficients.  My research study addresses this potential issue by collecting objective 
information and measures from the Fintech startup founders, mostly avoiding 
subjective type questions.  A further issue in the data collection process is related to 
the quality of data collected.  To help startup founders get more comfortable in 
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sharing sensitive data, most of the data was gathered in the form of ranges, and thus 
estimates were derived as the midpoint of the ranges.  This approach means that I do 
not have exact figures for some of the different variables which may compromise 
some of the data quality. 
Given the challenges and limitations presented above, care must be taken on 
the interpretation of the results from the different empirical models.  It is safe to say 
that the models provide support on the statistical significance of the different factors 
that were evaluated.  Nevertheless, I was not able to test the predictive power of the 
models, so it is hard to say that the numerical effects discussed in the Analysis of 
Results section are completely accurate and reliable.  Moreover, certain variables 
such as Strategic Partnerships may have a two-way causal relationship with financial 
performance and social impact.  In particular, it is possible, although unlikely, that 
higher financial performance and higher number of active customers could lead to 
more strategic partnerships for a startup.  Therefore, it is important to be aware of 
these potential issues when reviewing the results of the empirical analysis. 
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Chapter 9: Areas of Future Research 
 
The exploratory nature of this research study and some of the limitations 
mentioned in previous chapter offer fertile ground for areas of future research.  
Increasing the sample size would be an important step, since it opens the possibility 
to expand the empirical model and evaluate other key areas that were not studied.  By 
having a larger sample size, the predictive power of the model can be tested and also 
may help increase the model’s statistical validity.  
There are potential strong interaction effects between the different 
variables in the model which would be an essential area to evaluate by having a 
larger sample size.  Specifically, there are 3 interaction effects that can be readily 
identified: (1) Regulatory environment as a moderator between Interoperability and 
the success (as measured by financial inclusion and financial performance) of Fintech 
new ventures; (2) Interoperability as a mediator between Strategic Partnerships and 
success; and (3) Scalability as a mediator between Strategic Partnerships and the 
success of Fintech new ventures.  In my research study, I argue that Fintech startups 
that adopt an interoperability business model and operate in an enabling regulatory 
framework that is open to financial inclusion will be able to achieve higher financial 
performance and drive higher financial inclusion.  In addition to having a direct effect 
on the success of Fintech startups, the regulatory framework may also act as a 
moderator to the relationship between interoperability and the success of Fintech 
startups in financial inclusion.  Lauer & Tomilova, 2017 discuss how interoperability 
between the different players in digital financial services can expand the reach of 
accounts and products/services offered to the people at the BOP and the underbanked.  
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To achieve full interoperability, it requires bringing together many different players 
which may include banks, payment providers, Fintech startups and MNOs into the 
financial system.  According to the G20 Program for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), the 
regulatory framework can influence interoperability by making sure that it is 
technically feasible among the different players involved (Global Standard-Setting 
Bodies and Financial Inclusion: The Evolving Landscape | GPFI, 2016).  
Additionally, by having an open approach to allowing different non-bank players to 
provide digital financial services and establishing regulations that promote financial 
inclusion, the regulatory framework can enhance the interoperability between the 
Fintech startups and the other players in the value chain, since it gives them the 
flexibility to work together in an environment that is approved by the regulators.  
Another potential interaction effect that could be evaluated is the fact that 
interoperability could be a mediator to the relationship between strategic partnerships 
and the success of Fintech startups in financial inclusion.  By having more strategic 
partnerships with Financial Institutions, MNOs, E-Commerce companies and others, 
it is possible that it may drive higher interoperability between the different players 
and thus expand the reach of products/services offered to the unbanked and 
underbanked, resulting in higher financial inclusion and higher financial performance.  
Interactions effects where scalability serves as the mediator to other factors and the 
success of Fintech startups should also be analyzed.  Rai, Borah, & Ramaprasad 
(1996) studied the success factors of strategic alliances in the information technology 
sector, and they alluded to the fact that having strategic alliances may allow 
companies to further expand their products/services into potentially new markets, 
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which increases their scalability resulting in higher financial performance.  Therefore, 
scalability acts as a mediator between strategic partnerships and business 
performance, or success, of a startup. 
A larger sample size can also allow the testing of additional factors that may 
influence the success of Fintech startups in financial inclusion.  The Resource 
Based View (RBV) theory of strategy management has been applied to new ventures 
by numerous academic researchers (C. Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001; Kakati, 2003; 
Miloud, Aspelund, & Cabrol, 2012).  The authors argue that startups pursue 
entrepreneurial strategies that focus on the accumulation of intangible resources in 
order to grow and survive.  Some of the firm specific resources refer to the founding 
team’s prior startup and relevant industry experience, as well as financial resources 
and investments from VC firms and other institutions.  These factors could also be 
evaluated to see if they have a significant effect on the performance of Fintech 
startups in financial inclusion.  Additional factors related to the market/environment 
would also make sense to analyze.  The market/environment is the second most 
widely studied area in entrepreneurship research after the founder / venture team 
characteristics as it relates to the success of new ventures.  While I capture some of 
these factors as control variables in my empirical model, one factor that could 
potentially influence the success of Fintech startups in financial inclusion is a 
National Electronic Identity (ID) Infrastructure.  There are approximately 1.5 billion 
people, mostly in Asia and Africa, which do not have a proof of identity, and 
essentially are cut off from accessing basic services and rights (Identification for 
Development Strategic Framework, 2016).  Without a proof of identity such as an ID 
 204 
 
card, the Know Your Customer (KYC) process required to open a bank account 
becomes more onerous and may lead to the rejection of opening the account.  Some 
emerging market countries have set up national ID systems, but in most of the 
developing world, there is no national legal proof of identity for all of the people.  
The electronic national ID system greatly simplifies the KYC process and thus makes 
it easier to conduct digital financial transactions.  In addition, an electronic and/or 
biometric identification system makes it more difficult to forge and thus can impact 
the behavior of risky users of financial services.  This enhanced system can also allow 
better monitoring and tracking of borrowers.  Moreover, it should enable Fintech 
startups in financial inclusion to more easily access potential customers and simplify 
the onboarding process.  In turn, this should drive higher customer growth resulting in 
higher financial performance and higher financial inclusion. 
Given that success is an evolutionary process, the key factors that impact the 
success of Fintech startups should vary depending on the startup’s stage in their 
lifecycle.  Due to the limited number of startups in the data sample, it was not 
possible to analyze this phenomenon in this research study.  However, if there is 
access to enough data on Fintech startups in financial inclusion that are at different 
stages of development, it would be interesting to develop empirical models to 
determine the most important factors that impact the success of Fintech startups at 
each stage of their development cycle.  This way, for startups that are at very early 
stages of development (i.e., just developed its first product/service and started selling 
to customers), an empirical model will be developed that will show which factors are 
most significant; a different empirical model will be developed for startups that are 
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more mature and are scaling up their revenues and customers, which may identify 
similar or different factors that lead to their success. 
Future research on gaining a better understanding of the different factors that 
explain the variation of financial performance and financial inclusion in my research 
study would be an indispensable next step.  An in-depth study of the dynamics of the 
strategic partnerships that Fintech startups set up with financial institutions and e-
commerce companies will provide a better explanation on the importance of these 
factors.  Specifically, it would be helpful to address the following questions: 
 What factors lead to the successful creation of these relationships? 
 How does culture, business characteristics (i.e., markets, products, etc.), and 
other factors affect the dynamics of these partnerships? 
Similar in-depth studies should be performed on customer centricity and 
interoperability, which are statistically significant in my research study, so that we 
gain a better perspective on how Fintech startups in financial inclusion can best 
implement these business models. 
Financial exclusion is a global issue that affects more than half of the global 
adult population.  My research study focuses on Fintech startups that are trying to 
solve this issue, but only in select regions of the world which have the highest 
occurrence of financial exclusion.  Extending this research study to cover China, one 
of the largest economies in the world and which has a significant proportion of its 
population that are unbanked and underbanked, would be extremely fruitful.  A 
similar empirical study should be conducted on China’s Fintech startups that are 
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serving the unbanked and underbanked, to determine which factors are most 
important to drive higher financial performance and financial inclusion in the country.  
The results can then be compared against my research study to see if there are similar 
factors affecting the success of these startups.  More importantly, given the 
tremendous success of companies such as Alipay and many others driving higher 
financial inclusion in the country, it would be helpful to understand what key lessons 
and insights from these success stories can be applied to other regions of the world. 
Lastly, future research on the social aspects of Fintech startups in 
financial inclusion would be helpful in order to understand the effect that social 
factors may have on driving higher financial inclusion and higher financial 
performance.  For example, do the startup founders need to have a stated social 
mission and objective in order to be able to develop better products and services that 
help the unbanked and underbanked? Are the founders who are more focused on the 
social aspects able to deliver both higher financial inclusion and higher financial 
performance, or is there a trade-off between social impact and financial performance?  
Does the amount of funding from VC firms get affected if the startup has a higher 
focus on the social impacts?  The additional research would expand the empirical 
analysis that I have performed and determine the significance of social factors on the 
success of the Fintech startups in financial inclusion. 
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Appendix: Interview / Survey Questions for Data Collection 
 
CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY FACTORS POTENTIAL 
MEASURABLE 
VARIABLES 
INTERVIEW/SURVEY QUESTIONS ANSWER 
Business 
Strategies 
Organizational 
Structure / Business 
Model 
Characteristics 
Business Model 
Type 
Business Model Type 1. Regarding the business model type, please classify 
your business into one of the following (select one): 
a. Freemium 
b. Subscription 
c. Referral fee 
d. Advertisement fee 
e. Markup 
f. Other:  _____________ 
 
2. Regarding the customers that you are serving, please 
classify your business into the following (you can 
select more than one): 
a. B2C (Business-to-Consumer) – your 
business is directly serving consumers 
b. B2B (Business-to-Business) – your business 
is providing products/services to other 
businesses 
c. B2B2C (Business-to-Business-to-
Consumer) 
d. P2P (Peer-to-Peer) 
e. Other:  _________________ 
 
3. For the customers you are targeting, if you had to 
choose one of the below, which one would you say is 
your main target customer base (choose one only)? 
a. Unbanked 
b. Underbanked (have a bank account, but only 
limited usage with no access to credit) 
c. Banked (have a bank account, and regular 
users of multiple banking products) 
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CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY FACTORS POTENTIAL 
MEASURABLE 
VARIABLES 
INTERVIEW/SURVEY QUESTIONS ANSWER 
Market Sub-
segments served 
Market Sub-segments 
served 
4. For the market sub-segments you are serving, what 
are the main areas of focus for your startup. Please 
select from the list below (check all that apply) 
a. Peer-to-Peer lending 
b. Lending 
c. Money transfer (remittances) 
d. Payments 
e. Credit scoring / data analytics 
f. Insurance 
g. Savings 
h. E-commerce 
i. Other:  _______________  
 
Mission/Objectives Social 
Mission/Objective 
Social 
mission/objective 
5. Does your startup have a social mission / social 
objective? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Scalability Scalability Geographic expansion 6. Currently, in how many countries are you offering your products / services? 
a. 1 
b. 2 
c. 3 to 5 
d. 6 to 8 
e. Greater than 8 
 
Product/Service 
Expansion 
7. Currently, how many types of products/services are 
you offering in each market you operate?  A 
product/service type refers to “Credit Scoring”, 
“Lending”, “Payments”, “Money Transfer 
(Remittance)”, “Insurance”, “Savings” 
 
Technology Scalability 8. Is the technology you are using for your 
product/service allow you to easily scale up without 
incurring significant costs or compromise the 
efficiency of the operations? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Customer 
Centricity 
Customer-
Centricity 
Simplicity / Ease of 
Use of Product / 
Service 
9. If your startup is offering loans, payment capabilities 
or money transfer services, how long (days) does it 
take to complete a transaction – from the time the 
customer applies to the time they receive the money? 
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10. If your startup is offering microinsurance, how long 
(days) does it take to process the insurance claim? 
 
Customer Experience 11. Is the customer experience positive (easy, intuitive, 
understandable, quick and dignified)? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Understanding 
Customers 
12. Do you currently perform detailed market research 
on customers and derive insights to better target your 
customers? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
13. Are there mechanisms for gathering customer 
insights from front line staff? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Product Design 14. Do the different operational areas within your startup 
work together to design products/services based on 
customer insights? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
15. Do you use design thinking principles when 
designing the customer interface for your 
product/service? 
a. Yes 
b. No  
 
16. Does your startup mine data about customers and use 
it to design and deliver services? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
17. Do your customers influence your innovations? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Customer Performance 
Metrics 
18. Do you have customer performance metrics in place 
that looks at which types of customers you are 
serving, how they are using your products/services 
and how satisfied they are? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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19. Is profitability and performance monitored at the 
customer or customer segment level? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
20. Do you track Customer Lifetime Value (CLV) for 
your business? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
21. If you track CLV, what has been the average growth 
rate in CLV since founding your startup? 
a. 0% to 10% 
b. 10% to 20% 
c. 20% to 30% 
d. Greater than 30% 
e. NA – I don’t track CLV 
 
22. Do you track Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC) for 
your business? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
23. If you track CAC, what is the current CLV/CAC 
ratio for your business? 
a. 0x to 1.0x 
b. 1.0x 
c. 1.0x to 3.0x 
d. 3.0x to 5.0x 
e. 5.0x to 7.0x 
f. Greater than 7.0x 
g. NA – I don’t track CLV/CAC ratio 
 
24. Do you measure customer satisfaction? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Transparency and 
Support systems to 
customers 
25. Does your startup have 24/7 Customer Service 
support – either through mobile, online, or physical 
phone number? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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26. Does your startup have fraud detection mechanisms 
currently in place? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
27. Does your startup provide transparency on how the 
company uses the customers’ data, and provide 
Consumer Privacy Protection policies? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Trust in Product / 
Service 
28. What percent of your customers are using the 
products / services that you are offering (fill in a 
percentage for each; needs to add up to 100%): 
a. Not Applicable – my startup only offers 1 
product / service  _________% 
b. Using only 1 product / service, but not all 
__________% 
c. Using 2 or more products / services, but not 
all __________% 
d. Using all products / services 
____________% 
 
29. What percent of your customers are repeat 
customers? Repeat customers are defined as 
customers that use your product/service at least 3 
times within the last year.  An estimate value or 
range would be fine. 
 
30. Do your customers regularly refer you to other / new 
customers? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Interoperability Interoperability Percent of all platforms that the product / 
service works in 
31. What % of all of the mobile network operators does 
your product/service work in for each respective 
country that you operate? 
a. Less than 25% 
b. 25% to 50% 
c. 51% to 75% 
d. 76% to 100% 
e. 100% 
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32. What different mobile technology platforms does 
your product / service work in? Please check all that 
apply. 
a. USSD 
b. Text / SMS 
c. Android 
d. iOS (Apple) 
e. Windows Phone 
f. Blackberry 
 
Level of 
Interoperability in 
Business Model 
33. How would you define the level of interoperability of 
your startup’s business model (select one): 
a. Agent-Level – your customer can use the 
agent networks of other MNOs for cash in / 
cash out 
b. MNO-Level – your customer can use your 
product/service across multiple MNOs 
c. Platform-Level – customer can use your 
product/service across any other digital 
financial service platform (which may be 
similar to yours) 
d. None of the Above – Works only within my 
website / mobile app / system 
 
Customer Strategy Customer 
Acquisition 
Strategy 
Methods to acquire 
customers 
34. Describe your customer acquisition strategy – 
specifically, please provide an approximate 
percentage for each item below, which should add up 
to 100%: 
a. Traditional ads using TV, radio, billboards, 
newspapers, magazines  _________% 
b. Online ads through different websites  
__________% 
c. Social media (Facebook, Twitter, other local 
social media)  ________% 
d. Agents / distributors  _________% 
e. Direct sales  ____________% 
f. Referral program  _________% 
g. Other – please provide:  _________% 
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Customer Conversion 
Rate 
35. What is the average customer conversion rate for 
your business currently? 
a. Less than 5% 
b. 5% to 10% 
c. 10% to 15% 
d. 16% to 20% 
e. 21% to 25% 
f. Greater than 25% 
 
Agent Metrics Agent Networks 36. Do you use an agent network for your 
product/service? If so, what is the current size of 
your agent network? 
 
 
37. As a follow-up to the previous question, how many 
years did it take you to reach the current size of your 
agent network? 
 
38. In how many cities and regions of the country does 
your agent network cover? 
 
39. What % of your agents are in (percentages should 
add to 100%): 
a. Not Applicable – my startup does not use 
agents 
b. Rural areas _______% 
c. Urban areas _______% 
 
Low Margins Low Margins Fees to Customer 40. Do you offer your main product / service for free? a. Yes 
b. No 
 
41. How does your product / service compare to the 
existing products / services used by customers 
currently, in terms of affordability? 
a. Same price 
b. Lower price (10% to 50% lower) 
c. Significantly lower price (> 50% lower) 
d. Not Applicable – there is no existing 
product/service that this replaces 
 
42. What is the fee / cost to the customer to do a 
transaction in your platform?  Please describe the 
different fees / fee structures 
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Discounts / Promotions 43. Do you currently offer significant discounts / 
promotions (discounts of 20% or greater) to 
incentivize customer usage of your products / 
services? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
44. How often (# of times per year) do you offer 
significant discounts / promotions (discounts of 20% 
or greater) to incentivize customer usage of your 
products / services? 
 
Networks & 
Strategic 
Partnerships 
Strategic 
Partnerships 
Strategic 
Partnerships 
Partnerships with 
Banks (local and 
multinational) 
 
Partnerships defined as 
having revenue sharing 
agreements, sharing of 
distribution channels 
and/or customers, and 
other legal agreements.  It 
also means that you can 
use your partners’ 
company name/logo in 
your app / website 
45. How many partnerships do you currently have 
with the top 10 local financial institutions (by 
revenue)? Financial institutions refer to banks, 
lenders, insurance companies, microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), asset managers 
a. 0 
b. 1 
c. 2 to 4 
d. 4 to 6 
e. Greater than 6 
 
46. As a follow up to the previous question, if your 
startup has been in business for more than 1 year, 
how long (number of years) have you had the 
partnerships with the top 10 local financial 
institutions?  
a. Not applicable – startup has only been in 
business for 1 year 
b. Less than 1 year 
c. 1 to 3 years 
d. 4 to 6 years 
e. Greater than 6 years 
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47. How many partnerships do you currently have with 
multinational banks or financial institutions 
(lenders, insurance companies, microfinance 
institutions, asset managers, etc.)? 
a. 0 
b. 1 
c. 2 to 4 
d. 4 to 6 
e. Greater than 6 
 
48. As a follow up to the previous question, if your 
startup has been in business for more than 1 year, 
how long (number of years) have you had the 
partnerships with multinational banks or financial 
institutions? 
a. Not applicable – startup has only been in 
business for 1 year 
b. Less than 1 year 
c. 1 to 3 years 
d. 4 to 6 years 
e. Greater than 6 years 
 
Partnerships with 
Mobile Network 
Operators (local and 
multinational) 
 
Partnerships defined as 
having revenue sharing 
agreements, sharing of 
distribution channels 
and/or customers, and 
other legal agreements.  It 
also means that you can 
use your partners’ 
company name/logo in 
your app / website 
 
49. How many partnerships do you currently have with 
mobile network operators? 
a. 0 
b. 1 
c. 2 to 4 
d. 4 to 6 
e. Greater than 6 
 
50. If your startup has been in business for more than 1 
year, how long (number of years) have you had the 
partnerships with mobile network operators? 
a. Not applicable – startup has only been in 
business for 1 year 
b. Less than 1 year 
c. 1 to 3 years 
d. 4 to 6 years 
e. Greater than 6 years 
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Partnerships with E-
Commerce Companies 
(local and 
multinational) 
 
Partnerships defined as 
having revenue sharing 
agreements, sharing of 
distribution channels 
and/or customers, and 
other legal agreements.  It 
also means that you can 
use your partners’ 
company name/logo in 
your app / website 
51. How many partnerships do you currently have with 
local e-commerce companies? 
a. 0 
b. 1 
c. 2 to 4 
d. 4 to 6 
e. Greater than 6 
 
52. If your startup has been in business for more than 1 
year, how long (number of years) have you had the 
partnerships with local e-commerce companies? 
a. Not applicable – startup has only been in 
business for 1 year 
b. Less than 1 year 
c. 1 to 3 years 
d. 4 to 6 years 
e. Greater than 6 years 
 
53. How many partnerships do you currently have with 
multinational e-commerce companies? 
a. 0 
b. 1 
c. 2 to 4 
d. 4 to 6 
e. Greater than 6 
 
54. If your startup has been in business for more than 1 
year, how long (number of years) have you had the 
partnerships with multinational e-commerce 
companies? 
a. Not applicable – startup has only been in 
business for 1 year 
b. Less than 1 year 
c. 1 to 3 years 
d. 4 to 6 years 
e. Greater than 6 years 
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Partnerships with 
multinational credit 
card / payment 
companies 
 
Partnerships defined as 
having revenue sharing 
agreements, sharing of 
distribution channels 
and/or customers, and 
other legal agreements.  It 
also means that you can 
use your partners’ 
company name/logo in 
your app / website 
 
55. How many partnerships do you currently have with 
multinational credit card / payment companies 
(i.e. PayPal, Visa, MasterCard, AMEX, etc.)? 
a. 0 
b. 1 
c. 2 to 4 
d. 4 to 6 
e. Greater than 6 
 
56. If your startup has been in business for more than 1 
year, how long (number of years) have you had the 
partnerships with multinational credit card / 
payment companies? 
a. Not applicable – startup has only been in 
business for 1 year 
b. Less than 1 year 
c. 1 to 3 years 
d. 4 to 6 years 
e. Greater than 6 years 
 
Business Networks Business 
Networks 
Experience in terms of 
local laws, regulations 
and how business is 
done 
57. How many years have you done business in the 
country that you intend to operate prior to founding 
your startup? 
a. Less than 1 year 
b. 1 to 5 years 
c. 6 to 10 years 
d. 11 to 15 years 
e. 16 to 20 years 
f. Greater than 20 years 
 
Connections to 
Government and/or 
Government-related 
institutions 
58. Do you (or your founding team members) have 
connections with Government or Government-related 
institutions in the countries you operate? 
Connections can be defined as prior working 
relationship and/or friendships with folks in these 
institutions that can help open doors 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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59. As a follow-up to the previous question, how many 
connections do you have with Government or 
Government-related institutions? 
 
Connections to top 
businesses in the 
country 
60. Do you (or your founding team members) have 
connections with top businesses (as defined by 
revenue) in the countries you operate? Connections 
can be defined as prior working relationship and/or 
friendships with folks in these institutions 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
61. As a follow-up to the previous question, how many 
connections do you have with top businesses in the 
country you operate? 
 
Success 
(Business 
Performance) 
Business 
Performance 
Metrics 
Operational 
Metrics 
Customer Growth rate 62. What is the Average Monthly Growth Rate of 
registered customers since the founding of the 
company? 
a. 0% to 10% 
b. 11% to 20% 
c. 21 to 30% 
d. 31% to 40% 
e. 41% to 50% 
f. Greater than 50% 
 
  63. What is the total number of registered customers 
that you currently have? (a range of values is fine) 
 
Financial 
Inclusion Metrics 
Active Customer 
Metrics 
64. How do you define active customers in your business 
(select one)? 
a. Number of customers that have conducted at 
least 1 transaction over the last 30 days 
b. Number of customers that have conducted at 
least 1 transaction over the last 60 days 
c. Number of customers that have conducted at 
least 1 transaction over the last 90 days 
d. Other – please provide 
 
65. What is the total number of active customers that 
you currently have? (a range of values is fine) 
 
66. What is the Average Monthly Growth Rate of 
active customers since the founding of your 
startup? 
a. 0% to 10% 
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b. 11% to 20% 
c. 21 to 30% 
d. 31% to 40% 
e. 41% to 50% 
f. Greater than 50%  
Active Ratio Metrics 67. Active ratio is equal to the ratio of Active 
customers divided by the total registered 
customers.  Currently, what is the Active ratio for 
your startup? 
a. Less than 15% 
b. 15% to 29% 
c. 30% to 45% 
d. Greater than 45% 
 
68. As a follow-up to the previous question, if your 
startup has been in business for more than 1 year, 
what has been the improvement in Active Ratio 
(in percentage points) since the founding of the 
startup? 
a. Not applicable – startup has only been in 
business for less than 1 year 
b. 0 
c. 1 to 3 percentage points  
d. 4 to 6 percentage points 
e. 7 to 9 percentage points 
f. Greater than 9 percentage points 
 
Merchant 
Metrics 
Merchant Growth Rate 69. If your startup has been in business for more than 1 
year, what is the Average Monthly Growth Rate of 
merchants accepting and/or using your product / 
service? 
a. Not Applicable – my startup does not target 
merchants 
b. 0% to 10% 
c. 11% to 20% 
d. 21 to 30% 
e. 31% to 40% 
f. 41% to 50% 
g. Greater than 50% 
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70. What is the current number of merchants accepting 
and/or using your product / service?  How many 
years did it take you to achieve the current level? 
 
Transaction 
Metrics 
Transaction Volume 
and Growth 
71. What is the current average monthly transaction 
volume (based on number of transactions) – refers 
to all types of transactions (loans, remittances, 
payments, savings, insurance, etc.) 
a. Less than 50,000 
b. 50,000 to 100,000 
c. 101,000 to 150,000 
d. 151,000 to 200,000 
e. 201,000 to 250,000 
f. Greater than 250,000 
 
72. What is the current average annual growth rate of 
transaction volume (based on number of 
transactions) – refers to all types of transactions 
(loans, remittances, payments, savings, insurance, 
etc.) 
a. 0% to 10% 
b. 11% to 20% 
c. 21 to 30% 
d. 31% to 40% 
e. 41% to 50% 
f. Greater than 50% 
 
73. What is the current average monthly transaction 
dollar volume (in US$) – refers to all types of 
transactions (loans, remittances, payments, savings, 
insurance, etc.) 
a. Less than $500,000 
b. $500,000 to $1 million 
c. $1 million to $5 million 
d. $6 million to $10 million 
e. $11 million to $20 million 
f. $21 million to $50 million 
g. Greater than $50 million 
 
74. What is the Annual current average monthly
growth rate of transaction volume (based on 
US$)– refers to all types of transactions (loans, 
remittances, payments, savings, insurance, etc.) 
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a. 0% to 10% 
b. 11% to 20% 
c. 21 to 30% 
d. 31% to 40% 
e. 41% to 50% 
f. Greater than 50% 
75. What is the average transaction size per customer? A 
range of values is fine 
 
76. If your startup has been in business for more than 1 
year, what is the average monthly growth rate in 
transaction size / loan amount per customer since 
its founding? 
a. 0% to 10% 
b. 11% to 20% 
c. 21% to 30% 
d. 31% to 40% 
e. 41% to 50% 
f. Greater than 50% 
g. Not Applicable – startup is not a B2B, 
B2B2C or P2P model 
 
77. For P2P lending companies and for companies that 
provide loan products, currently what % of loans 
are fully repaid on time? 
a. Less than 50% 
b. 50% to 70% 
c. 71% to 80% 
d. 81% to 90% 
e. 91% to 100% 
f. Not applicable – my startup is not in the 
lending area 
 
78. As a follow up to the previous question, if your 
startup has been in business for more than 1 year, by 
how many percentage points has the average % of 
loans that are fully repaid on time improved since 
its founding? 
 
79. For P2P lending startups and startups that provide 
loan products, currently what is your % default 
rate? 
a. 0% 
b. 1% to 5% 
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c. 6% to 10% 
d. 11% to 15% 
e. 16% to 20% 
f. Greater than 20% 
g. Not applicable – my startup is not in the 
lending area 
80. As a follow up to the previous question, if your 
startup has been in business for more than 1 year, by 
how many percentage points has the % default 
rate declined since the founding of your business?
 
Financial Metrics Revenue Growth 81. What is the current monthly revenue growth rate 
for the company? 
a. 0% to 5% 
b. 6% to 10% 
c. 11 to 15% 
d. 16% to 20% 
e. 21% to 25% 
f. Greater than 25% 
 
82. What is the Total Revenue for the last fiscal year 
(estimate is fine)? 
 
Average Revenue per 
User (ARPU) 
83. What is the current ARPU for your startup?  
84. What is the average annual growth rate of ARPU for 
your startup since its founding? 
 
Sources of Revenue 85. What are your different sources of revenue? Please 
provide a list 
 
Gross Margins 86. What is the average gross margin for your business 
currently? 
a. Negative 
b. 0% to 10% 
c. 11% to 15% 
d. 16% to 20% 
e. 21% to 25% 
f. 26% to 30% 
g. Greater than 30% 
 
87. If your startup has been in business for more than 1 
year, by how many percentage points has gross 
margin improved since the founding of your 
startup? 
 
 245 
 
CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY FACTORS POTENTIAL 
MEASURABLE 
VARIABLES 
INTERVIEW/SURVEY QUESTIONS ANSWER 
a. 0 
b. 1 to 5 percentage points 
c. 6 to 10 percentage points 
d. 11 to 15 percentage points 
e. Greater than 15 percentage points 
Burn Rate 88. What is your current burn rate? 
a. Less than $10,000/month 
b. $10,000 to $30,000/month 
c. $31,000 to $60,000/month 
d. $61,000 to $90,000/month 
e. $91,000 to $100,000/month 
f. Greater than $100,000/month 
 
89. Please provide a breakdown of your burn rate in % 
terms (should add up to 100%): 
a. Development of product/service   ______% 
b. Marketing / Customer acquisition   
_______% 
c. Management Salaries _______% 
d. Others – please provide:  _______    
_______% 
 
Fixed vs. Variable 
Costs 
90. For the last fiscal year, what are your total costs? 
What is % breakdown between fixed vs. variable 
costs? 
 
Asset Base 91. Regarding the asset base in your startup, currently 
what are fixed assets as a % of total assets? 
a. Less than 10% 
b. 10% to 30% 
c. 31% to 50% 
d. 51% to 70% 
e. Greater than 70% 
 
92. What % of total assets are working capital items 
such as inventory and accounts receivable? 
a. Less than 10% 
b. 10% to 30% 
c. 31% to 50% 
d. 51% to 70% 
e. Greater than 70% 
 
Funding Metrics Funding and 
Investment (VC and 
Other Sources) 
93. Have you raised any funding at all? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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94. If you answered Yes to the previous question, what is 
the current funding stage that your startup is at? 
a. Seed (includes Angel funding) 
b. Series A 
c. Series B 
d. Series C 
e. Series D 
 
95. What is the total amount of funding that the startup 
has raised so far (VC and other corporations)? 
a. Less than $500k 
b. $500k to $1 million 
c. $1 million to $2 million 
d. $3 million to $5 million 
e. $6 million to $10 million 
f. $11 million to $20 million 
g. Greater than $20 million 
 
96. If you have not raised funding from VCs and only 
the founders have invested in the startup, what is the 
total amount that has been invested in your startup? 
a. Less than $500k 
b. $500k to $1 million 
c. $1 million to $2 million 
d. $3 million to $5 million 
e. $6 million to $10 million 
f. $11 million to $20 million 
g. Greater than $20 million 
 
97. When did you raise your last funding round?  When 
do you expect to raise the next round of funding?   
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Valuation 
Metrics 
Valuation 98. What is your current implied post-money valuation? 
a. Less than $5 million 
b. $5 million to $15 million 
c. $16 million to $25 million 
d. $26 million to $35 million 
e. $36 million to $45 million 
f. $46 million to $55 million 
g. Greater than $55 million 
 
Resources / 
Capabilities 
Founder / Founding 
Team / 
Management Team 
Characteristics 
Year Founded Year Founded 
(Vintage) 
99. What year was the company founded?  
100. In what year did you, or one of the members of the 
founding team, started working full time on the 
startup? 
 
Year Launched 101. In what year did you officially launch your first 
product/service? 
 
Founding Team 
Size 
Founding team size 102. What is the size of the founding team? Please select 
one from the below: 
a. 1 
b. 2 
c. 3 
d. 4 
e. Greater than 4 
 
Years 
Relationship 
between 
Founders 
# of years of 
relationship between 
Founders 
103. How long (number of years) have you known each of 
the members of the founding team (average for all 
the members)? Please select one of the choices 
below: 
a. Less than 1 year 
b. 1 year 
c. 2 to 5 years 
d. 6 to 10 years 
e. Greater than 10 years 
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# of years of working 
relationship between 
Founders 
104. On average, how long (number of years) have you 
worked with the different members of the founding 
team (average for all members)? 
a. Less than 1 year 
b. 1 year 
c. 2 to 5 years 
d. 6 to 10 years 
e. Greater than 10 years 
 
Prior Industry 
Experience 
# of years of Financial 
Services industry 
experience 
105. How many years of prior experience have you or any 
member of the founding have had in the financial 
services industry – please provide a sum of the years 
for all of the members of the founding team 
a. Less than 5 years 
b. 5 to 10 years 
c. 11 to 15 years 
d. 16 to 20 years 
e. 21 to 25 years 
f. Greater than 25 years 
 
# of years of Financial 
inclusion/development 
sector experience 
106. How many years of prior experience have you or any 
member of the founding have had in the financial 
inclusion and/or working with the poor – please 
provide a sum of the years for all of the members of 
the founding team 
g. Less than 5 years 
h. 5 to 10 years 
i. 11 to 15 years 
j. 16 to 20 years 
k. 21 to 25 years 
l. Greater than 25 years 
 
Team 
Capabilities 
Technical Experience 107. Does one of the founding team members have 
technical experience (i.e., working in the technology 
industry either as a programmer and/or in-depth 
understanding of technology infrastructure, software 
architecture)? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY FACTORS POTENTIAL 
MEASURABLE 
VARIABLES 
INTERVIEW/SURVEY QUESTIONS ANSWER 
Prior Startup 
Experience 
Number of startups 
founded in the past 
108. How many members of the founding team have 
founded prior startups? 
 
109. As a founding team, how many prior startups have 
you founded together? 
 
Successful exits in 
prior startups 
110. If you have founded prior startups, have you had 
successful exits?  Yes or No. Success in this case is 
defined from the investors’ perspective:  you are able 
to sell your startup for a price that is higher than the 
amount that has been invested 
 
Financial Resources Investments from 
Prominent 
Organizations 
Investment from 
prominent VCs 
111. Can you please provide the names of the VC funds 
that have invested in your startup, and how much 
each has invested as well % equity ownership for 
each one? 
 
Investment from 
prominent development 
organizations in 
financial inclusion 
112. Have you received funding from other prominent 
sources that are involved in the non-profit and/or 
financial inclusion areas, such as Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation, IFC, Accion, Omidyar Networks, 
BRAC Bank, Skoll Foundation, Rockefeller 
Foundation, Schwab Foundation, MasterCard 
Foundation? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
Inclusive 
Innovation 
Inclusive 
Innovation 
First to introduce a new 
product or service 
113. How many other companies were providing the same 
product / service as you when you introduced your 
product / service in your target market? 
a. None 
b. 1 to 3 companies 
c. 4 to 6 companies 
d. Greater than 6 companies 
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CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY FACTORS POTENTIAL 
MEASURABLE 
VARIABLES 
INTERVIEW/SURVEY QUESTIONS ANSWER 
Uniqueness / Newness 114. When you introduced your product or service, was 
the product / service / technology considered unique 
or completely new when compared to other similar 
products / services in the country? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
115. Is the product/service and the associated business 
model a completely brand new idea, or a Copy-Paste 
idea? 
a. Copy-Paste 
b. Completely Brand New 
c. Hybrid – Copy-Paste, but highly modified 
to the local market 
 
Level of Inclusiveness 116. Does your product / service / technology / business 
model solve a problem specifically for the 
marginalized poor or underbanked in a cheap 
and very cost efficient manner when compared to 
current products / services that they currently 
use? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
117. Does your product / service / technology / business 
model offer a clear roadmap to creating economic 
opportunity and improves the economic livelihood of 
your customers (either consumers or SMEs)? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
 
 
